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Abstract
Governments all over the world are rapidly embracing digital technologies for information collection, governance, and social control. Recent studies suggest citizens may accept or even support digital surveillance. By using an online survey dataset on public opinion about facial recognition technology, contact tracing apps, and the social credit system in China, Germany, the US, and the UK, this article shows that these studies have overlooked a small yet significant group of digital technology doubters. Our results show that while up to 10% of Chinese citizens belong to the group of "digital doubters," this group is the largest in Germany with 30% of citizens. The US and the UK are in the middle with approximately 20%. While citizens who belong to this group of digital doubters worry about privacy and surveillance issues, their attitudes can also be explained by them not being convinced of the benefits of digital technologies, including improved efficiency, security, or convenience. We find that the more citizens lack trust in their government, the more likely they are to belong to the group of digital doubters. Our findings demonstrate that in both democratic and authoritarian states, there are citizens opposing the adoption of certain digital technologies. This underscores the importance of initiating societal debate to determine the appropriate regulations that align with these societal preferences.

A variety of commercial and local government social credit systems (SCSs) are now being implemented in China in order to steer the behavior of Chinese individuals, businesses, social organizations, and government agencies. Previous research finds that these SCSs are employed by the Chinese state as "surveillance infrastructure" and for social management. This article focuses on a different angle: the public's opinion of SCSs. Based on a cross-regional survey, the study finds a surprisingly high degree of approval of SCSs across respondent groups. Interestingly, more socially advantaged citizens (wealthier, better-educated, and urban residents) show the strongest approval of SCSs, along with older people. While one might expect such knowledgeable citizens to be most concerned about the privacy implications of SCS, they instead appear to embrace SCSs because they interpret it through frames of benefit-generation and promoting honest dealings in society and the economy instead of privacy-violation.

AbstractIn the existing literature there is general agreement that the effectiveness and efficiency of command and control instruments versus market‐based instruments is highly context specific. A country's particular regulatory environment and state capacity, as well as the features of given environmental problems, play an important role in ascertaining what the "right" set of policy instruments for environmental management might be. This article examines how command and control instruments are used as an environmental enforcement mechanism in China's authoritarian state. Based on extensive fieldwork, this paper shows that the reliance on binding environmental targets as the main domestic policy instrument in China has generated numerous undesirable consequences. While China's target‐based approach to implementation has incentivized local officials to strictly enforce environmental mandates, there are numerous shortcomings in the system. In particular, target rigidity, cyclical behaviour, poor data quality, and the absence of an independent monitoring agency have generated adverse effects and contribute to a yawning gap between regulatory goals and outcomes. The paper concludes that binding environmental targets as the main command–control instrument in China can be more accurately described as "command without control" as the target‐setting central government does not exercise a high degree of control over implementation and monitoring processes. But command and control instruments can be suited for managing "first‐generation" environmental problems and addressing environmental issues that have easily identifiable pollution sources and which are easy to verify.

China's national leaders have recently set ambitious goals to restructure and diversify the economy towards a more resource-efficient and sustainable growth path. To address the growing national environment and energy concerns, leaders introduced several binding environmental targets for government departments and large enterprises. The heavy reliance on a target-based implementation approach raises questions about the effectiveness of this strategy in the short and long run for environmental governance in China. Based on fieldwork in Jiangsu, Hunan, and Shandong provinces in 2012, this paper studies the desirable and undesirable outcomes of binding environmental targets in China's evolving green planning system. This paper argues that environmental targets have a signaling function that has resulted in ecological issues movement onto local governments' core policy agendas. However, in the nascent green planning system, classic planning problems have generated undesirable consequences such that that environmental targets are not always achieving their intended goals. Strategic and cyclical behavior by local government officials in leadership positions often lead to short-term maximization actions instead of long-term innovative environmental management. This analysis of local leaders' responses to top-down targets aims to generate a more realistic picture of what binding environmental targets can and cannot achieve.

