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AbstractIn this paper, I analyze the experience of European monetary and financial integration to shed some light on the question of the desirability and feasibility of monetary unification in East Asia. The experience of Europe shows that trying to fix the exchange rates when capital is freely moving is unsustainable and leads to frequent speculative crises. This leads to only two options: Either a monetary union or floating exchange rates. Monetary union requires very intrusive political unification. Given the complete absence of political unification in Asia, the only possible conclusion is that Asia will have to live with increasing exchange rate volatility.

How should the European Union react to the decision of the UK to withdraw from the union? This is the question that has been at the centre of the political debate in Europe since Brexit became a reality. In this article, I will first discuss the nature of the reforms that are called for as a result of the Brexit vote. I will then turn to the issue of the negotiating strategy that the EU should adopt towards the UK.

The Eurozone's present state of crisis originated from decisions made at its creation. The decision to create a monetary union was motivated by political objectives and completely disregarded the economics of a monetary union. Political leaders did not understand the necessary economic conditions for a successful monetary union and did not recognize the inherent fragility of the monetary union they established. They showed the same disturbing lack of understanding of the economics of the sovereign debt crisis in 2010. They misdiagnosed the problem, and their response included disastrous decisions that intensified the crisis. This review explains these errors and concludes with recommendations for saving the euro.

The Eurozone's present state of crisis originated from decisions made at its creation. The decision to create a monetary union was motivated by political objectives and completely disregarded the economics of a monetary union. Political leaders did not understand the necessary economic conditions for a successful monetary union and did not recognize the inherent fragility of the monetary union they established. They showed the same disturbing lack of understanding of the economics of the sovereign debt crisis in 2010. They misdiagnosed the problem, and their response included disastrous decisions that intensified the crisis. This review explains these errors and concludes with recommendations for saving the euro. Adapted from the source document.

AbstractWhen entering a monetary union, member countries change the nature of their sovereign debt in a fundamental way; that is, they cease to have control over the currency in which their debt is issued. As a result, financial markets can force these countries' sovereigns into defaulting. This makes the monetary union fragile and vulnerable to changing market sentiments. It also makes it possible that self‐fulfilling multiple equilibria arise. I analyse the implications of this fragility for the governance of the Eurozone. I argue that the role of the European Central Bank as a lender of last resort is crucial in reducing the fragility of the Eurozone. In addition, steps towards a budgetary union are key in structurally strengthening the union.

The sovereign debt crisis has made it clear that central banking is more than keeping inflation low. Central banks are also responsible for financial stability. An essential tool in maintaining financial stability is provided by the capacity of the central bank to be the lender of last resort in the banking system. In this paper I argue that the ECB should also be the lender of last resort in the government bond markets of the monetary union, very much like the central banks in countries that issue debt in their own currencies are. This is necessary to prevent countries from being pushed into bad equilibria by self-fulfilling fears of liquidity crises in a monetary union. I also survey the different arguments that have been formulated by opponents of the view that the ECB should be the lender of last resort in the government bond markets.