Suchergebnisse

In the debate over relief for Africa and the Third World, the situation of dictatorial, corrupt, and mismanaged régimes is often subsumed with the rest. It is rather uncritically accepted that indebtedness chiefly results from the impact of international factors, such as falling commodity prices, International Monetary Fund conditionalities, and rising metropolitan interest rates. The independent national state, whatever its policies and form, is seen as simply the passive victim of such forces, and little or no differentiation is made between the régime and the groups and classes of the domestic society.

The nine member-states of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (S.A.D.C.C.) – Zimbabwe, Zambia, Angola, Mozambique, Botswana, Tanzania, Malawi, Lesotho, Swaziland – are notable for their collective weakness relative to South Africa, and their very wide economic and political heterogeneity.1Only four, or at most five, have economies whose annual G.D.P. exceeds $2,000 million: two of these, Angola and Mozambique, are under more or less constant attack from South Africa or its surrogate forces, while Tanzania is actually the most remote, physically and economically. At the same time, Malawi, Swaziland, and Lesotho – who are not in the so-called 'Frontline', unlike the other six – have rather close political relations with Pretoria, Malawi most substantively since as early as 1966 and Swaziland since 1982.2Botswana is more independent politically, with a modest G.D.P. and very small population.

Kaundas Fehlleistungen sind vor allem Folge seiner akuten finanziellen Auslandsabhängigkeit, seiner innenpolitischen Intoleranz, seinem katastrophalen wirtschaftlichen Mismanagement und der völlig fehlenden regionalen Kooperation. Sambia hätte die Kapazität gehabt, zur Lockerung der ökonomischen Abhängigkeit der Region von Südafrika beizutragen. Es ist jedoch zweifelhaft, ob Präsident Kaunda jemals praktische Maßnahmen in dieser Richtung ergreifen wird. (DÜI-Hlb)

After years of agricultural production significantly below domestic consumption needs for key commodities, in 1985 Zambia looked forward to a good harvest of maize, the nation's staple. The Minister of Co-operatives, Justin Mukando, said in February that more than eight million bags were anticipated, and the Prime Minister, Kebby S. K. Musokotwane, declared in May that 'we expect about ten million bags of maize'.1 In the Zambian system of presidentialism and state capitalism, the purchasing, transportation, and storage of crops, as with many other agricultural functions, was in the hands of the state. This was so in terms of the close involvement of political figures at the highest level, and through the continued reliance upon the National Agricultural Marketing Board (Namboard) and the quasi-parastatal provincial co-operative marketing unions. President Kenneth Kaunda committed himself and his Government to success in the forthcoming harvest when he told Parliament in January: 'I am not prepared to see a recurrence of what happened last year when thousands of bags of maize remained uncollected in various depots'; the state would ensure that the agencies involved in the collection of produce improved their performance.

After years of agricultural production significantly below domestic consumption needs for key commodities, Zambia in 1985 anticipated a good harvest of maize, the nation's staple. In the country's presidential & state capitalist system, the purchasing, transportation, & storage of crops are in the hands of the state, as are many other agricultural functions. There is involvement of political figures at the highest level, & reliance on established, though inefficient, Ru parastatal organizations, the National Agricultural Marketing Board, & provincial cooperative marketing unions. While climatic factors favored the 1985 harvest, the state's management was, if anything, worse than usual. The failures pointed once again to broad & serious structural weaknesses in the state apparatus & the domestic political economy. Modified AA

Neben schlechten Ernteergebnissen hatte Sambia in den letzten Jahren erhebliche Probleme mit der Maisvermarktung, die voll in staatlicher Hand liegt. Erhebliche Maismengen wurden an den Sammelstellen nicht abgeholt und verdarben. Im Zusammenhang mit der guten Ernte von 1985 wurde versucht, das Vermarktungssystem zu verbessern: Analyse der bisherigen Probleme und Schwächen der Vermarktungseinrichtungen; Leistungsfähigkeit bei der effektiven Einbringung und Verteilung der Ernte; Erscheinungsformen des staatlichen Mismanagements. Zunehmende Bedeutung der Maiserzeugung auf Großfarmen im Unterschied zu den verbalen Absichtserklärungen der Regierung, die kleinbäuerliche Landwirtschaft stärker fördern zu wollen. (DÜI-Hlb)

Die anhaltende Ausbeutung der Kleinbauernschaft durch den Staat, der dadurch seine politische Klientel (Minenarbeiter, Städter, Bürokratie) zufriedenstellte, hat zu einer Stagnation der ländlichen Entwicklung geführt, die nur durch materielle Anreize für die Kleinbauern wieder aufzuheben ist. (DÜI-Spe)