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As nuclear weapons become ever more sophisticated, so the deterrence debate becomes increasingly complex. The Ban the Bomb' slogans of the 1950s had been replaced by cries for nuclear-free zones', and talk of megatonnage' and fallout' had given way to talk of tactical' nuclear weapons and limited strike capability'. Originally published in 1982, this book considers the ethical issues raised by nuclear policies and by the debate between proponents of the multilateralist/unilateralist approaches to disarmament and arms control at the time. It is not, like so many books on the subject, an ideological statement: there are essays by defence strategists which put the case for deterrence and essays by academics and churchmen which strenuously oppose it. The book also includes an essay on attempts to mitigate the appalling brutality of the many conventional' wars since 1945. At a time when the rhetoric and misinformation produced on both sides of the debate continued to obscure many vital issues, this book was welcome, sensible and necessary.

'EXTERNAL SOVEREIGNTY' IS THE CONCERN OF THIS PAPER, AND THE extent to which it has been eroded, in substance if not in form, by the pressures of the modern world. The formal distinction between external sovereignty and internal sovereignty needs to be emphasized at the outset. Externally, sovereignty connotes equality of status between the states – the distinct and separate entities – which make up our international society. Internally, it connotes the exercise of supreme authority by those states within their individual territorial boundaries. From Bodin who, in De La République (1577), saw souveraineté as the exclusive right 'to give lawes unto all and everie one of its . . . subjects and to receive none from them' to the Permanent Court of International Justice which, in the Wimbledon Case (1922), held that the sovereign state 'is subject to no other state and has full and exclusive powers within its jurisdiction without prejudice to the limits set by applicable law', the concept of the sovereign state has implied both supremacy within and equality of status without.

The British Commonwealth of Nations and the United Nations have today at least one thing in common, namely, that each faces a crisis so serious as to threaten its very survival. Nor are the reasons for the crises so very different. In part they stem from the nature of the two institutions. Both are associations of sovereign states, each one of which views the Commonwealth or United Nations relationship as only one strand–and only rarely the most important strand–in a complex and variegated web of relationships.

Charting the course of attitudes in Britain toward the United Nations is mainly a matter of defining small gradations within a fairly limited range, a range varying from sympathetic concern—and ritualistic commendation—at one end of the spectrum to barely dis uised indifference at the other. Among a small section of radical public opinion the Organization can still (August 1961) arouse fervent support, while the right-wing Beaverbrook press and its sympathizers lose few opportunities of pointing out its deficiencies. Nevertheless, during most of its fifteen years' existence, so far as public interest in Britain in its political activities is concerned, the limited impact the United Nations has had on most of the major issues of peace and war has discouraged "popular opinion" from waxing very enthusiastic-or bitter-about it; indeed, although a generally accepted part of international life, it has for long periods languished relatively unnoticed in a diplomatic backwater. Only at such moments of crisis as Korea, Suez, or the Congo, when the Organization has been forced into the mainstream of international politics has this rather tepid reaction been punctuated by heightened tension—and acrimony.