Suchergebnisse

Documentos de Trabajo Conjuntos / Universidad de la Laguna, Universidad de Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales ; 2004-09 ; En los últimos años, tanto en la Unión Europea como en España, se ha procedido a descentralizar algunos aspectos relevantes de la política de defensa de la competencia. El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar la interacción entre información y riesgo de captura asociada a esta nueva situación, partiendo de algunos modelos clásicos de regulación. Nuestros resultados confirman que, desde el punto de vista de los precios y la eficiencia productiva, la descentralización supone una mejora al incrementar la información que posee la agencia de la competencia sobre las empresas. Sin embargo, el riesgo de captura puede ser mayor, diluyendo así esa ventaja inicial y haciendo que la descentralización, especialmente, si no va acompañada de una independencia política de la agencia, no genere resultados globales mejores que los de la centralización. ; In recent years some key aspects of competition policy have been decentralized both in EU and Spain. Departing from standard models, this paper analyses the new tradeoffs associated to this situation: better regulatory information collected by the Competition Agency versus higher risk of capture by local firms. Our results confirm that, from the point of view of consumer prices and productive efficiency, decentralization improves social welfare due to the informational effect. However, in several circumstances the higher risk of capture offsets this positive effect, particularly if the Agency remains politically dependent. In summary, decentralization of competition policy does not always improves social welfare as compared to the centralized former situation.

Documentos de Trabajo Conjuntos / Universidad de la Laguna, Universidad de Las Palmas de Gran Canaria, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales ; 2004-09 ; En los últimos años, tanto en la Unión Europea como en España, se ha procedido a descentralizar algunos aspectos relevantes de la política de defensa de la competencia. El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar la interacción entre información y riesgo de captura asociada a esta nueva situación, partiendo de algunos modelos clásicos de regulación. Nuestros resultados confirman que, desde el punto de vista de los precios y la eficiencia productiva, la descentralización supone una mejora al incrementar la información que posee la agencia de la competencia sobre las empresas. Sin embargo, el riesgo de captura puede ser mayor, diluyendo así esa ventaja inicial y haciendo que la descentralización, especialmente, si no va acompañada de una independencia política de la agencia, no genere resultados globales mejores que los de la centralización. ; In recent years some key aspects of competition policy have been decentralized both in EU and Spain. Departing from standard models, this paper analyses the new tradeoffs associated to this situation: better regulatory information collected by the Competition Agency versus higher risk of capture by local firms. Our results confirm that, from the point of view of consumer prices and productive efficiency, decentralization improves social welfare due to the informational effect. However, in several circumstances the higher risk of capture offsets this positive effect, particularly if the Agency remains politically dependent. In summary, decentralization of competition policy does not always improves social welfare as compared to the centralized former situation.

This paper empirically investigates the causal relationship between local government transparency and political corruption in a sample of Spain's 110 largest municipalities. After implementing a two-stage probit estimation procedure, our evidence indicates that transparency is inversely related to the likelihood of local political corruption. This result supports the hypothesis that a lack of transparency conceals corrupt activities and that an unwillingness to provide information is a good proxy of the likelihood of corruption.

This paper empirically investigates the causal relationship between local government transparency and political corruption in a sample of Spain's 110 largest municipalities. After implementing a two-stage probit estimation procedure, our evidence indicates that transparency is inversely related to the likelihood of local political corruption. This result supports the hypothesis that a lack of transparency conceals corrupt activities and that an unwillingness to provide information is a good proxy of the likelihood of corruption.

This paper empirically investigates the causal relationship between local government transparency and political corruption in a sample of Spain's 110 largest municipalities. After implementing a two-stage probit estimation procedure, our evidence indicates that transparency is inversely related to the likelihood of local political corruption. This result supports the hypothesis that a lack of transparency conceals corrupt activities and that an unwillingness to provide information is a good proxy of the likelihood of corruption.

Premio "Alexandre Pedrós" al artículo más destacado publicado en la Revista en 2016. Patrocinado por la Societat Econòmica Barcelonesa d'Amics del Pais. ; Incluye JEL classification: K14, P48, Z18 ; The pardon is a legal, although controversial, instrument with a long history that persists in many different judicial systems across the world. The juridical literature often considers it to be a perversion in the separation of powers within the State, and the motivations behind it are always under scrutiny. In this paper we seek to establish whether there are specific factors that affect and determine pardons. Using a database of all pardons granted in Spain between 1995 and 2013, including our own elaborated individual data, the econometrical estimations ; Los indultos son un instrumento legal, aunque genera controversias, con una dilatada historia que persiste un diferentes sistemas judiciales en el mundo. La literatura académica la considera como una perversión en la separación de poderes dentro del Estado, y sus motivaciones están bajo escrutinio. En este trabajo perseguimos establecer si existen factores específicos que afectan a la concesión de los indultos. A partir de una base de datos que contiene todos los indultos concedidos en España en 1995 y 2013, así como información de elaboración propia, las estimaciones econométricas.

