Suchergebnisse

Interstate conflicts emerge when domestic political parties & other groups decide to call attention to existing hostile relations with an external enemy. These conflicts are enhanced when disputed territory becomes an issue & when an entrenched history of conflict already exists. The conflict between Bolivia & Paraguay illustrates the manner in which evolutionary changes in domestic & international politics can instigate conflict. The basic rivalry level (BRL) model & the evolutionary model of conflict are supported by empirical evidence. This is true in cases involving conflicts that emerge as a result of political shock & cases where there exists a history of past conflict. 1 Table, 51 References. K. Larsen

This article reexamines the democratic peace in a longitudinal fashion. We extend the democratic peace proposition beyond isolated militarized disputes or wars to longer-term interstate rivalries. Rivalries of all types are rare among democratic dyads; there is only one case of enduring rivalry between consistently democratic states, & most conflictual relationships between democracies remain confined to isolated conflict. Second, we assess the effect of regime change on rivalry behavior when a regime change precipitates or ends a jointly democratic dyad. Enduring rivalries that include both joint democratic & nondemocratic periods exhibit significantly lower dispute propensities while both rivals are democratic, although proto-rivalries show much smaller differences. Importantly, the pacifying effect of democracy appears to strengthen over time after the transition to joint democracy, which is consistent with the onset & deepening of democratic norms. Both proto & enduring rivalries show a decreasing propensity for militarized conflict within a year of the transition to joint democracy, & this propensity decreases almost to zero within five years. Our results generally confirm & extend the robust effects of the democratic peace. 4 Tables, 23 References. Adapted from the source document.