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In: NBER macroeconomics annual, Band 27, Heft 1, S. 420-428
ISSN: 1537-2642
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In: NBER macroeconomics annual, Band 27, Heft 1, S. 420-428
ISSN: 1537-2642
In: ECB Working Paper No. 1560
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Using a unique dataset of the Euro area and the U.S. bank lending standards, we find that low (monetary policy) short-term interest rates soften standards, for household and corporate loans. This softening – especially for mortgages – is amplified by securitization activity, weak supervision for bank capital and too low for too long monetary policy rates. Conversely, low long-term interest rates do not soften lending standards. Finally, countries with softer lending standards before the crisis related to negative Taylor-rule residuals experienced a worse economic performance afterwards. These results help shed light on the origins of the crisis and have important policy implications.
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In: ECB Working Paper No. 1147
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In: ECB Working Paper No. 1248
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Offering a framework for understanding the reasons for the regulatory shift from a microprudential to a macroprudential approach to financial regulation, this book provides a list of challenges in the implementation of macroprudential policy and a discussion on its limitations. --
In: CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP15473
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In: ECB Working Paper No. 20202504
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In: CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP15539
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In: Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Paper No. 37/2020
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In: CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP14988
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In: ECB Working Paper No. 2398
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We show that risk mitigating incentives dominate risk shifting incentives in fragile banks. Risk shifting could be particularly severe in banking since it is the most opaque industry and banks are one of the most leveraged corporations with very low skin in the game. To analyze this question, we exploit security trading by banks during financial crises, as banks can easily and quickly change their risk exposure within their security portfolio. However, in contrast with the risk shifting hypothesis, we find that less capitalized banks take relatively less risk after financial market stress shocks. We show this using the supervisory ISIN-bank-month level dataset from Italy with all securities for each bank. Our results are over and above capital regulation as we show lower reach-for-yield effects by less capitalized banks within government bonds (with zero risk weights) or within securities with the same rating and maturity in the same month (which determines regulatory capital). Effects are robust to controlling for the covariance with the existence portfolio, and less capitalized banks, if anything, reduce concentration risk. Further, effects are stronger when uncertainty is higher, despite that risk shifting motives may be then higher. Moreover, three separate tests – based on different accounting portfolios (trading book versus held to maturity), the distribution of capital and franchise value – suggest that bank own incentives, instead of supervision, are the main drivers. Results are confirmed if we consider other sources of balance sheet fragility and different measures of risk-taking. Finally, evidence from the recent COVID-19 shock corroborates findings from the Global Financial Crisis and the Euro Area Sovereign Crisis.
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In: CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP15276
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