Suchergebnisse

Die Debatte um ferngesteuerte und sogenannte "autonome" militärische Robotik hat auch zu neuen Anfragen, an das soldatische Ethos geführt: Sollen Soldatinnen und Soldaten auch Risiken tragen, die sie mit technologischen Mitteln leicht vermeiden könnten? Werden durch den Einsatz von Drohnen und autonomen Waffensystemen militärische Tugenden zugrunde gehen? Wie viel technologische Asymmetrie ist in einem Kampf noch akzeptabel? Bedarf es eines neuen Ethos der Ritterlichkeit für Soldaten? Der vorliegende Band versucht, in einer thematischen Auswahl den traditionellen Grundideen von Ritterlichkeit und militärischer Tugend, wie etwa Tapferkeit, nachzuspüren. Auch fragt er nach der ethischen Bedeutung dieser soldatischen Eigenschaften für gegenwärtige Konflikte.

Die Debatte um ferngesteuerte und sogenannte "autonome" militärische Robotik hat auch zu neuen Anfragen, an das soldatische Ethos geführt: Sollen Soldatinnen und Soldaten auch Risiken tragen, die sie mit technologischen Mitteln leicht vermeiden könnten? Werden durch den Einsatz von Drohnen und autonomen Waffensystemen militärische Tugenden zugrunde gehen? Wie viel technologische Asymmetrie ist in einem Kampf noch akzeptabel? Bedarf es eines neuen Ethos der Ritterlichkeit für Soldaten? – Der vorliegende Band versucht, in einer thematischen Auswahl den traditionellen Grundideen von Ritterlichkeit und militärischer Tugend, wie etwa Tapferkeit, nachzuspüren. Auch fragt er nach der ethischen Bedeutung dieser soldatischen Eigenschaften für gegenwärtige Konflikte. Mit Beiträgen vonNigel Biggar, Torsten Meireis, Alexander Merkl, Jörn Müller, Peter Olsthoorn, Gregory M. Reichberg, Niklas Schörnig und Malcolm Vale.

The speed of technological change is demonstrated not least by the new military technologies that are in use or are currently being developed. For example, the use of remote-controlled and semi-autonomous weapons systems has long been standard in the armed forces, and advances in artificial intelligence mean that more "decision-making " can be expected to be transferred to the machines used by the military. But not everything that is technologically possible is ethically justifiable. This volume, which brings together contributions to an annual conference of the European Chapter of the International Society for Military Ethics, attempts to address the ethical and legal problems posed by emerging military technologies. In a number of exciting essays, internationally renowned researchers present their insights.

The speed of technological change is demonstrated not least by the new military technologies that are in use or are currently being developed. For example, the use of remote-controlled and semi-autonomous weapons systems has long been standard in the armed forces, and advances in artificial intelligence mean that more "decision-making " can be expected to be transferred to the machines used by the military. But not everything that is technologically possible is ethically justifiable. This volume, which brings together contributions to an annual conference of the European Chapter of the International Society for Military Ethics, attempts to address the ethical and legal problems posed by emerging military technologies. In a number of exciting essays, internationally renowned researchers present their insights

The judgment of 1 December 1999 by the Court of Cassation relates to the responsibility of organisers of sport events, and more precisely, to that of users of go-cart circuits. This responsibility was relied upon by a go-cart driver who suffered an accident on a circuit of this type.
The judgment is classic in its principle: the Court of Cassation rules that organisers of sport activities have to guarantee the security of participants. However, this security obligation is limited to an "obligation of means". Thus, the organiser is only liable in case of defective means. Participants of this dangerous sport are supposed to have accepted its risks; that is why they cannot expect from the organiser to offer an absolute guarantee of safety. Moreover, as participants play an active role in the sport activity, they introduce an uncertain external factor into the organiser's security obligation: their own behaviour. The consequences are nevertheless potentially serious for the participant, because the participant is not entitled to compensation if the organiser cannot be proven to have been at fault. Only a very rigorous interpretation of the obligation of cautiousness and surveillance on the part of the organiser can avoid this result.
The judgment, being further proof of the difficulties arising from the distinction between obligation of means and obligation of result, is analysed in the following comments from the point of view of Austrian, Scottish and Spanish law.

Initiated by the European Commission, the first study published in this volume analyses the largely unresolved question as to how damage caused by artificial intelligence (AI) systems is allocated by the rules of tortious liability currently in force in the Member States of the European Union and in the United States, to examine whether - and if so, to what extent - national tort law regimes differ in that respect, and to identify possible gaps in the protection of injured parties. The second study offers guiding principles for safety and liability with regard to software, testing how the existing acquis needs to be adjusted in order to adequately cope with the risks posed by software and AI. The annex contains the final report of the New Technologies Formation of the Expert Group on Liability and New Technologies, assessing the extent to which existing liability schemes are adapted to the emerging market realities following the development of new digital technologies