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Abstract
The theory of games, though at first greeted with great expectations by some social scientists, soon became a source of frustrated hopes to many of them. Too much of the theory seemed to be devoted to "zero-sum" and "one-shot" games. But most social contexts are not zero-sum and involve repeated interaction too. There was a certain lack of such game theoretic models which could be successfully adapted to social phenomena as were apt to appear in reality. Recently the theory of games seems to be on its way to closing this gap within a special branch devoted to "repeated games" or "supergames". Very promising is the approach of Michael Taylor which is surveyed and discussed in the subsequent paper. This approach has two main merits: First it can be understood with a modest mathematical background, secondly it can be adapted easily to a more precise reconstruction of classical topics in political theory. Though one might not agree with some of Taylor's conclusions it seems to be worthwhile to get acquainted at least with the basics of his analysis and to take it as a first step to opening avenues for future social research.

Abstract
Utilitarianism has been widely accused of inadequately treating the problem of human rights. One main criticism has been, that it could not account for acceptable institutions of legal punishment. Though the utilitarian position seems to be untenable it contains some sound points - above all its consequentialist metaethics. The central weakness of "rightbased" justifications of the criminal sanction on the other hand seems to be that they do not give due place to the consequences of alternative institutional settings. But it seems to be possible to establish a right-based and consequentialist moral theory of legal punishment leading to an acceptable practice of punishment - though not necessarily the one we are acquainted with.