Suchergebnisse

How does the passage of time contribute to the establishment of civilian control of the State? We argue that civilian dominance of politics is achieved once civilianized institutions are adopted and sufficient time has passed to permit: (1) the development of a shared norm of civilian control within the military and (2) learning among military elites that fosters a belief that civilian rule is robust to military challenges. As a result, civilian control is self-reinforcing. We evaluate these claims by developing and validating a latent variable model of self-reinforcing institutional dynamics. We generate estimates of civilian control for all countries, 1945–2010, and find strong evidence that civilian control self-reinforces, but incrementally and over the course of several decades.

Counting repressive events is difficult because state leaders have an incentive to conceal actions of their subordinates and destroy evidence of abuse. In this article, we extend existing latent variable modeling techniques in the study of repression to account for the uncertainty inherent in count data generated for this type of difficult-to-observe event. We demonstrate the utility of the model by focusing on a dataset that defines 'one-sided-killing' as government-caused deaths of non-combatants. In addition to generating more precise estimates of latent repression levels, the model also estimates the probability that a state engaged in one-sided-killing and the predictive distribution of deaths for each country-year in the dataset. These new event-based, count estimates will be useful for researchers interested in this type of data but skeptical of the comparability of such events across countries and over time. Our modeling framework also provides a principled method for inferring unobserved count variables based on conceptually related categorical information.