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Abstract.  Ludwig von Mises is often regarded as a "champion" of laissez faire. This characterization seems to contradict Mises's clear statement that economics is value free. The aim of this paper is to resolve this apparent contradiction. We accomplish this by distinguishing, as Mises did, between the advocacy of specific laissez‐faire policies and the advocacy of a laissez‐faire ideology vis‐à‐vis the alternative ideologies of socialism and interventionism. Mises argued that the logic of a value‐free economics could be used to show that socialist and interventionist policies would not achieve a goal that the socialists and interventionists implicitly or explicitly aim to achieve, that of progress in terms of material wealth for the members of society. Thus, Mises resolved the contradiction by shifting the debate from the welfare analysis of particular policies to a logical analysis of the ends of a particular ideology and the means available to achieve those ends.In a seminal paper in neo‐Austrian economics, Murray Rothbard criticized Mises. We analyze Rothbard's argument partly as a means of elucidating Mises's views and argue that Rothbard misinterpreted Mises and quoted him out of context. Rothbard failed to adequately support his claim that Mises held the beliefs that Rothbard attributed to him. Moreover, Rothbard's paper undermined the value freedom that Mises regarded as a crucial characteristic of economics.

Abstract.  Walter Block's critique of my paper fails to address the main argument: that Ludwig von Mises's support for laissez faire comes from a comparison of the systems recommended by the ideologies of socialism, interventionism, and liberalism. Mises compares these systems according to the criterion of their capacity to achieve the goal of satisfying material wants. This goal is either explicit or implicit in the arguments made by those who subscribe to the above ideologies. He uses value‐free economic reasoning to determine whether the systems recommended by the three ideologies will achieve the goal. In this reply, I reaffirm the argument in the face of Block's critique. In addition, I address two other arguments. The first is the implicit argument in Murray Rothbard and in Block that Mises erred because he failed to take account of all the goals that policy advocates might have in recommending a policy. I argue that he did not err. The second is that Mises is a utilitarian, an argument also advanced by Leland Yeager. I argue not only that Mises was not but also that he repudiated the idea that his support for laissez faire was based on utilitarian welfare principles. The reply also answers some of Block's more specific criticisms of my paper.

The loan fund theory of capital was developed by the unheralded American economist, Herbert J. Davenport (1861-1931). Davenport's name has virtually disappeared from writings on the history of economic thought. Today, he seems best known as a teacher of Frank Knight at Cornell around 1915. Davenport wrote three major books during an 18-year period between 1896 and 1914. The first (1896) was a treatise based on what he called the "principle of sacrifice," or subjective opportunity cost. His second book, Value and Distribution (1908), covered much of the same ground but also presented some original contributions. It marked his emergence as a professional economist, since he presented his ideas within the context of an appraisal of classical and neoclassical economic doctrine. Among other things, the book contained a penetrating, subjectivist critique of four ideas in the history of subjectivist economics: marginal utility, Eugen von Bohm-Bawerk's theory of capital, Friedrich Wieser's theory of cost, and Frank Fetter's theory of market interest. It also introduced the loan fund theory of capital, which is the topic of this paper.

Abstract. Despite a recent claim to the contrary, Herbert J. Davenport was firmly against the Henry George proposal to try to raise all public funds from a tax on land. This is evidenced by two papers he wrote on the subject. Davenport argued that the single tax on land would prompt the inefficient use of substitutes for land, that it would tend to destroy the base upon which the tax was levied, and that it would offend our sense of justice, or the equal treatment principle. The most important and effective of his arguments appears to be the first. It was, more specifically, that in the event of a land tax, individuals would economize on land. They would farm more intensively, they would construct higher buildings, and they would exploit potential underground living space. This paper describes Davenport's arguments and shows why they have been misinterpreted in the past as supporting Henry George's tax theory.

Frank Knight was a "grand theorist." Like other grand theorists from Adam Smith to Friedrich A. Hayek, his interests extended beyond economics. In economics, his major writings focused on the most general problems of the discipline, his goal being to show the merits and limitations of the free enterprise system. He took a special interest in intersubjective uncertainty and the accompanying problem of agency. To benefit from an economic transaction an individual must rely on others (agents, broadly speaking) to perform actions even though he or she cannot be certain that the others will decide to perform the actions. Agency, in the broadest sense, is present in all relationships that are properly defined as economic. Knight apparently recognized that both the classical liberal's trust in free enterprise and the interventionist's distrust stem from their different views of the agency problem and of how best to solve it. Accordingly, he made the problem a centerpiece of his investigation of free enterprise in his celebrated Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (1921). The agency problem also plays an important role in the modern, or new institutionalist, theory of the firm. The new institutionalists aim to show that some observable economic relationship, rule or procedure in an organization, most notably a Coasean firm, is a result of the efforts of individuals to deal with the agency problem.

Abstract. The methodology of Austrian economics's presented in the writings of Ludwig von Mises is described. The Misesian system is built on a priori categories (choice, causality, teleology, time, uncertainty) which Mises regarded as common to all human actors. He used these categories to describe how theories of social phenomena must be constructed if they are to be comprehensible to others. To interpret history, including economic history, one must invent models based on subsidiary assumptions and he or she must make bypotheseszbom the specific "intentions and expectations" of actors. One model is that of an "economic institution." The meaning of the Misesian model of an institution is stated. It is said to have much in common with the models of phenomenologicai sociology. Finally, contrary to recent papers in this Journal, it is argued that (1) Misesian a priori categories are not alternatives to a priori assumptions described by institutionalists, (2) although a pure theory of choice does not lend itself to the evaluation of public policy, hypotheses about specific intentions and expectations do permit such evaluations, and (3) statements by Mises on institutions and the study of history resemble those made by many institutionalists.

A riot is defined as an unlawful act (or set of unlawful acts) committed in the presence of a crowd which is sufficiently large &/or sympathetic that ordinary law enforcement procedures are inadequate. The economic model of behavior asserts that an act is the (sometimes indirect) result of a conscious choice. The criteria for choice are defined to be the subjective benefits & costs. Thus, to reduce riot, one need only to alter the nature of the benefits & costs. Before one can do so, however, he must identify the benefits & costs that appear to be relevant. The potential benefits to riot participants are delineated. On the basis of this typology, 8 different ways of reducing riot participation are identified. The inefficiency of group punishment in reducing riot participation is discussed. Since there are various alternative means of reducing participation, the policy-maker is faced with a choice. The alternative he chooses will probably depend largely on his own evaluation of the importance of the well-being of the various types of riot participants & of the well-being of taxpayers who must pay the bill. In essence, he must make an ethical judgment (at least implicitly). 2 such judgments & the type of riot-prevention recommendation that would be suggested by each are discussed. The judgment that income should be redistributed in favor of rioters would lead to a recommendation of the techniques which appear to be the most popular. The judgment that the deterrent power of laws should be the same under all circumstances leads to the advocacy of higher penalties for persons who riot. AA.