Suchergebnisse

AbstractIn majoritarian parliaments, the executive branch typically enjoys an informational advantage over the legislature. In theory, legislators can reduce this asymmetry with information from interest groups. In practice, the government is almost always better informed than the legislature. This article develops a model whereby a politician's access to outside information depends not just on her parliamentary power but on the diffusion of legislative agenda control among political parties—for example, during minority government. Using a new panel data set of 41,619 lobbying communications, it finds interest groups are more likely to communicate with government frontbenchers than with opposition or backbench members. This gap diminishes as agenda control diffuses to opposition parties. It also finds evidence of partisan clustering in lobbying networks during majority government. Strong legislative parties weaken accountability by restricting access to outside information, but this is conditional on the governing party's control over the agenda.

Policy entrepreneurship is often used to explain agenda setting through reference to the behavior of individual "change agents." But there are still gaps in our understanding of what motivates entrepreneurs. Rational choice theory emphasizes the importance of material and nonmaterial incentives; however, it remains unclear what role institutions play. This article aims to empirically examine the relationship between incentives and institutional encouragement of innovation. Using a case study of the federal government of Canada, I find evidence that incentives matter. Government agencies with many incentives are more likely to encourage innovation than agencies with few incentives. These results underscore the importance of institutions in determining the motivations of policy entrepreneurs, and suggest future research should focus on the interplay among individual, political, and institutional factors.

AbstractMuch of political science rests on assumptions about how policy makers and citizens behave. However, questions remain about how public policy can improve the government–citizen relationship. In this research note, we present behavioural insights (BI) as one way to address this gap. First, we argue that BI can be strategically used both to alleviate administrative burdens and to enhance citizen experience. Second, we argue that BI interventions can assist in several stages of the policy process, strengthening causal inferences about policy efficacy. Third, we present original data from Canada's ongoing experimentation with BI across multiple jurisdictions and areas of public policy. We conclude by acknowledging the myriad pathways through which BI research can engage with public policy to support the enhancement of citizen-oriented service delivery.

Conventional OLS fixed-effects and GLS random-effects estimators of dynamic models that control for individual-effects are known to be biased when applied to short panel data (T ≤ 10). GMM estimators are the most used alternative but are known to have drawbacks. Transformed-likelihood estimators are unused in political science. Of these, orthogonal reparameterization estimators are only tangentially referred to in any discipline. We introduce these estimators and test their performance, demonstrating that the unused orthogonal reparameterization estimator in particular performs very well and is an improvement on the commonly used GMM estimators. When T and/or N are small, it provides efficiency gains and overcomes the issues GMM estimators encounter in the estimation of long-run effects when the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is close to one.

Voters are increasingly concerned that special interests control the policy process. Yet, the literature on representation is more optimistic: elected officials face strong incentives to listen to voters—not just lobby groups—and this makes for more responsive policies. Building on recent work, we argue a more nuanced point: different types of groups have different effects on responsiveness. We show empirically that lobbying from "cause" groups—representing diffuse interests like climate change—strengthens responsiveness, while lobbying from "sectional" groups—representing industry and professional associations—has no observable effect. Our project uses a novel data set of Canadian lobbying registrations spanning fifteen policy areas from 1990 to 2009. Using a dynamic panel model, we test how interest group lobbying moderates the effect of voter issue attention on government spending. Our findings contribute to contemporary debates over the influence of organized groups, suggesting some interest groups may improve representation.

Despite its diverse makeup and deep divisions, Canada has a fairly solid reputation as a stable democracy and political community but we are repeatedly reminded how fragile this "community of communities" may in fact be. Using new data from the Comparative Provincial Election Project, we examine how Quebecers feel about Canada and Quebec and compare these perspectives to those of other Canadians. We find that support varies provincially, over time and across subnational political communities. And in Quebec, political performance has a strong bearing on support for political communities, even after controlling for other common cultural, structural or contextual explanations.