EPDF and EPUB available Open Access under CC-BY-NC-ND licence.It is often claimed that the UK is unusually attached to its National Health Service, and the last decade has seen increasingly visible displays of gratitude and love. While social surveys of public attitudes measure how much Britain loves the NHS, this book mobilises new empirical research to ask how Britain love its NHS.
Ellen A. Stewart offers timely critique of both the potential, and the dysfunctions, of Britain's complex love affair with its healthcare system.
In this analysis, Julia Gurol unpicks the complex security relations between the European Union (EU) and China. Systematic and accessible, this is an essential guide to the past, present and future of one of the world's most important, yet most complicated, security relationships.
Abstract This article argues that transregional communication mechanisms and the diffusion of narratives are important co-drivers towards autocratization. Offering a look beyond the 'material' in the study of global authoritarianism, it makes two conceptual arguments. It shows show transregional authoritarian practices are often discursively reinforced. Moreover, it demonstrates how narratives and their transregional diffusion are a form of authoritarian image management and a tool for fostering authoritarian stability. Departing from the basic assumption of authoritarian diffusion, the article is guided by two questions: which narratives of supremacy are used by the Chinese government in the context of the pandemic? And how are these narratives received, reproduced and contested in the Gulf? Based on a qualitative analysis of more than 3,000 media outlets (March–May 2020) from China and the Gulf region, the article shows how China strategically promotes authoritarian narratives regarding its international role, by telling stories of supremacy and heroism and by narratively conjuring a new world order. Moreover, it shows how the Chinese narratives are diffused to Iran, Saudi-Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar and depicts the different patterns of reception, reproduction and contestation.
Why do we observe an increase of EU-China security cooperation over time, while at the same time, political tensions deepen? And why does cooperation emerge on some security issues but not on others? Although the main drivers of EU-China relations remain of an economic kind, meaning primarily concerns with trade, investment and intellectual property issues, the security dimension of the relationship has increased over time and has developed into a vital pillar of EU-China relations. While a lot has been written about EU-China economic affairs, their relationship in the security realm is a controversial and highly debated, yet under-researched issue. This dissertation examines the main drivers towards cooperation in EU-China security relations by applying a mixed comparison approach. Drawing on a combination of rationalist and constructivist explanatory factors it assesses the role of complex interdependence, economic interests, a convergent problem understanding and mutual perceptions in order to explain why EU-China security cooperation takes place despite deepening political tensions. A diachronic comparison investigates temporal patterns, revealing an increase of complex interdependence and a converging understanding of what constitutes security as the main drivers towards security cooperation over time. A synchronic comparison of three security issues, anti-terrorism, anti-piracy/maritime security and climate/energy security, further underlines these findings. In analyzing variation over time and between security issues, the present study provides a comprehensive assessment of EU-China security relations in the context of political tensions and shows why security cooperation takes place against all odds. It provides incentives for further in-depth process research on the roles of the EU and China in different security issues and has practical implications for the orientation of the EU's future China policy.
AbstractCrises constitute ideal opportunities for authoritarian leaders to promote certain narratives, shaping reality in their favor and crafting their own preferred storylines about current events. In other words: they serve authoritarian leaders on a silver platter the opportunity to instrumentalize these unforeseen circumstances to gain domestic political legitimacy by promoting strategic narratives. The COVID-19 pandemic was no exception in this regard. Ever since its onset in early 2020, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was among the most active actors worldwide seeking to capitalize on the global crisis for legitimation purposes. Whether applying narratives of governance supremacy, portraying the People's Republic of China as a "global savior," or promoting emotionally appealing nationalistic narratives, the regime used the pandemic as a window of opportunity to rebrand its international role and enhance its domestic legitimacy. When observing the CCP's communication style over the course of 24 pandemic months (2020–2022), however, major shifts become apparent regarding the main narratives crafted in communication with national audiences. Based on this, the paper focuses on the role of such narratives for legitimation claims. Using exemplary media articles collected between the outbreak of the pandemic in China in late 2019 until the harsh Shanghai lockdown in spring 2022, it thus traces the narratives employed by Chinese state elites and explores how they are intertwined with nationalism and broader power claims.
From discrimination against Chinese-read migrant workers, via intraregional competition for China's favour, to collaboration on infrastructural megaprojects, vaccine development and digital surveillance techniques: Arab-Chinese relations in times of COVID-19 are complex and multi-layered. Yet, established regime-centric approachesoften fail to see this complexity by almost exclusively focusing on questions of authoritarian regime collaboration. Such approaches not only ignore the diversity of involved actors and the inherently transregional nature of contemporary authoritarian power, but also bear the risk of reproducing binary notions of authoritarianism vs. liberal democracy that fundamentally ignore the latter's coercive core. Recent work on the duality of infrastructure as both enabling global flows of goods and (re-)producing social hierarchies helps us overcome the methodological nationalism found in the majority of scholarship on authoritarian power. In this article, we provide a selective overview, through the prism of logistics and infrastructure, of Arab-Chinese authoritarian entanglements in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. Understanding authoritarian practices as territorially unboundedmodes of governance, our objective is to develop a more in-depth and context-sensitive understanding of the transregionally connected mechanisms of (re-)producing authoritarian power. We argue that the pandemic constitutes a seemingly managerial opportunity for the intensified diffusion of authoritarian practices thatbothenable certain infrastructural politics and in turn are also rendered possible by them. This emphasis on infrastructure, understood as simultaneously fostering a global circulation of goods and capital, as well as reinforcing containment and facilitating new forms of managing and repressing public discontent, provides us with a helpful lens for the development of a truly transregional understanding of authoritarian collaboration. We discuss this argument based on selected examples of digital and physical infrastructure(s) in Arab-Chinese relations,and their embedding in global flows of capital.
