Suchergebnisse

"New technologies of non-lethal weapons (NLW) are under military research and
development, mainly in the USA. Due to incomplete information, judgement under criteria
of the laws of warfare or of human rights is hampered. This study analyses four potential
NLW technologies which are based on physics to provide reliable information for such
assessment." (excerpt)

"Nanotechnology (NT) is about analysis and engineering of structures with size between 0.1 and 100 nanometres (1 nm = 10 -9 m). At this scale, new effects occur and the boundaries between physics, chemistry and biology vanish. NT is predicted to lead to stronger but lighter materials, markedly smaller computers with immensely increased power, large and small autonomous robots, tools for manipulation of single molecules, targeted intervention within cells, connections between electronics and neurones, and more. In recent years military research and development (R&D) of NT has been expanded markedly, with the USA far in the lead. US work spans the full range from electronics via materials to biology. While much of this is still at the fundamental level, efforts are being made to bring applications to the armed forces soon. One quarter to one third of the Federal funding for NT goes to military R&D, and the USA outspends the rest of the world by a factor 4 to 10. NT applications will likely pervade all areas of the military. Very small electronics and computers will be used everywhere, e.g. in glasses, uniforms, munitions. Large-scale battle-management and strategy-planning systems will apply human-like reasoning at increasing levels of autonomy, integrating sensors, communication devices and displays into an ubiquitous network. Stronger but light-weight materials, more efficient energy storage and propulsion will allow faster and more agile vehicles in all media. NT-based materials and explosives can bring faster and more precise projectiles. Small arms, munitions and anti-personnel missiles without any metal can become possible. Systems worn by soldiers could monitor the body status and react to injury. Systems implanted into the body could monitor the biochemistry and release drugs, or make contacts to nerves and the brain to reduce the reaction time, later possibly to communicate complex information. Autonomous land vehicles, ships and aircraft would become possible mainly through strongly increased computing power. By using NT to miniaturise sensors, actuators and propulsion, autonomous systems (robots) could also become very small, principally down to below a millimetre - fully artificial or hybrid on the basis of e.g. insects or rats. Satellites and their launchers could become small and cheap, to be used in swarms for earth surveillance, or for anti-satellite attack. Whereas no marked change is expected concerning nuclear weapons, NT may lead to various new types of chemical and biological weapons that target specific organs or act selectively on a certain genetic or protein pattern. On the other hand, NT will allow cheap sensors for chemical or biological warfare agents as well as materials for decontamination. Most of these applications are ten or more years away. Using criteria of preventive arms control, potential military NT applications are evaluated. New conventional, chemical and biological weapons would jeopardise existing arms-control treaties. Armed autonomous systems would endanger the law of warfare. Military stability could decrease with small distributed battlefield sensors and in particular with armed autonomous systems. Arms racing and proliferation have to be feared with all applications. Strong dangers to humans would ensue from armed mini-/ micro-robots and new chemical/ biological weapons used by terrorists. Negative effects on human integrity and human rights could follow indirectly if body manipulation were applied in the military before a thorough societal debate on benefits, risks and regulation." (excerpt)

"The Rwandan genocide of 1994 was a prime example for the negative impact of manipulation and propaganda discourses which incited a large section of the Hutu population to kill approximately 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu. The project asked if and how today, more than a decade after the genocide, the antagonistic relationships between the parties to the conflict have changed and whether sustainable peace is possible in the future. The overall object of analysis was thus the process of conflict transformation in Rwanda. Against this backdrop, it analysed the impact of various peacebuilding discourses, leading to two objectives: objective 1: Development of a framework for the analysis of conflict transformation; objective 2: Assessment of the impact of peacebuilding discourses on conflict transformation in Rwanda. (...)" (author's abstract)

"The main emphasis of this report is on the domestic scenery with respect to both comparing and explaining the individual missile defence policies of 16 democracies. These 16 case studies give answers to the following three research questions: 1. How the missile defence (MD) policy in each country has developed as a response to the proliferation problem in the context of the broader security and foreign policy; 2. how it is located in the overall domestic setting and 3. how the MD policy can be explained. What accounts for the variety of missile defence policies of the democracies? In a nutshell, it is neither their formal status as a democracy, nor their different quality as a democratic country within the spectrum of the stable, new, and deficient democracies in the cases of Turkey and even more so of Russia. The two traditional explanatory factors - the role of military alliances such as NATO and the geographical/ geopolitical position of the democracies examined - are secondary. In the final analysis it is the combination of the foreign policy orientations in connection with the particular domestic power constellations (in some cases strong economic and bureaucratic interests), the role of the US and the relevance of perceived threats that account for either a sceptical/critical or a supportive policy (threats defined mostly as missiles from non-democratic adversaries, but to a lesser extent as the US menacing the basic foreign policy orientations of other democracies). The research report finally lists several major problems ahead associated with missile defence systems. To mention two of them: In the case of basing radars or interceptors on Central European territory, Russia in particular would be affected. What if Moscow chooses to obstruct those kinds of missile defence plans, establishes stronger ties with Beijing, intensifies its arms trade in the rocket area with countries of concern, bypasses arms control agreements, continues to intensify its arms build-up and aims its nuclear tipped missiles at Polish strategic targets? In addition, ecological and social risks are probably associated with the interception of an atomic, biological or chemical warhead which falls on European territory. The report concludes with research perspectives. They focus on the conflict potential to be assessed in view of rising nations (economically and technologically) and in terms of their 'rising' rocket and space-faring capabilities. Here, Brazil, China, India, and Iran are the case in point. Finally, the research question is raised: What role is missile defence likely to play in the context of a ballistic missiles free zone? Would missile defence enhance or hamper such a zone?" (excerpt)

