Prácticas de las asignaturas de economía y organización industrial
In: Materials didàctics 153
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In: Materials didàctics 153
In: The B.E. journal of economic analysis & policy, Band 16, Heft 2, S. 1203-1212
ISSN: 1935-1682
Abstract
This note considers a general symmetric quantity-setting oligopoly where the "coefficient of cooperation" defined by Cyert and DeGroot (1973, "An Analysis of Cooperation and Learning in a Duopoly Context". The American Economic Review 63:24–37) is interpreted as the parameter indicating severity of competition. It is obtained that horizontal mergers are more likely to be profitable in a more competitive market structure. Consequently, the results by Salant et al. (1983, "The Effects of an Exogenous Change in Industry Structure on Cournot-Nash Equilibrium". The Quarterly Journal of Economics 98 (2):185–99) about merger profitability are sensitive to the assumption of pre-merger Cournot competition.
In: The B.E. journal of theoretical economics, Band 15, Heft 2
ISSN: 1935-1704
AbstractThis note shows that in a general symmetric quantity-setting oligopoly, the conjectural variations solution replicates that of a model where the "coefficient of cooperation" defined by
In: Journal of economics, Band 96, Heft 2, S. 137-147
ISSN: 1617-7134
This paper considers a theoretical model of n asymmetric firms that reduce their initial unit costs by spending on R&D activities. In accordance with Schumpeterian hypotheses we obtain that more efficient (bigger) firms spend more in R&D and this leads to a more concentrated market structure. We also find a positive relationship between innovation and market concentration. This calls for a corrective tax on R&D activities to curtail strategic incentives to over-invest in R&D trying to achieve a higher market share.
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Working paper
In: The Manchester School, Band 90, Heft 1, S. 77-91
ISSN: 1467-9957
AbstractThis paper considers a vertically related industry where an upstream supplier simultaneously and independently negotiates linear tariffs with two asymmetrically capacity constrained downstream retailers endowed with (possibly) asymmetric bargaining powers over the purchase of an input. We introduce price leadership as the type of downstream competition. An increase in the upstream supplier's bargaining power toward the large firm induces a positive externality on the small firm's tariff. We also obtain that, a priori the small firm may end up (i) demanding a larger stock of the input and (ii) paying less for it. Our model also proves useful to show that the well‐known countervailing buyer power hypothesis could not hold because an integrated downstream firm might negotiate a better input price without any pass‐through to the final consumers. We mainly relate our analysis to the UK grocery market and to the recent empirical evidence regarding its functioning.
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Working paper
In: The B.E. journal of economic analysis & policy, Band 19, Heft 4
ISSN: 1935-1682
Abstract
We discuss horizontal mergers in a linear, homogeneous, symmetric Cournot market where the new entity repeatedly competes with outside firms over an indefinite horizon and efficiency gains are ruled out. If the degree of collusion among the outside firms is large enough, then, despite the large payoff of each outsider, we obtain output configurations solving both the profitability and the free riding issues. Such a result requires that mergers involve a sufficiently small number of firms, which is in sharp contrast with the findings in the literature and rationalize the empirical fact that relatively small mergers, even in absence of synergies, do actually occur and that, although outside firms may benefit from the merger of their rivals, insiders end up being better off. Finally, we show that merging can often be a more advantageous alternative than a fully collusive agreement, in which, moreover, the free riding component is not solved.
In: Bulletin of economic research, Band 66, Heft S1
ISSN: 1467-8586
ABSTRACTWe discuss the effects of the existence of non‐colluding (fringe) firms on cartel sustainability. We obtain, using trigger strategies, that with product differentiation collusion is always more easily sustained when firms compete in prices than when firms compete in quantities. This is true basically because (i) price competition is more intense than quantity competition, and (ii) fringe firms exacerbate the fact that cartel firms have more incentives to deviate from the agreement under quantity competition. This result reverses previous findings where, in the absence of fringe firms, product differentiation plays a crucial role in determining the effectiveness of price or quantity competition in sustaining collusion.
In: Journal of economics, Band 126, Heft 3, S. 259-274
ISSN: 1617-7134
In: Estudios de Economía. Vol. 45 - Nº 1, Págs. 29-50 (2018)
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In: Mathematical social sciences, Band 128, S. 60-67
In: CEIS Working Paper No. 550
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In: Journal of economics, Band 114, Heft 2, S. 177-204
ISSN: 1617-7134