Abstract One of the EU's key foreign policy objectives is to promote the values enshrined in its treaties, such as democracy, the rule of law and human rights. The EU's self-conception of being a "rule maker" rather than a "rule taker" in international relations, however, is increasingly contested both by internal (e.g., democratic backsliding or a general tendency towards nationalist politics) as well as external challenges (e.g., the return of bilateralism or the rise of new actors). China's Belt and Road Initiative (bri) is often understood as the most serious opposition on the external side to the EU's model of international cooperation and global governance, in that it promotes a pragmatic instead of a norm-based approach, at least at first glance. The Chinese foreign policy model that the bri reflects, explicitly favours open membership, flexibility and economic gains over multilateral institutions and norm-based action. By drawing on original interviews and analysing central policy documents, this article shows how the juxtaposition of normativity and pragmatism has shaped the political and academic discourse on the EU's foreign policy and idea of global governance. It argues that this duality of normativity versus pragmatism is misleading because it overlooks the fact that the EU and China both (a) constitute the framework for a certain practice and (b) are rooted in practice. Drawing on Kagan's cultural thesis of foreign policy, it questions the real meaning of this juxtaposition and applies a practice-based reading to the EU's and China's modes of foreign policy making. The article further shows that scrutinising foreign policy through the prism of practice can provide a more context-sensitive and encompassing understanding of how the EU and China construct their foreign policies as well as of possible conflicts that arise from them.
Only with the three largest emitters (the EU, China and the US) building a coalition was it possible to conclude the Paris Agreement in 2015. With the announced withdrawal of the US, the interdependence between the EU and China has increased significantly. Both actors have reiterated their will to implement the Paris Agreement and to cooperate on climate change. In times of political constraints between the EU and China, this seems puzzling. The paper takes a role-theoretic perspective to assess the following question: How can the changing roles of the EU and China, ascribed to them by external and internal expectations, explain their increased climate cooperation? It draws on a qualitative text analysis of policy documents and expert interviews. The paper concludes with a discussion of the findings against the backdrop of growing tensions between the EU and China.
Only with the three largest emitters (the EU, China and the US) building a coalition was it possible to conclude the Paris Agreement in 2015. With the announced withdrawal of the US, the interdependence between the EU and China has increased significantly. Both actors have reiterated their will to implement the Paris Agreement and to cooperate on climate change. In times of political constraints between the EU and China, this seems puzzling. The paper takes a role-theoretic perspective to assess the following question: How can the changing roles of the EU and China, ascribed to them by external and internal expectations, explain their increased climate cooperation? It draws on a qualitative text analysis of policy documents and expert interviews. The paper concludes with a discussion of the findings against the backdrop of growing tensions between the EU and China.
AbstractOnly with the three largest emitters (the EU, China and the US) building a coalition was it possible to conclude the Paris Agreement in 2015. With the announced withdrawal of the US, the interdependence between the EU and China has increased significantly. Both actors have reiterated their will to implement the Paris Agreement and to cooperate on climate change. In times of political constraints between the EU and China, this seems puzzling. The paper takes a role‐theoretic perspective to assess the following question: How can the changing roles of the EU and China, ascribed to them by external and internal expectations, explain their increased climate cooperation? It draws on a qualitative text analysis of policy documents and expert interviews. The paper concludes with a discussion of the findings against the backdrop of growing tensions between the EU and China.
Forschende, die in sensiblen Sicherheitskontexten arbeiten, sehen sich während ihrer Feldforschung mit zahlreichen Herausforderungen konfrontiert. Ethische Fragen, Themen wie Macht und Repräsentation, aber auch die (Un-)Sicherheit der Forschenden, möglicher InterviewpartnerInnen und der erhobenen Daten sind zu beachten. Dieser Artikel thematisiert die zentralen Herausforderungen sicherheitssensibler Forschungskontexte und erarbeitet anhand zweier Beispiele - China und des südlichen Mittelmeerraums - mögliche Bewältigungsstrategien. Erst diskutieren die Autorinnen kritisch, in welchen Phasen des Forschungsprozesses sowie in welcher Form sich Sicherheitssensibilität manifestiert. Anschließend werden drei Phasen der Feldforschung herausgearbeitet - Vorbereitung, Realisierung und Evaluation - und der Umgang mit Sicherheitssensibilität sowie Fragen von (Un-)Sicherheit erörtert. Abschließend diskutieren die Autorinnen die Implikationen von Feldforschung in sensiblen Sicherheitskontexten für den Forschungsprozess und leiten generelle Handlungsempfehlungen für die Durchführung von Feldforschung in den Sozialwissenschaften daraus ab.
