Suchergebnisse

Der Aufsatz beschäftigt sich mit den Beziehungen zwischen der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED) der DDR und der Sozialistischen Partei Islands (SEI) während des Kalten Krieges. Untersucht werden die strukturellen Grenzen der ideologischen Zusammenarbeit beider Parteien – Islands NATO-Mitgliedschaft und die US-Militärpräsenz – ebenso wie die Möglichkeiten der Zusammenarbeit, die sich vor allem während der Regierungsbeteiligung der SEI in den fünfziger Jahren entwickelte. Besondere Berücksichtigung findet Einar Olgeirsson, Vorsitzender der SEI von 1939 bis 1968, der entscheidend zur Entwicklung der politischen, wirtschaftlichen und kulturellen Verbindungen zu SED und DDR beitrug. Es wird argumentiert, dass das Experiment transnationaler sozialistischer Solidarität zweier Parteien, die in radikal unterschiedlichen politischen Systemen verwurzelt waren, an Faktoren wie ideologischen Differenzen oder den politischen und wirtschaftlichen Entwicklungen in Island scheiterte. ; The article deals with the relationship between the East German Socialist Unity Party (SED) and the Icelandic Socialist Party (SEI) during the Cold War. It details the structural limitations of ideological cooperation between the two parties – Iceland's NATO membership and the U.S. military presence – as well as its possibilities, especially in the 1950s, through the governmental participation of the SEI. Special attention is devoted to the role played by Einar Olgeirsson, the chairman of the SEI 1939–1968, who was instrumental in forging and developing political, economic, and cultural ties with the SED and the German Democratic Republic. The article argues that this experiment in transnational solidarity between socialist parties from two radically different political systems failed in the end due to several factors, including ideological differences and the political and economic development in Iceland.

The 1951 U.S. -Icelandic Defense Agreement paved the way for a permanent U.S. military presence at the Keflavik base in Iceland, an outpost that played a crucial role in U.S. strategy during the Cold War. The article explores two gender-related aspects of the U.S. -Icelandic Cold War relationship:the restrictions on off-base movements of U.S. soldiers, and the secret ban imposed by the Icelandic government on the stationing of black U.S. troops in Iceland. These practices were meant to "protect" Icelandic women and to preserve a homogeneous "national body." Although U.S. officials repeatedly tried to have the restrictions lifted, the Icelandic government refused to modify them until the racial ban was publicly disclosed in late 1959. Even after the practice came to light, it took another several years before the ban was gradually eliminated. Misguided though the Icelandic restrictions may have been, they did, paradoxically, help to defuse domestic opposition to Iceland's pro-American foreign policy course and thus preserved the country's role in the Western alliance.