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It is becoming increasingly fashionable to argue that conflict patterns today are fundamentally different from patterns in past eras. If correct, this argument could call into question the future value of decades of seientific research on the sources and consequences of interstate conflict. This paper reviews several Prominent differences that have been proposed and examines major conflict-related data sets for evidence related to these explanations. It appears that intrastate conflict is currelltly more frequent and bloodier than interstate conflict, as many analysts have argued, but that this has been the case for most of the past two centuries. Similarly, while analysts claim that future conflict will revolve around ethnic or cultural issues rather than territoral or ideological questions, the available evidence is mixed. I conclude with seieral suggestions for future research on militarized conflict, focusing on three themes: non-state actors, sub-war intrastate conflict, and (both interstate and intrastate) contentious issues and issue management.

Interstate conflicts emerge when domestic political parties & other groups decide to call attention to existing hostile relations with an external enemy. These conflicts are enhanced when disputed territory becomes an issue & when an entrenched history of conflict already exists. The conflict between Bolivia & Paraguay illustrates the manner in which evolutionary changes in domestic & international politics can instigate conflict. The basic rivalry level (BRL) model & the evolutionary model of conflict are supported by empirical evidence. This is true in cases involving conflicts that emerge as a result of political shock & cases where there exists a history of past conflict. 1 Table, 51 References. K. Larsen

Recent research on interstate conflict and rivalry has shown that most conflict occurs between long-time rival countries, and has used enduring rivalries to test propositions on arms races, deterrence, and power transitions. Yet most of this research has focused on the dynamics of already-established rivalry; little is known about how adversaries become long-term rivals. The present effort attempts to account for the origins of rivalry with an evolutionary model of interstate rivalry that treats rivalry as a dynamic process, evolving out of interactions between two adversaries. Empirical analyses reveal that the context of recent relations between two adversaries has a great influence on their conflict behavior, particularly on their probability of engaging in further conflict along the path toward or away from enduring rivalry. As two adversaries accumulate a longer history of conflict, their rivalry relationship tends to become "locked in" or entrenched, with future conflict becoming increasingly difficult to avoid; specific characteristics of their past confrontations can hasten or reverse this movement toward rivalry. This paper concludes by discussing the implications of this evolutionary model for the understanding of rivalry, conflict, and world politics more generally.

This article reexamines the democratic peace in a longitudinal fashion. We extend the democratic peace proposition beyond isolated militarized disputes or wars to longer-term interstate rivalries. Rivalries of all types are rare among democratic dyads; there is only one case of enduring rivalry between consistently democratic states, & most conflictual relationships between democracies remain confined to isolated conflict. Second, we assess the effect of regime change on rivalry behavior when a regime change precipitates or ends a jointly democratic dyad. Enduring rivalries that include both joint democratic & nondemocratic periods exhibit significantly lower dispute propensities while both rivals are democratic, although proto-rivalries show much smaller differences. Importantly, the pacifying effect of democracy appears to strengthen over time after the transition to joint democracy, which is consistent with the onset & deepening of democratic norms. Both proto & enduring rivalries show a decreasing propensity for militarized conflict within a year of the transition to joint democracy, & this propensity decreases almost to zero within five years. Our results generally confirm & extend the robust effects of the democratic peace. 4 Tables, 23 References. Adapted from the source document.

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