part PART I COUNTRY STUDIES -- chapter Japan -- chapter South Korea -- chapter North Korea -- chapter Mongolia -- chapter People's Republic of China -- chapter Taiwan -- chapter Hong Kong -- chapter Vietnam -- chapter Cambodia -- chapter Thailand -- chapter Philippines -- chapter Indonesia -- chapter Brunei -- chapter East Timor -- chapter Malaysia -- chapter Singapore -- part PART II COMPARATIVE STUDIES -- chapter 17 The Emergence of East Asian Constitutionalism: Features in Comparison -- chapter 18 The Making and Remaking of Constitutions in Southeast Asia: An Overview.
Magna Carta's status as a touchstone of modern thinking about the rule of law rests on several well-known myths. This article evaluates the influence of Magna Carta on modern constitutions, both in termsof formation as well as content. The analysis confirms that Magna Carta's relevance is, if anything, onthe rise, even if the causal chains linking it to current developments are weak-linked and distant. Wespeculate on the mysterious processes that produce influence among legal texts, arguing that championsand empire are crucial factors in the case of Magna Carta. ; Government
Judges are society's elders and experts, our masters and mediators. We depend on them to dispense justice with integrity, deliberation, and efficiency. Yet judges, as Alexander Hamilton famously noted, lack the power of the purse or the sword. They must rely almost entirely on their reputations to secure compliance with their decisions, obtain resources, and maintain their political influence. InJudicial Reputation, Nuno Garoupa and Tom Ginsburg explain how reputation is not only an essential quality of the judiciary as a whole, but also of individual judges. Perceptions of judicial systems around the world range from widespread admiration to utter contempt, and as judges participate within these institutions some earn respect, while others are scorned. Judicial Reputation explores how judges respond to the reputational incentives provided by the different audiences they interact with--lawyers, politicians, the media, and the public itself--and how institutional structures mediate these interactions. The judicial structure is best understood not through the lens of legal culture or tradition, but through the economics of information and reputation. Transcending those conventional lenses, Garoupa and Ginsburg employ their long-standing research on the latter to examine the fascinating effects that governmental interactions, multicourt systems, extrajudicial work, and the international rule-of-law movement have had on the reputations of judges in this era.--
Drafters of new constitutions face a bewildering array of choices as they seek to design stable and workable political institutions for their societies. One such set of choices concerns the status of international law in the domestic legal order. In a global era, with an expanding array of customary and treaty norms purporting to regulate formerly domestic behavior, this question takes on political salience. This paper seeks to describe the phenomenon of constitutional incorporation of international law in greater detail and provide a preliminary empirical test of the competing explanations for it. First, the discussion focuses on the concepts of monism and dualism, which have become conventional terms used by lawyers to describe the interaction of domestic and international legal systems. Second, a theory of commitments as well as the advantages and disadvantages of international law are set forth. Third, empirical implications are developed for the precommitment and diffusion theories, which are then tested. Findings show that adopting international law is a useful strategy for democracies to lock in particular policies, encourage trust in governments and state regimes, and bolster global reputations.
Drafters of new constitutions face a bewildering array of choices as they seek to design stable and workable political institutions for their societies. One such set of choices concerns the status of international law in the domestic legal order. In a global era, with an expanding array of customary and treaty norms purporting to regulate formerly domestic behavior, this question takes on political salience. This paper seeks to describe the phenomenon of constitutional incorporation of international law in greater detail and provide a preliminary empirical test of the competing explanations for it. First, the discussion focuses on the concepts of monism and dualism, which have become conventional terms used by lawyers to describe the interaction of domestic and international legal systems. Second, a theory of commitments as well as the advantages and disadvantages of international law are set forth. Third, empirical implications are developed for the precommitment and diffusion theories, which are then tested. Findings show that adopting international law is a useful strategy for democracies to lock in particular policies, encourage trust in governments and state regimes, and bolster global reputations.
In: Political science quarterly: a nonpartisan journal devoted to the study and analysis of government, politics and international affairs ; PSQ, Band 129, Heft 4, S. 749-751
In 1960, there were 101 middle-income countries. By 2008, only thirteen of these had become high-income countries. Why do so many middle-income countries fail to develop after a promising start, becoming mired in the so-called middle-income trap? This interdisciplinary volume addresses the special challenges that middle-income countries confront from both a theoretical and a practical perspective. It is the first volume that addresses law and development issues in middle-income countries from the perspective of political, administrative and legal institutions and policies. The goal is to provide international development agencies and domestic policy makers with feasible recommendations to address the wide range of technically, politically and socially complex issues that middle-income countries face