Suchergebnisse

Russlands Krieg gegen die Ukraine begann mit einer nuklearen Drohung Putins gegen den Westen. Es folgten weitere, teils noch deutlichere Drohungen des Kremls. Der Westen nimmt diese und die generelle Gefahr eines russischen Nuklearwaffeneinsatzes ernst und warnt vor den möglichen Konsequenzen; betont aber auch, dass es bisher keine konkreten Anzeichen für einen möglichen Einsatz gäbe. Warum kam es in Russlands Krieg gegen die Ukraine bisher nicht zum Einsatz nuklearer Waffen? Ausgehend von rationalistischen, normativen und kooperativ-formalisierten Theorien und Modellen zum Nichteinsatz beleuchtet dieser Forumsbeitrag die nukleare Praxis des Kriegs und vergleicht sie mit den in der Literatur zu findenden Erklärungen. Der Beitrag kommt zu dem Schluss, dass sich der bisherige Nichteinsatz nur teilweise mit den vorhandenen Theorien erklären lässt. Aus diesem Umstand und aus dem Fakt, dass der Krieg bereits eine Reihe neuer nuklearer Phänomene geschaffen hat, ergeben sich offene Fragen und blinde Flecken der Forschung, die eine weitere wissenschaftliche Befassung rechtfertigen.

AbstractThe politics of nuclear arms control between the United States and Russia are in a protracted state of crisis, which is in need of explanation. This article provides an overview of bilateral contractual milestones from 1972 to 2001 and analyzes instances of cooperation through the lens of three key factors that have influenced the process. It then considers the changes that these factors have undergone over twenty years of crisis in bilateral arms control from 2001 to 2021 and gauges the possible consequences of a continuation of the current situation. It concludes that during the first period, a shared willingness to shield the bilateral process from political disruption, U.S. bipartisan support, and cooperatively addressing the vertical diffusion of offensive and defensive missile capabilities were both possible and necessary for ensuring success. During the second period, these key factors underwent significant changes and ultimately had a negative effect on the bilateral process, which makes the current crisis unique compared to earlier episodes of regression. Most importantly, both sides were no longer willing to shield the bilateral process in its entirety during this period, including defensive and sub-strategic offensive elements. With a view to future consequences, these findings point to reduced arms race stability, weaker negotiated outcomes, and an erosion of the global nonproliferation regime.

The wider conflict between Russia and the West over Ukraine has triggered a revival of Cold War-style policies in both the political and military realms. Remembering the famous 1963 speech by Egon Bahr on "Change through Rapprochement" a number of important lessons learnt can be applied to the conflict of today. As Bahr pointed out, a realistic policy towards the Soviet Union has to be based on patience, the avoidance of open conflict through regular dialogue, entrenchment in liberal values, and cooperation in the economic realm. Even though the world of today has fundamentally changed compared to 1963, important aspects of Bahr's strategic concept are still valuable in dealing with Russia. However, their implementation hinges on the ability of the main actors - Russia and the United States - to exert a policy of realism and restraint. (S+F/Pll)

The goal of a world free from nuclear weapons is directly related to the issues of international institutions and deterrence. Assuming that it would be possible, first, to move to significantly lower numbers of nuclear weapons and then to zero nuclear weapons, governing institutions would have to be resilient enough to respond in a timely manner and to uphold the bargain. But what factors determine and influence institutional resilience? And what would be the likely role of deterrence? This article first assesses what the general ir narratives tell us about determining factors. It then examines two empirical cases from the realm of arms control institutions (the cfe and the npt treaties) and asks why these agreements are not as effective as intended. The next section discusses three additional factors of influence and identifies a shared interest in overcoming the deterrence principle as a key variable for institutional cooperation and as a factor that continues to influence resilience and effectiveness. The last section presents the conclusions.