Direct constitutional democracy: Comment on "Proposals for a Democracy of the Future" by Bruno Frey
In: Homo oeconomicus: HOE ; journal of behavioral and institutional economics, Band 34, Heft 2-3, S. 237-242
ISSN: 2366-6161
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In: Homo oeconomicus: HOE ; journal of behavioral and institutional economics, Band 34, Heft 2-3, S. 237-242
ISSN: 2366-6161
In: Handbuch Rechtsphilosophie, S. 278-283
In: The independent review: journal of political economy, Band 20, Heft 1, S. 11
ISSN: 1086-1653
In his seminal book The State ([19851] 1998) Anthony de Jasay draws attention to the anomaly that a minimal state would have to devote its coercive power to no other purpose than to keep itself minimal. Once a state exists, those in control of its fundamental coercive power will use it for their particular redistributive purposes and go beyond the minimum redistribution necessary to maintain the minimal state. Within a politically realist perspective, neither anarchy nor the minimal state forms a stable equilibrium of social interaction. Nevertheless, Jasay prefers anarchy to a minimal state as an ideal. The worst atrocities in human history have been committed by states. In view of the risks brought about by founding a state, anarchy may be seen as a mortally justified hedge of bets: the best and the worst results of human organization are prevented. Adapted from the source document.
In: The independent review: journal of political economy, Band 18, Heft 3, S. 391-400
ISSN: 1086-1653
James M. Buchanan was a contractarian. The author is not. But he shares Buchanan's classical-liberal ideals. In his account of what he regards as Buchanan's classical-liberal views, he starts with a reconstruction of the somewhat unconventional but very far-sighted way in which Buchanan intuitively made the conceptual distinction between what he calls 'philosophical' liberalism and 'political' (or institutional) liberalism. It seems that Buchanan in his more unguarded moments intended to subscribe to both philosophical and political liberalism. Accepting that philosophical liberalism is impossible, however, he thinks that Buchanan should be seen as a 'communitarian liberal philosopher.' His philosophical use of the unanimity principle rather naturally led him to this position and the political liberalism implied by it. As an ordo- rather than an anarcholiberal, Buchanan understood that in a world without a state, all life would become 'politicized.'. Adapted from the source document.
In: Liberale Außenpolitik im 21. Jahrhundert, S. 47-60
In: Public choice, Band 152, Heft 3-4, S. 439-443
ISSN: 1573-7101
In: Organisationen regeln, S. 111-128
In: Organisationen regeln: die Wirkmacht korporativer Akteure, S. 111-128
Im Anschluss an eine historische Anknüpfung (Spinozas Hobbes-Interpretation) wendet sich der Verfasser gegen die Auffassung, die moderne Theorie wiederholter Spiele habe das Ordnungsproblem gelöst. Nachdem er auf der Linie des methodologischen Individualismus, aber im Gegensatz zum Modell des homo oeconomicus die Grundthese verteidigt hat, dass individuelle Regelbindung, die eine intrinsische individuelle Motivation voraussetzt, unverzichtbar für die Existenz sozialer und organisatorischer Regeln ist, wendet er sich dem technologischen Problem zu, wie die Entstehung von Ordnung unter der Voraussetzung individuell regelbefolgenden Verhaltens unter Einbeziehung historisch gewachsener Weisheit und moderner Entscheidungstheorie verstanden werden kann. Abschließend werden auf der Basis der skizzierten Verankerung von Regelsystemen in regelbefolgendem Individualverhalten Schlussfolgerungen hinsichtlich der Gestaltung vor Organisationen formuliert. (ICE2)
In: Public choice, Band 152, Heft 3, S. 439-444
ISSN: 0048-5829
In: The Good Society: a PEGS journal, Band 20, Heft 1, S. 37-49
ISSN: 1538-9731
In: Politics, philosophy & economics: ppe, Band 9, Heft 4, S. 398-410
ISSN: 1741-3060
Conceptualizing behavior decision theoretically as being 'pulled' (by an expected future) is fundamentally different from conceptualizing it as 'pushed' (or determined by past conditions according to causal laws). However, the fundamental distinction between teleological and non-teleological explanations not withstanding, decision-theoretic and evolutionary 'ways of world making' lead to strikingly similar forms of political, philosophical, and economic models. Common Hobbesian roots can account historically for the emergence of such a common 'PPE' outlook, while a game-theoretic framework of indirect evolution can accommodate the fundamental methodological tension between teleological and non-teleological approaches or the 'humanities' and the 'science' traditions in PPE's disciplines.
In: Homo oeconomicus: HOE ; journal of behavioral and institutional economics, Band 34, Heft 4, S. 257-258
ISSN: 2366-6161
In: Homo oeconomicus: HOE ; journal of behavioral and institutional economics, Band 34, Heft 4, S. 343-359
ISSN: 2366-6161
We suggest that procedures of monetarized bidding can facilitate co-operation in Elinor Ostrom type common(s) projects without crowding out communitarian faculties of self-governance. Axioms securing procedurally egalitarian bidding on the basis of declared monetary evaluations are introduced. They guarantee that all realized changes of a status quo are in an objective (pecuniary) sense equally advantageous for all members of the community. Some empirical evidence that procedurally fair bidding can promote communitarian co-operation rather than crowding it out, is presented. The practical scope and limits of procedural egalitarianism need further empirical exploration, though.
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