Suchergebnisse

Public involvement in constitution making is increasingly considered to be essential for the legitimacy and effectiveness of the process. It is also becoming more widespread, spurred on by constitutional advisors and the international community. Yet we have remarkably little empirical evidence of the impact of participation on outcomes. This essay examines hypotheses on the effect of one aspect of public participation in the constitution-making process—ratification— and surveys available evidence. We find some limited support for the optimistic view about the impact of ratification on legitimacy, conflict, and constitutional endurance. ; Government

Drafters of new constitutions face a bewildering array of choices as they seek to design stable and workable political institutions for their societies. One such set of choices concerns the status of interna- tional law in the domestic legal order. In a global era, with an ex- panding array of customary and treaty norms purporting to regulate formerly domestic behavior, this question takes on political salience. This paper seeks to describe the phenomenon of constitutional incor- poration of international law in greater detail and provide a prelimi- nary empirical test of the competing explanations for it. First, the dis- cussion focuses on the concepts of monism and dualism, which have become conventional terms used by lawyers to describe the interac- tion of domestic and international legal systems. Second, a theory of commitments as well as the advantages and disadvantages of interna- tional law are set forth. Third, empirical implications are developed for the precommitment and diffusion theories, which are then tested. Findings show that adopting international law is a useful strategy for democracies to lock in particular policies, encourage trust in govern- ments and state regimes, and bolster global reputations. ; Government

Many constitutions include provisions intended to limit the discretion of governments in economic policy. In times of financial crises, such provisions often come under pressure as a result of calls for exceptional responses to crisis situations. This volume assesses the ability of constitutional orders all over the world to cope with financial crises, and the demands for emergency powers that typically accompany them. Bringing together a variety of perspectives from legal scholars, economists, and political scientists, this volume traces the long-run implications of financial crises for constitutional order. In exploring the theoretical and practical problems raised by the constitutionalization of economic policy during times of severe crisis, this volume showcases an array of constitutional design options and the ways they channel governmental responses to emergency