This paper analyzes the career backgrounds of local government officials in provincial Environmental Protection Bureaus (EPBs) in China and explains appointment processes of Chinese EPB bureaucrats. Using biographical information of provincial EPB heads and drawing on extensive fieldwork conducted in 2010 in Shanxi Province and Inner Mongolia, this paper finds that only one-fourth of current EPB heads were promoted through the bureau ranks within the EPB, while the remaining three-fourths were appointed from positions outside the environment field. Further, nearly all EPB heads' professional backgrounds and associated networks can be clearly categorized as environmental, business, provincial government, or local government oriented. The paper delineates these four types of Chinese EPB leaders and explains why an awareness of the different professional orientations is critical to understanding environmental protection in China. These findings have implications for inferring the unique characteristics of a province's EPB leadership, the implementation capacities of provincial EPBs, and the appointment preferences of provincial leaders.

This book presents an analysis of why some large infrastructure projects are delayed or compromised and offers important insights into the better delivery of future projects. It provides an important reaction to the ambitious €315 billion investment plan devised by the European Commission, wherein Europe's infrastructure is a key investment target. Germany is adopted as a focus, as Europe's largest economy, and a nation that has seen significant delays and tensions in the delivery of key infrastructure projects. The contributions to this volume demonstrate various patterns for infrastructure assets and illustrate how factors such as poor project governance, early planning mistakes, inappropriate risk management and unforeseen technological challenges influence delivery. The in-depth case studies on the Berlin Brandenburg Airport, the Hamburg Elbphilharmonie, and offshore wind parks show how project delivery can face massive problems, and illuminating solutions are offered to these problems. Overall, the case of Germany also offers the opportunity to assess various new forms of project delivery, such as public-private partnerships (PPP), and the risks and opportunities of ambitious first-mover 'pioneer' projects. The book will be of great interest for scholars and upper-level students of human geography, business and management, as well as policy makers.

Rapid digitalization and an aging population are leading to an increasingly prominent age-based digital divide among the world's elderly population. This study focuses on China, one of the most rapidly aging and digitalizing countries in the world. Employing a mixed-method approach, this research examines how elderly individuals experience the digital transformation and the associated digital divide. The findings suggest that the elderly interviewees encounter multiple barriers to learning and using digital technologies, which highlights the significant role of social support and networks in facilitating their adaptation to the digital society and lifestyle. Attitudes toward digital engagement and digitalization vary greatly among the elderly, ranging from being optimistic to feeling left behind and having multiple concerns. Our findings further reveal that the Chinese government has implemented numerous digital apps tailored to the demands of the elderly and provided training opportunities to bridge the gray digital divide. This emphasizes the responsiveness and adaptiveness of Chinese authorities in addressing pressing societal issues. However, we identify a gap in digital outreach, as most elderly interviewees have limited awareness of government digital inclusion policies and programs. This article contributes to digital divide research and offers practical implications for countries grappling with the gray digital divide.

AbstractDigital data have become a valuable resource for autocratic governments seeking to influence societal behaviours. The rise of social credit systems in China has garnered a great deal of attention, with some even referring to them as 'Orwellian' surveillance systems. This study expands on previous research that has found surprisingly high levels of acceptance of social credit systems in China to the Southeast Asian region. Through an online opinion survey conducted in Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, we discovered that citizens in these countries exhibit higher acceptance rates of social credit systems than opposition rates, although lower than those observed in China. Moreover, we find that acceptance rates would decline significantly if the technologies supporting these systems originated from China. By introducing an external technology acceptance model, we provide an explanation for these findings based on citizens' attitudes towards their domestic situation and their perceptions of China's potential benefits to their countries. Interestingly, most of the 'China Threat' perceptions do not translate into opposition against Chinese social credit system technologies, except for military risks. Instead, citizens' negative views are primarily influenced by specific technology‐related risks. These findings contribute to the existing literature on the acceptance of government‐run social credit systems and public perception in the context of international relations.