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"Martha Finnemore uses one type of force, military intervention, as a window onto the shifting character of international society. She examines the changes, over the past four hundred years, in why countries intervene militarily as well as in how they have intervened." "Finnemore looks at three types of intervention: collecting debts, addressing humanitarian crises, and acting against states perceived as threats to international peace. In all three, she finds that intervention that is now considered obvious was vigorously contested or even rejected by people in earlier periods for well-articulated and logical reasons. As broad historical perspective allows her to explicate long-term trends: the steady erosion of force's normative value in international politics, the growing influence of equality norms in many aspects of global political life, and the increasing importance of law in intervention practices."--Jacket

How do states know what they want? Asking how interests are defined and how changes in them are accommodated, Martha Finnemore shows the fruitfulness of a constructivist approach to international politics. She draws on insights from sociological institutionalism to develop a systemic approach to state interests and state behavior by investigating an international structure not of power of meaning and social value. An understanding of what states want, she argues, requires insight into the international social structure of which they are a part

Despite preponderant power, unipoles often do not get their way. Why? Scholars interested in polarity and the systemic structures determined by the distribution of power have largely focused on material power alone, but the structure of world politics is as much social as it is material. In this article the author explores three social mechanisms that limit unipolar power and shape its possible uses. The first involves legitimation. To exercise power effectively, unipoles must legitimate it and in the act of legitimating their power, it must be diffused since legitimation lies in the hands of others. The second involves institutionalization. A common way to legitimate power is to institutionalize it. Institutionalizing power in rational-legal authorities fundamentally transforms it, however. Once in place, institutions, laws, and rules have powers and internal logics of their own that unipoles find difficult to control. The third relates to hypocrisy. The social structures of legitimation and institutionalization do more than simply diffuse power away from the unipole; they create incentives for hypocrisy. Hypocrisy is a double-edged sword for unipoles. On the one hand, unrestrained hypocrisy by unipoles undermines the legitimacy of their power. On the other hand, judicious hypocrisy can provide crucial strategies for melding ideals and interests. Indeed, honoring social ideals or principles in the breach can have long-lasting political effects, as decades of U.S. hypocrisy about democratization and human rights suggest. Adapted from the source document.

Despite preponderant power, unipoles often do not get their way. Why? Scholars interested in polarity and the systemic structures determined by the distribution of power have largely focused on material power alone, but the structure of world politics is as much social as it is material. In this article the author explores three social mechanisms that limit unipolar power and shape its possible uses. The first involves legitimation. To exercise power effectively, unipoles must legitimate it and in the act of legitimating their power, it must be diffused since legitimation lies in the hands of others. The second involves institutionalization. A common way to legitimate power is to institutionalize it. Institutionalizing power in rational-legal authorities fundamentally transforms it, however. Once in place, institutions, laws, and rules have powers and internal logics of their own that unipoles find difficult to control. The third relates to hypocrisy. The social structures of legitimation and insti tutionalization do more than simply diffuse power away from the unipole; they create incentives for hypocrisy. Hypocrisy is a double-edged sword for unipoles. On the one hand, unrestrained hypocrisy by unipoles undermines the legitimacy of their power. On the other hand, judicious hypocrisy can provide crucial strategies for melding ideals and interests. Indeed, honoring social ideals or principles in the breach can have long-lasting political effects, as decades of U.S. hypocrisy about democratization and human rights suggest.

The American-led Iraq war that began in 2003 has generated intense discussion about when it is legitimate to use force and what force can accomplish. Often this debate is portrayed as a breakdown in consensus, with the US charting a new unilateralist course that undermines existing multilateral understandings of how force should be used. Often, too, the debate is portrayed as a transatlantic one in which Europeans (notably France, supported by Germany) are leading the multilateralist defence against growing US unilateralism.

Although international relations scholars have acknowledged the widening gap between the US & European with regards to their competing perspectives about the use of military force, it is demonstrated that similar disparities have emerged between European nations, within American society, & across the international community. After reviewing contemporary definitions of multilateralism & identifying the concepts central characteristics, common misconceptions about the notion are highlighted, eg, the emergence of multilateralism will successfully eliminate disagreement between international partners. Two prevalent divergences within the multilateral framework about deployments of military force are identified: accommodating states that possess substantially less military power & determining the efficacy & legitimacy of military interventions. Additional attention is dedicated to scrutinizing the various mechanisms designed to evaluate the legitimacy of the multilateral framework governing the use of force. J. W. Parker

"Academics and policy makers frequently discuss global governance but they treat governance as a structure or process, rarely considering who actually does the governing. This volume focuses on the agents of global governance: 'global governors'. The global policy arena is filled with a wide variety of actors such as international organizations, corporations, professional associations and advocacy groups, all seeking to 'govern' activity surrounding their issues of concern. Who Governs the Globe? lays out a theoretical framework for understanding and investigating governors in world politics. It then applies this framework to various governors and policy arenas, including arms control, human rights, economic development, and global education. Edited by three of the world's leading international relations scholars, this is an important contribution that will be useful for courses, as well as for researchers in international studies and international organisations"--

Ikenberry, G. John ; Mastanduno, Michael ; Wohlforth, William C.: Introduction: unipolarity, state behavior, and systemic consequences. - S. 1-27 Wohlforth, William C.: Unipolarity, status competition, and great power war. - S. 28-57 Finnemore, Martha: Legitimacy, hypocrisy, and the social structure of unipolarity: why being a unipole isn't all it's cracked up to be. - S. 58-85 Walt, Stephen Martin: Alliances in a unipolar world. - S. 86-120 Mastanduno, Michael: System marker and privilege taker: U.S. power and the international political economy. - S. 121-154 Snyder, Jack ; Shapiro, Robert Y. ; Bloch-Elkon, Yaeli: Free hand abroad, divide and rule at home. - S. 155-187 Jervis, Robert: Unipolarity: a structural perspective. - S. 188-213