Premio "Alexandre Pedrós" al artículo más destacado publicado en la Revista en 2016. Patrocinado por la Societat Econòmica Barcelonesa d'Amics del Pais. ; Incluye JEL classification: K14, P48, Z18 ; The pardon is a legal, although controversial, instrument with a long history that persists in many different judicial systems across the world. The juridical literature often considers it to be a perversion in the separation of powers within the State, and the motivations behind it are always under scrutiny. In this paper we seek to establish whether there are specific factors that affect and determine pardons. Using a database of all pardons granted in Spain between 1995 and 2013, including our own elaborated individual data, the econometrical estimations ; Los indultos son un instrumento legal, aunque genera controversias, con una dilatada historia que persiste un diferentes sistemas judiciales en el mundo. La literatura académica la considera como una perversión en la separación de poderes dentro del Estado, y sus motivaciones están bajo escrutinio. En este trabajo perseguimos establecer si existen factores específicos que afectan a la concesión de los indultos. A partir de una base de datos que contiene todos los indultos concedidos en España en 1995 y 2013, así como información de elaboración propia, las estimaciones econométricas. ; 102 ; 81 ; 25

Incluye JEL classification: D7; L4; O4 ; This paper shows what drivers the effectiveness of antitrust policy, by using internationally collated data on the perception of effectiveness of competition policy. It concludes that average antitrust effectiveness depends on per capita income and supranational policy leadership, such as the one at the core of the EU. Additionally, it shows that some aspects of competition policy design have a significant impact on policy results. ; Este trabajo muestra qué guía la efectividad de la política de competencia utilizando una base de datos internacional sobre la percepción de la efectividad de dicha política. El estudio concluye que la efectividad media depende de la renta per cápita y de liderazgos supranacionales como el ejercido desde el núcleo de la Unión Europea. Adicionalmente, el trabajo muestra que algunos aspectos del diseño de la política tienen un impacto significativo en sus resultados. ; 88 ; 69

Incluye JEL classification: D7; L4; O4 ; This paper shows what drivers the effectiveness of antitrust policy, by using internationally collated data on the perception of effectiveness of competition policy. It concludes that average antitrust effectiveness depends on per capita income and supranational policy leadership, such as the one at the core of the EU. Additionally, it shows that some aspects of competition policy design have a significant impact on policy results. ; Este trabajo muestra qué guía la efectividad de la política de competencia utilizando una base de datos internacional sobre la percepción de la efectividad de dicha política. El estudio concluye que la efectividad media depende de la renta per cápita y de liderazgos supranacionales como el ejercido desde el núcleo de la Unión Europea. Adicionalmente, el trabajo muestra que algunos aspectos del diseño de la política tienen un impacto significativo en sus resultados.

Market competition levels affect all agents of an economy: businesses, consumers and the State. Traditional analysis has evaluated the State's effects on the other agents, but no analysis has been conducted regarding the inverse relationship. Thus, the aim of this study is to estimate the tributary income losses that low levels of competition in the retail petrol market could cause in a market, using for it the Canary Islands Autonomous Community. To begin, we will use Parker and Röller´s methodology (1997) to measure the level of competition and confirm a deficiency. Then, using estimated rates, we will determine the differences that would appear in tributary income if the market were to behave as a balance of competition in quantities. Our results show that the lack of competition causes a substantial loss of income for this region, somewhere between 5 and 10 percent of the real income from the tax on unleaded petrol for the year 2004.

AbstractThis paper estimates the impact of reforming competition authorities on perceived antitrust effectiveness using methods of causal inference. We study how 20 countries reformed their competition authorities in depth between 1995 and 2020, and what has been the outcome of such reforms in the perceived competition policy effectiveness by the business community compared with 18 control countries in a balanced panel. As the political economy literature warned, we find that reforms paradoxically have not always improved antitrust effectiveness. Some of the reforms approved stalled or backlashed as politicians opted for a Machiavelli option: undertaking "counter‐reforms" even in the name of an apparent but deceptive progressiveness and pro‐competition drive.