Suchergebnisse

Summary
One of the Lisbon Treaty's most significant innovations was the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS), which changed the EU's functioning not only in Brussels, but also around the world. Zooming in on the multilateral context of the UN in New York, this article examines the new EU delegations and highlights the main challenges that are inherent in their establishment. These delegations could be engrafted upon a wide network of European Commission delegations, yet the literature gives little indication of success in integrating the functions and actors. Adding to the literature and building upon interviews with policy officials in both Brussels and New York, this article indicates an additional external challenge in implementing Lisbon's provisions, with the context of the UN General Assembly raising more fundamental questions on status and membership — questions that have also shaped the role of the EU delegation to the UN during its first year of operation.

This article explains why the potential impact of domestic problems on the Belgian Presidency should not have been exaggerated in the first place, pointing towards the importance of timing, experience, preparation and consensus. Also, it argues that the role of the federal government in the management of the EU Presidency diminished in 2001 when regional authorities became fully involved. The Lisbon Treaty eroded its role even further, introducing new foreign policy actors and formalizing the trio Presidency format. This contribution not only discusses the context that defined Belgium's priorities and achievements in 2010 and the Belgian performance, it also presents some initial indications of the EU's functioning in the post-Lisbon era, in particular of the role of the rotating Presidency. Adapted from the source document.

AbstractWhat explains the reversal of transnational private rule‐making authority? Embedding constructivist insights within a rational principal–agent model, this article advances a five‐step sequential process that nuances the traditional explanation of delegitimation. It argues that entrepreneurs must first successfully promote the belief that the high costs of ineffective private policies follow from the private rule‐setter's flawed institutional attributes. Subsequently, a de‐delegation solution that minimizes transaction and uncertainty costs must be proposed. The examination of two cases in the field of international sport governance, namely the deliberate reversal of private authority in anti‐doping governance and the lack thereof in anti‐match‐fixing governance, lends support to these propositions. It sheds new light on the creation of the World Anti‐Doping Agency (WADA) and explains why there will probably be no counterpart to fight match‐fixing.