"In the framework of the OSCE's post-conflict rehabilitation activities, the police component is of increasing importance. The aim of the Centre for OSCE Research's (CORE) project 'The OSCE and the Creation of Multi-Ethnic Police Forces in the Balkans', on which the findings of this report are based, was to analyze the OSCE police missions in Kosovo, Southern Serbia (Presevo Valley) and Macedonia, to inquire whether and to what extent multi-ethnic police services can help to overcome the legacy of ethno-political conflicts, and to study the problems confronting the OSCE, UN and EU when they developed and implemented their training concepts. The three central research questions were: Firstly, to what extent could multi-ethnic police forces be established in the post-war societies of the Western Balkans? Secondly, to what degree have the populations gained confidence in them? And thirdly, which factors explain the success or failure in establishing multi-ethnic police services? The findings of the study are primarily based on interviews with and surveys of about 700 local police officers and their OSCE, UN and EU police instructors and monitors in Kosovo, Southern Serbia and Macedonia. The results of the study are mixed. One clear success consists in the fact that the international police missions were able in all three cases to recruit and train as many officers as planned. Furthermore, a general climate of professionalism and comradeship has developed within the multi-ethnic police units. Moreover, in all three cases the ethnic Albanian population has gained confidence in the new police forces. However, a number of negative aspects must also be mentioned. In contrast to the ethnic Albanian population, ethnic Serbs and Macedonians view the multi-ethnic units with much scepticism. In addition, there are considerable problems with integrating the multi-ethnic units into the regular Serbian and Macedonian police forces, in particular into the special police forces that fight organized crime and terrorism. The prime reason for this poor integration is the insufficient training of the new police officers. The low educational level of many ethnic Albanian police applicants poses a significant obstacle to their further education. The fact that unsuitable police applicants were nevertheless recruited is due to the political pressure by all ethnic communities. In addition, international actors in Kosovo had severe problems in gaining reliable information about the applicants, because relevant documents had vanished during the war. Other reasons for the often unprofessional performance of new police officers were rooted in the over-centralized command structures of the Serbian and Macedonian post-socialist police forces that also give way to political interference into the police service. A related problem is the very low salaries of police officers that provide fertile ground for corruption. Finally, effective police work was hampered in all three cases by the severe deficits within the judiciary. The conclusion is that states and international organizations should be prepared to provide a sufficient level of resources over a longer period to secure the sustainability of police re-form. In addition, they should exert more political pressure on the political actors of the host countries to combat the structural deficits in the police services and the judiciary. Moreover, additional efforts are needed to achieve better integration of minority officers in all branches of the police services, and to further promote the acceptance of the multi-ethnic police units within the ethnic Serbian and Macedonian communities." (author's abstract)

"This research paper analyzes the efforts of the past decade to turn the UN peace operations apparatus into a learning organization. It begins by examining a traditional organizational culture of peacekeeping, which is the subject of section 2 of this paper. The traditional culture emerged under the conditions of Cold War peacekeeping operations. It prized maximum political flexibility over professional management practices. After the shock of the UN's catastrophic failures in the face of genocide in Rwanda and Srebrenica, this traditional culture came to be challenged by a new generation of peace operations officials. This group of 'reformers' promoted objectives such as critical reflection and organizational learning while the 'traditionalists' sought to protect the organization from excessive bureaucratic standardization. Section 3 details the structural and political constraints to learning that the reform agenda had to deal with in the beginning. The peace operations bureaucracy is a fragile, extremely decentralized and highly politicized organization – and none of these traits have served to promote its capacity to institutionalize learning. Perhaps most importantly, the fact that all but a few civilian staff can only ever receive short-term contracts and have had, in 2009, less than two years of experience in peace operations underscores the adverse career incentives and limited cause to identify strongly with the organization that individuals have. Together with the cultural rift that had begun to emerge in the late 1990s, these structural and political constraints provided the backdrop for the reform efforts that began in 2000 with the so-called Brahimi report, driven by the new generation of managers who gradually came into influential headquarters jobs from the field. Their initial efforts are outlined in section 4, which draws on examples from several in-depth case studies on specific attempts at learning particular lessons in various subject areas of peace operations. After several years of focusing on the nuts and bolts of managing growth, the learning agenda took shape in 2005 as part of 'Peace Operations 2010,' Under-Secretary-General Jean-Marie Guéhenno's central professionalization initiative. Section 5 depicts the 'Peace Operations 2010' agenda that put learning at the center of reform efforts, again with illustrations from our in-depth case studies on the impact of those efforts (published in full detail elsewhere). Two of the key elements of Peace Operations 2010 were a top-down guidance development effort and a bottom-up knowledge sharing toolbox, the products of which could be used as a source of feedback to inform the formulation and improvement of guidance for as long as it would take to establish an effective evaluation capacity as well. Training and evaluation, however, did not receive the same level of attention and political/financial support from member states. As a result, even the lessons that were taken up by the organization, debated, refined and formally adopted often languished for lack of effective institutionalization in practice." (author's abstract)

