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This article explores whether union commitment dampens public sector job satisfaction. By examining the connection between union commitment and two workplace attributes that are presumed to be more prevalent in public sector workplaces—perceptions of higher red tape and greater public service motivation—this article develops three hypotheses exploring the direct and indirect relationships between union commitment and public sector job satisfaction. The findings from a series of structural equation models indicate that union commitment directly increases members' job satisfaction, but it more prominently increases members' job satisfaction indirectly by reducing perceived red tape and enhancing public service motivation.

This study examines whether public sector unionization encourages members to perceive more red tape in the work organization. Using the concepts of union socialization, commitment to union values, and stakeholder red tape, I develop and test a theoretical model that accounts for the direct and indirect effects of union socialization on member perceptions of red tape. The results from a series of structural equation models suggest that more socialized members perceive more red tape and are more likely to commit to union values. However, more committed union members perceive less red tape within the work organization. As such, the increase in perceived red tape because of union socialization is partially mitigated by member commitment to union values.  Although interaction between union members may alert employees to negative components of the work environment, commitment to union values encourages members to perceive organizational rules as necessary protections of employee rights.

Students of public management often argue that imposing market‐based logic on public sector organizations can undermine the altruistic motives of public employees. Focusing on the complex relationships between 'reinventing government' reforms, bureaucratic red tape, and public service motivation (PSM), we contend that the effects of reinvention reforms on PSM change as a function of the ability of reforms to cut bureaucratic red tape. A series of structural equation models reveal that the relationships between reinvention reforms, bureaucratic red tape, and PSM are much more complex than previously thought. Contrary to conjectures in the mainstream PSM literature, implementing market‐like reforms in public organizations positively influences PSM, if one views the reform as minimizing red tape.