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ABSTRACTThe theory of regime complexity offers a useful lens through which to analyse the increasing density of international institutions and the patterns of conflict and cooperation among them. Scholarship on crisis and development finance would benefit from more fully employing this approach to explain the emergence of overlapping institutions and offer recommendations for designing regime complexes. The theory advanced here emphasizes the strategies of key states to use institutional overlap to limit agency 'drift' away from their preferences. Prioritizing control often comes at the cost of conflict among the institutions, however, and can thus impede the achievement of financial stability and development goals. The regime complexity approach is distinct from the rational design of institutions, institutional experimentalism and theoretical realism. Drawing on lessons from the euro crisis, this article offers informed conjectures on financial arrangements in the regions of Latin America and East Asia and their interaction with global multilateral institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund.

AbstractRegions of the world have developed an increasing number of financial arrangements to underpin the stability of capital markets and combat crises. But these arrangements vie for influence over international finance with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), as has been dramatically illustrated during the euro crisis, and threatens to fragment global financial governance. This article reviews the regional financial arrangements (RFAs) and their relationships to the IMF, examines the sources of conflict between these institutions, draws lessons from the euro crisis for institutional cooperation, and proposes a set of guidelines and principles to avoid fragmentation of financial governance in the future.

AbstractScholarship on European integration has debated the external character of the monetary union extensively. This article examines the establishment of the institutional arrangements for foreign exchange intervention and the policy‐making surrounding the market operations of autumn 2000 – the only case to date of euro area intervention in currency markets. Drawing on elite interviews of officials in European institutions and international organizations, among other sources, it specifies the division of labour between the European Central Bank, Eurogroup and other European actors. The article concludes that (1) the inter‐institutional understanding within the euro area gives substantial but not complete latitude to the ECB, (2) the understanding is susceptible to renegotiation over time and (3) economic divergence within the euro area could threaten the ability of the monetary union to act coherently externally.

Die Grundthese dieses Artikels lautet, daß kurzfristig auftretende Veränderungen der amerikanischen Geldpolitik, übertragen durch den internationalen Geldmarkt, die europäischen Staaten zu einer engeren Koordinierung ihrer Wechselkurs- und Geldpolitik zwang. Der Autor überprüft seine These in bezug auf die wirtschaftliche Integration innerhalb der EU, indem er vier Perioden analysiert, in denen die USA durch ihre Politik zur Stabilisierung der internationalen Geldmärkte beitrugen, und sieben Perioden, in denen die USA Störungen in diesem Systen hervorriefen. Die europäischen Regierungen und Zentralbanken schränkten ihre geldpolitische Kooperation ein, wenn die USA systemstabilisierend wirkten, und weiteten sie aus, wenn Störungen verursacht wurden. (swp-clv)

Existing explanations of European monetary integration, emphasizing economic interdependence, issue linkage, institutions, and domestic politics, take a predominantly regional approach. In the international monetary thesis developed here, I argue that U.S. policy disturbances, transmitted through the international monetary system, created compelling incentives for European states to cooperate on exchange-rate and monetary policy. I develop a general theory of macroeconomic power, based on open economy macroeconomics, and show how the exercise of such influence can drive regional monetary integration. This article then tests the international thesis with reference to monetary integration within the European Union by examining four periods in which the United States acted to stabilize the international monetary system and seven episodes in which it disrupted the system. European governments and central banks reduced regional monetary cooperation when the United States supported system stability and strengthened it after each episode of disruption. The evidence thus strongly supports the inference that the link is causal.