In den vergangenen drei Jahrzehnten ist das akkumulierte Wissen über die Mechanismen und Funktionen biologischer Systeme durch wissenschaftliche und technologische Entwicklungen explosionsartig gewachsen. Der vorliegende Forschungsbericht untersucht die Wechselwirkung von naturwissenschaftlicher Forschung, insbesondere in der Biotechnologie und Molekularbiologie, und politischem Steuerungshandeln im Bereich der Rüstungskontrolle. Vor dem Hintergrund der gegenwärtigen Krise der Genfer Verhandlungen über ein Verifikationsprotokoll zum "Übereinkommen über das Verbot der Entwicklung, Herstellung und Lagerung bakteriologischer (biologischer) Waffen und Toxinwaffen" (BWÜ) ist es dringend erforderlich, den Handlungsbedarf für die Rüstungskontrollpolitik neu zu bestimmen. Die Verfasser untersuchten die Missbrauchsmöglichkeiten neuer Forschungserkenntnisse und Technologieentwicklungen für die Herstellung von Biowaffen auf der Grundlage einer naturwissenschaftlichen Analyse. In der Studie konnten besondere Risikobereiche identifiziert und sichtbar gemacht werden, die für die Rüstungskontrollpolitik und für Verifikationssysteme zu biologischen Waffen von grundlegender Bedeutung sind. Hierbei traten deutliche Hinweise auf einen Paradigmenwechsel bei den Proliferationsgefahren für biologische und chemische Waffen zutage: Lag die Hauptgefahr bisher im Einsatz modifizierter Mikroorganismen, um Infektionskrankheiten auszulösen, so steht nun die Möglichkeit im Vordergrund, biochemische Agenzien als Waffen zu benutzen, um gezielt die Funktionsweise und Interaktion biologischer Systeme im menschlichen Körper anzugreifen. Im Zentrum der Untersuchung standen zwei lebenswichtige, miteinander verbundene physiologische Systeme - das Nerven- und das Immunsystem, die eine doppelte Verletzbarkeit durch Manipulationen aufweisen und somit eine grundsätzliche Relevanz für die biochemische Rüstungskontrolle besitzen. Eine Analyse dieser Systeme im Kontext jüngster Entwicklungen in den Lebenswissenschaften (Life Sciences) verdeutlicht, dass ein Großteil des gestiegenen Wissens einen dual-use-Charakter hat und somit für nicht-friedliche Zwecke missbraucht werden kann, sofern die Verbotsnormen des BWÜ in dem kommenden Jahrzehnten nicht angepasst werden. (ICD2)

"While there is an increasing number of articles and studies identifying lessons from the record of UN peacebuilding operations, it is striking how little we know about the UN's very capacity for organizational learning on peacebuilding, and about learning in international organizations in general. This pilot study seeks to lay the foundations for an in-depth investigation of the UN's record on organizational learning. Our study is motivated by both, a research and a policy imperative. On the research front, studying organizational learning within the UN peacebuilding bureaucracy contributes to opening up the 'black box' of international organizations. So far, mainstream work in the discipline of International Relations (IR) has produced surprisingly few studies on the everyday workings of international organizations, let alone their ability to learn. Studying organizational learning calls for an interdisciplinary approach bringing together IR (including peace and conflict studies), public management and the sociology of organizations. This has the potential of advancing conceptual debates within the discipline of IR. The study proceeds in three steps. The first step surveys the relevant literature from different disciplines and concludes that peace research, IR and organization theory do not offer ready-made frameworks for the analysis of organizational learning in international organizations. Building on existing research, we identify key elements of a new framework starting with a definition of the key term, organizational learning: We define organizational learning "as a process of cognitive change through the questioning of the means and/or ends of addressing problems. The process manifests itself in the development and implementation of new rules and routines guiding the organization's actions." In a second step, we survey the evolution of the "infrastructure of learning" in the UN peacebuilding bureaucracy over the past 15 years. We hold that a number of factors (lack of will both within member states and the UN Secretariat as well as the lack of resources and appropriate incentive structures) contributed to the very slow recognition of the UN's learning needs. Major crises (such as the soul-searching after Rwanda and Srebrenica) plus the Brahimi Report in 2000 provided a certain momentum that brought the need to build up the UN's learning capacity higher on the agenda. Still, a lot of work remains to be done. In a third step, we present a list of variables that influence learning that need to be considered in a future in-depth study. This list of factors includes power, organizational culture, leadership, human capital, staff mobility, knowledge management systems, as well as access to external knowledge. Outlining an agenda for future research, we present a draft model of the learning process that includes 1) knowledge acquisition, 2) advocacy/ decision- making, and 3) institutionalization." (excerpt)