Suchergebnisse

Race, religion, and reds -- Making history : the passage of ESEA -- Putting down roots, 1965-1968 -- How much? budget battles, 1969-1977 -- Ending massive resistance : the federal government and southern school desegregation, 1964-1970 -- Education reform in the Nixon administration : the case of bilingual education -- Transforming special education : the genesis of the Education For All Handicapped Children Act -- Compensatory education through the courts : the politics of school finance -- Teacher power : Carter, NEA, and the creation of the Department of Education -- Education and the Reagan revolution

Editorial note: Gareth Davies, Professor of EU law, Vrije Universiteit (VU) Amsterdam

Climate change is often seen as an issue of intergenerational equity - consumption now creates costs for future generations. However, radical mitigation now would reverse the problem, creating immediate costs for current generations, while the benefits would be primarily for future ones. This is a policy problem, as persuading those living now to bear the cost of changes whose benefits will mostly accrue after their deaths is politically difficult. The policy challenge is then how to temporally match costs to benefits, either by deferring mitigation costs, or by speeding up climatic benefits. Geoengineering may provide some help here, as it might enable climate change to be slowed more immediately, at a lower upfront cost, and allow a greater share of the mitigation and adaptation burden to be passed on to those in the future who will benefit most.

When Member States restrict free movement on public health grounds they must show that their measures have a sound scientific basis. However, during the pandemic Member States have imposed a wide variety of restrictions, at the border, and internally. While Member State governments have invariably had local scientific advice, the variety of their measures suggests that their actions have also been driven, to some extent, by public opinion, contrary to what EU law generally allows. This situation could be seen as a defeat for EU law as traditionally conceived, and the triumph of local preferences over scientific standards. Perhaps we learn that in a crisis, local desires for symbolic security and closure trump both law and science. Alternatively, it can be argued that the Court of Justice's emphasis on exclusively objective justifications for measures is unrealistic and over-strict. The pandemic responses show that (i) science is often neither clear nor determinative, and (ii) policy is invariably a mix of science and values, even in apparently technical fields. In either case, the absence of legal challenges to Member State actions leaves free movement in an uncertain state. Have we entered a new phase, where national fears are a more legitimate justification for restricting movement, or will the pandemic be treated as so exceptional as to be beyond law, and thus not a precedent?

Free movement is intended to bring Europeans together. This article suggests it may have the opposite effect: it may drive them apart. The mechanism involved is sorting. This happens when people are free to choose where to live, and choose a community which matches their preferences. This match can come about in different ways, but the result of them all is that people of particular preferences are clustered together, leading to society being structured as a series of adjacent mono-cultures. It is not a large step to suggest that this arrangement is likely to cause alienation between the communities. The fact of sorting means that they have less in common than they did before. For Europe, if sorting happens, this would imply that polarization between states would increase and the governability of the EU would be threatened. Free movement may be less a mechanism of integration than one of disintegration.

It is often assumed that Court of Justice interpretations of EU law are definitive and binding. However, this conflicts with conventional ideas about the trias politica, as well as with the principle of conferral, and rests on no more than the Court's own assertion. It also has harmful policy consequences, forcing national courts into constitutional resistance and, in claiming to fix the meaning of the Treaties, smothering Union politics. Interpretative pluralism, by contrast, insists on the possibility of diverging interpretations. That allows for wider participation in the construction of EU law, while retaining the integrity of Union law through commitment to shared texts and a balance of power between institutions. Institutional disagreements are reframed, not as conflicts between legal orders, but as conflicts about the meaning of a shared one. This approach is more profoundly integrative than the Court's top‐down approach, and also allows for greater diversity and experiment.

The federal government is now the lead responder when a major natural disaster strikes and the president frequently visits the scene, performing the role of consoler in chief. Both of these developments are relatively recent: before the 1960s, disaster response was dominated by subnational governments and the Red Cross, while the federal role was discharged mostly by mid‐level bureaucrats. This article argues that the Johnson presidency was a decisive turning point in terms of the first development and that Johnson also broke new ground by making a regular habit of visiting disaster scenes. However, it attributes the latter pattern more to LBJ's unique political approach than to external pressure, arguing that the expectation that presidents will provide emotional support to disaster victims has developed more recently.