Suchergebnisse

Recent literature on environmental governance in China frequently ascribes blame for China's environmental problems to sub-national governments' lax environmental enforcement. Such research implicitly assumes that more central control would lead to better results but, as yet, the role of the centre in environmental governance remains underresearched. In the context of the current phase of recentralization, this article studies central and local interests, capacities and interactions across policy issues and government agencies. By "bringing the centre back" into the study of central–local relations in China, we examine both where such recentralization has in fact occurred and whether such recentralization efforts have improved environmental outcomes. We argue that centralization does not improve outcomes in every case. Further, central and local levels of governance are not as different as they might seem. Indeed, there are significant areas of overlapping interests and similar patterns of behaviour, both positive (enforcement) and negative (shirking), between central and local administrations. The results draw an empirically and theoretically rich picture of central-local relations that highlights the innate complexity of China's environmental governance patterns during the current phase of recentralization. (China Q/GIGA)

This article examines the so-called "central State Owned Enterprise (SOE) problem" in China's environmental governance system, namely central SOEs' defiance of environmental regulation. We present evidence showing that, in the last decade, central SOEs have been the source of a large number of serious pollution incidents and have often failed to comply with environmental guidelines and regulations. Central SOEs in the electricity generation and oil and gas industries are particularly culpable, with six firms alone accounting for 62 per cent of all 2,370 reported violations (2004–2016). We argue that a combination of "central protectionism" of state-owned national champions and insufficient regulatory capacity in the environmental bureaucracy have provided state firms under central management with both incentives and opportunities to shirk on environmental regulations. Yet, while the institutions of central protectionism are deeply rooted, countervailing forces within the complex Chinese state are also gaining momentum. In spite of the considerable regulatory challenges, officials in the environment bureaucracy display increasing resolve and ingenuity in trying to strengthen their enforcement capacity. (China Q/GIGA)

Infrastructure only tends to be noticed when it is absent, declining, or decrepit, or when enormous cost overruns, time delays, or citizen protests make the headlines. If infrastructure is indeed a fundamental driver of economic growth and social development, why is it so difficult to get right? In addressing this perennial question, this volume makes the case for a governance perspective on infrastructure

Infrastructure only tends to be noticed when it is absent, declining, or decrepit, or when enormous cost overruns, time delays, or citizen protests make the headlines. If infrastructure is indeed a fundamental driver of economic growth and social development, why is it so difficult to get right? In addressing this perennial question, this volume-the fourth edition in an annual series tackling different aspects of governance around the world-makes the case for a governance perspective on infrastructure. This implies moving beyond rational economic analysis of what should be done towards an analysis of the political, institutional, and societal mechanisms that shape decision-making about infrastructure investment, planning, and implementation. Engaging with theories from sociology, political science, and public administration, and drawing on empirical analyses bridging OECD and non-OECD countries, the contributions to this volume dissect the logics of infrastructure governance in a novel way, providing timely analyses that will enrich both scholarly and policy debates about how to get infrastructure governance right