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"This book is the first scholarly book to take a comprehensive look at Germany's nuclear weapons policies in the 21st century. German foreign and security policy is facing a profound reorientation. Great power competition between the United States and both a revanchist Russia and a rising China, the return of war and nuclear threats to Europe, and the emergence of new technologies all force Germany to adapt. German policymakers and scholars increasingly speak of a pivotal Zeitenwende, an epochal turning point in history. How does Germany adapt its nuclear policies to these changing conditions? The volume brings together internationally renowned nuclear scholars and policy analysts from Germany and abroad. Focussing on German nuclear deterrence, arms control and disarmament as well as nonproliferation policies, the contributors assess how German leaders have navigated continuity and change, domestically and abroad. The volume concludes that Germany remains bound by dependence on the United States and its own conservatism. Within these parameters, German leaders have adapted slowly to change and continue to balance seemingly contradictory deterrence and disarmament goals. This book will be of much interest to students of nuclear proliferation, security studies, German politics and International Relations, as well as policymakers"--

This book is the first scholarly book to take a comprehensive look at Germany's nuclear weapons policies in the 21st century. German foreign and security policy is facing a profound reorientation. Great power competition between the United States and both a revanchist Russia and a rising China, the return of war and nuclear threats to Europe, and the emergence of new technologies all force Germany to adapt. German policymakers and scholars increasingly speak of a pivotal Zeitenwende, an epochal turning point in history. How does Germany adapt its nuclear policies to these changing conditions? The volume brings together internationally renowned nuclear scholars and policy analysts from Germany and abroad. Focussing on German nuclear deterrence, arms control and disarmament as well as nonproliferation policies, the contributors assess how German leaders have navigated continuity and change, domestically and abroad. The volume concludes that Germany remains bound by dependence on the United States and its own conservatism. Within these parameters, German leaders have adapted slowly to change and continue to balance seemingly contradictory deterrence and disarmament goals. This book will be of much interest to students of nuclear proliferation, security studies, German politics and International Relations, as well as policymakers.

AbstractThe politics of nuclear arms control between the United States and Russia are in a protracted state of crisis, which is in need of explanation. This article provides an overview of bilateral contractual milestones from 1972 to 2001 and analyzes instances of cooperation through the lens of three key factors that have influenced the process. It then considers the changes that these factors have undergone over twenty years of crisis in bilateral arms control from 2001 to 2021 and gauges the possible consequences of a continuation of the current situation. It concludes that during the first period, a shared willingness to shield the bilateral process from political disruption, U.S. bipartisan support, and cooperatively addressing the vertical diffusion of offensive and defensive missile capabilities were both possible and necessary for ensuring success. During the second period, these key factors underwent significant changes and ultimately had a negative effect on the bilateral process, which makes the current crisis unique compared to earlier episodes of regression. Most importantly, both sides were no longer willing to shield the bilateral process in its entirety during this period, including defensive and sub-strategic offensive elements. With a view to future consequences, these findings point to reduced arms race stability, weaker negotiated outcomes, and an erosion of the global nonproliferation regime.

This intervention argues that NATO needs a new strategy towards Russia. The current strategy is imbalanced because it over-emphasizes power and risks negatively affecting the European security order. A new strategy should recall the 1967 Harmel Report, which successfully combined the security elements of power, order, and liberal values. Today, such a balanced strategy is again needed. A new Harmel strategy (Harmel 2.0) should, like its predecessor, rely on a combination of deterrence and engagement. This intervention thus argues that in the realm of power, NATO needs to respond to Russia's hybrid warfare threats with conventional reassurance and societal soft power measures and that securing the Allies' economic vulnerabilities while leaving NATO's current nuclear posture untouched will also be crucial. In the realm of order, NATO needs to re-engage on cooperative security and the instruments of arms control, and it is argued that a pause to further NATO enlargement would be helpful. Finally, in the realm of liberal values, the Allies should lower their expectations as a gesture of recognition that they cannot change the domestic situation in Russia in the short term, but they should address the attitudes of certain member states in that realm. In order to succeed with such a multi-pronged strategy, the Allies need to better coordinate their policies in the OSCE and amongst EU countries.

This thesis analyzes the decay of cooperative arms control in Europe – that is, the forms of the institutions and the reasons for decay. It applies a multi-theory approach for assessing the foreign and security policies of the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia directed at cooperative arms control in Europe between 1973 and 2014 and the related institutions. Analysis of the thesis proves that the institutional form is that of a dense regime complex, consisting of five elemental regimes. The regime complex is in decay since almost all regimes are affected by indicators of decay. The reasons behind decay are multi-dimensional and relate to the times when the regime complex gained its full shape in parallel to the first round of NATO enlargement. The current lack in functioning European security institutions makes reviving the complex an urgent but hard to accomplish task. ; Im Zentrum dieser Dissertation steht die Analyse des Verfalls "Kooperativer Rüstungskontrolle in Europe" – ihrer entsprechenden Institutionen und der Gründe des Verfalls. Die Dissertation baut auf einem multi-theoretischen Ansatz zur Untersuchung der Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik der Vereinigten Staaten und der Sowjetunion/Russischen Föderation im Hinblick auf "Kooperative Rüstungskontrolle in Europa" von 1973 bis 2014 auf. Die Analyse beweist, dass ein dichter Regimekomplex, bestehend aus fünf einzelnen Regimen, den Institution Form gibt. Der Regimekomplex befindet sich im Stadium des Verfalls, da fast alle fünf Regime Verfallsindikatoren aufweisen. Die Gründe für den Verfall sind multidimensional. Sie gehen zurück auf die Zeit als der Komplex im Zusammenhang mit der ersten Runde der NATO-Osterweiterung seine volle Form entfaltete. Das momentane Defizit an funktionierenden europäischen Sicherheitsinstitutionen lässt die Wiederbelebung des Komplexes dringlich aber schwer erreichbar erscheinen.