Terminating Treaties
In: The Oxford Guide to Treaties (Duncan Hollis ed., 2012), pp. 634-650
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In: The Oxford Guide to Treaties (Duncan Hollis ed., 2012), pp. 634-650
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In: Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law, Band 21, S. 65
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In: Perspectives on politics: a political science public sphere, Band 7, Heft 1, S. 39-44
ISSN: 1537-5927
In: Perspectives on politics, Band 7, Heft 1, S. 39-44
ISSN: 1541-0986
The international intellectual property system provides an important illustration of how regime complexity shapes domestic and international strategies of states and non-state actors. This article describes and graphically illustrates the multifaceted nature of the international intellectual property system. It then analyzes the consequences of regime complexity for international and domestic politics, emphasizing the strategy of regime shifting and its consequences for chessboard politics and the domestic implementation of international rules.
In: European journal of international law, Band 19, Heft 1, S. 125-159
ISSN: 1464-3596
In: Harvard international law journal, Band 49, Heft 1, S. 1-52
ISSN: 0017-8063
World Affairs Online
In: European journal of international law, Band 19, Heft 1, S. 125-159
ISSN: 0938-5428
World Affairs Online
In: Supreme Court Review, p. 213, 2011
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In: Cambridge University Press, 2011
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In: European Law Journal, Band 17, Heft 5, S. 701
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In: BALANCING WEALTH AND HEALTH: GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND THE BATTLE OVER INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES IN LATIN AMERICA , Rochelle Dreyfuss & César Rodríguez-Garavito, eds. (2013)
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In: International organization, Band 64, Heft 4, S. 563-592
ISSN: 1531-5088
AbstractAre international courts power-seeking by nature, expanding the reach and scope of international rules and the courts' authority where permissive conditions allow? Or, does expansionist lawmaking require special nurturing? We investigate the relative influences of nature versus nurture by comparing expansionist lawmaking in the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the Andean Tribunal of Justice (ATJ), the ECJ's jurisdictional cousin and the third most active international court. We argue that international judges are more likely to become expansionist lawmakers where they are supported by substate interlocutors and compliance constituencies, including government officials, advocacy networks, national judges, and administrative agencies. This comparison of two structurally identical international courts calls into question prevailing explanations of ECJ lawmaking, and it suggests that prevailing scholarship puts too much emphasis on the self-interested power-seeking of judges, the importance of institutional design features, and the preferences of governments to explain lawmaking by international courts.
In: International organization, Band 64, Heft 4, S. 563-592
ISSN: 0020-8183
World Affairs Online
In: International Organization, Band 64, Heft 4
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Working paper
In: N.Y.U Journal of International Law and Politics, Band 41, S. 871
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Working paper