Suchergebnisse

Over the last decade the regulatory evaluation of environmental and public health risks has been one of the most legally controversial areas of contemporary government activity. Much of that debate has been understood as a conflict between those promoting ''scientific'' approaches to risk evaluation and those promoting ''democratic'' approaches. This characterization of disputes has ignored the central roles of public administration and law in technological risk evaluation. This is problematic because, as shown in this book, legal disputes over risk evaluation are disputes over administrative

This article's investigation into the "agency for legitimacy" proceeds in five steps: Part I introduces the concept of "administrative constitutionalism," which encompasses the debate over what should be the role and nature of public administration to ensure its legitimacy. It then lays out the elements of the rational-instrumental and deliberative-constitutive paradigms and explains how they contribute to administrative constitutionalism respectively from the outside-in and inside-out. Part II provides a brief history of administrative constitutionalism, which reveals there have been ongoing tensions between two paradigms—and thus between outside in and inside out accountability—since the 1880s. Part III elaborates on the authors' argument that the current emphasis on the rational-instrumental model has been administrative constitutionalism unsustainable. Part IV argues that acknowledging and developing the deliberative-constitutive paradigm will strengthen administrative constitutionalism by admitting the existence of agency discretion and by looking for realistic ways to make it accountable. Finally, Part V offers a case study in how the deliberative-constitutive paradigm can contribute to administrative constitutionalism. ; The Kay Bailey Hutchison Center for Energy, Law, and Business