Suchergebnisse

Why do some autocratic states allocate more resources to the military than others? We contend that as narrow political interests have more influence on a leader, relative to broader political interests, a state's military burden increases. Further, we argue that two domestic factors are central to explaining the relative strength of narrow political interests for military spending, and therefore variation in state military burden. First, institutions that increase the cost of political participation reduce the influence of the median citizen, increasing the strength of narrow political interests and, concomitantly, military spending. Second, as a regime ages, narrow interests become more entrenched and the regime becomes less concerned about overthrow. In turn, older regimes spend more on their militaries. We test hypotheses from this argument by examining the military burden for all autocracies over the period 1950–2000. We find that variation in restrictions on political participation and the age of the regime are central to understanding differences in military spending among autocracies. Further, once these institutional features are taken into account, we find only modest support for the view that certain types of regimes spend more than others. What matters is not regime type but specific institutional features that affect the strength of narrow interests and vary across, and within, autocratic regimes.

Do military regimes spend more on the military than other regime. - types? All leaders cater to their winning coalition. For military leaders,. - core supporters are other members of the military. To solicit. - support from this group, first, leaders are persuaded to spend more. - on the military to ensure their political survival, while other autocratic. - leaders tend to view the military as a competing power. - center. Second, the cost of repressing challenges from the public. - in military regimes is cheaper than in other regimes; therefore,. - leaders in military regimes allocate more resources to the military. - to satisfy them. We test this argument by examining military. - spending in different regime types for 1960-2000. The empirical. - results from Prais-Winsten regression with panel-corrected. - standard errors indicate that military regimes allocate more, on. - average, to the military than other regimes and that military. - rulers brought into power through military coups or who have . - experienced military coup attempts against them increase their. - military resource allocation. (International Interactions (London)/ FUB)