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The digital pdf of Chapter 16 is available Open Access under CC-BY-NC-ND licence.
This collection brings together leading figures in the study of international relations to explore praxis as a perspective on international politics and law. With its focus on competent judgments, the praxis approach holds the promise to overcome the divide between knowing and acting that marks positivist international relations theory.
Building on the transdisciplinary work of Friedrich Kratochwil, this book reveals the scope, limits and blind spots of praxis theorizing.

Friedrich Kratochwil's book explores the role of law in the international arena and the key discourses surrounding it. It explains the increased importance of law for politics, from law-fare to the judicialization of politics, to human rights, and why traditional expectations of progress through law have led to disappointment. Providing an overview of the debates in legal theory, philosophy, international law and international organizations, Kratochwil reflects on the need to break down disciplinary boundaries and address important issues in both international relations and international law, including deformalization, fragmentation, the role of legal pluralism, the emergence of autonomous autopoietic systems and the appearance of non-territorial forms of empire. He argues that the pretensions of a positivist theory in social science and of positivism in law are inappropriate for understanding practical problems and formulates an approach for the analysis of praxis based on constructivism and pragmatism

This article reviews Wiliam Bains book and places it in the wider discussion of seciularization vs. secularism taking place in the social science. in general.

AbstractIn putting Wendt's recent Quantum Mind in a larger context both of his own disciplinary engagement and some larger philosophical issues, I try to avoid a hasty dismissal, since the book seems at first blush to offer a 'theory of everything', or an uncritical acceptance, since the desire to know what makes the world hand together has always been part of the knowledge game. As to the first problem, I find it rather odd that Wendt spends little time in justifying his particular take on quantum theory, which is far from uncontroversial. Second, I attempt to understand why he has given up on the profession trying now to solve puzzles in the field by claiming that 'quantum consciousness theory' provides us with an 'ace up the sleeve'. But the fact that wave collapse plays havoc with our traditional notions of cause, location, and mass, does not without further ado entitle us to claim that all or most problems in social science dealing with issues of validity and meaning of our concepts (rather than 'truth/falsity', as decided by making existential assertions) have been solved by quantum mechanics.

AbstractThe comment expands the logic of the critique of the 'judicialisation' in the global era and suggests that arguments in support of this development often engage in confirmatory research which weighs the 'evidence' in light of our wishes and political projects. The talk about 'learning' and 'dialogue' cannot sustain this form of judicial paternalism (at best) as an instantiation of emancipation or celebrate it as a victory for law by dispensing with politics. It is just a politics by other means. But in this politics some traditional remedies for insuring the accountability of the 'rulers' (or rule-handlers) have been weakened. The comment adds several critical observations about the practices of discourse, law, politics and judging which cannot camouflage the problem of power and its legitimisation. Thus we had better consider also a political alternative which relies on a variety of different institutional solutions where courts have to compete with other institutions without fixed hierarchies and where different sources of legitimacy stand in tension with each other.

Published online: 15 April 2021 ; The comment expands the logic of the critique of the 'judicialisation' in the global era and suggests that arguments in support of this development often engage in confirmatory research which weighs the 'evidence' in light of our wishes and political projects. The talk about 'learning' and 'dialogue' cannot sustain this form of judicial paternalism (at best) as an instantiation of emancipation or celebrate it as a victory for law by dispensing with politics. It is just a politics by other means. But in this politics some traditional remedies for insuring the accountability of the 'rulers' (or rule-handlers) have been weakened. The comment adds several critical observations about the practices of discourse, law, politics and judging which cannot camouflage the problem of power and its legitimisation. Thus we had better consider also a political alternative which relies on a variety of different institutional solutions where courts have to compete with other institutions without fixed hierarchies and where different sources of legitimacy stand in tension with each other. ; This article was published Open Access with the support from the EUI Library through the CRUI - CUP Transformative Agreement (2020-2022)

AbstractThe problem of 'distance and engagement' highlights the Weberian paradox that objectivity in the social sciences cannot be based on demonstrative proof; it has to take into account values as the constituents of our 'interests'. Values should be explicit even if this 'perspectivity' cannot satisfy the criteria of necessity and universality. Allegedly, my skeptical approach to 'social theory' leaves researchers with insufficient 'hope', but one also learns from understanding that something is impossible or conceptually flawed. Moreover, deeper issues of analyzing social action, with existential and moral dimensions, should be considered. These involve our cognitive capacities, experiences, and emotions.

"A Pragmatic View of Practice in International Relations" published on by Oxford University Press.

"Constructivism" published on by Oxford University Press.

Este artículo aborda el tema de la naturaleza del conocimiento en los asuntos prácticos. Tradicionalmente esta cuestión ha sido abordada recurriendo a la construcción teórica ["theory-building"] y poniendo en juego una serie de criterios epistemológicos independientes que, supuestamente, garantizan los postulados formulados dentro de un marco teórico. En este contexto, la universalidad, entendida como generalidad, y la fiabilidad de los "datos" a lo largo de la historia son criterios particularmente poderosos que establecen la "verdad" de las proposiciones teóricas por medio de "tests" y, así, contribuyen a acumular "conocimiento". Pero este ideal del conocimiento "teórico" malinterpreta de forma significativa tanto el tipo de conocimiento que necesitamos para adoptar decisiones prácticas, como el de la "historia" para constituirnos en agentes. Al utilizar el argumento de Bull del segundo debate como contrapunto, y al revisar también las controversias relativas a la paz democrática y al papel de los estudios macro-históricos, primero me centro en la naturaleza de la "historicidad" y la situacionalidad [situatedness] de todo el conocimiento práctico. En segundo lugar, intento clarificar cómo el conocimiento del pasado que se relaciona con las elecciones prácticas en esa "historia" no es simplemente un almacén de datos fijos, sino un producto de la memoria, la cual está profundamente implicada tanto en nuestras construcciones de la identidad como de los proyectos políticos que perseguimos. En tercer lugar, esbozaré los criterios para la generación de conocimiento que son más apropiados cuando afrontamos problemas prácticos ; This article raises the issue about the nature of knowledge in practical matters. Traditionally this question has been answered by pointing to 'theory-building' and to field independent epistemological criteria that are supposed to provide the knowledge warrants for the assertions made within a theoretical framework. In this context universality, i.e. generality and transhistorical reliability of the 'data', are particularly powerful criteria that establish the 'truth' of theoretical propositions through 'tests' and thus contribute to cumulative 'knowledge'. But this ideal of 'theoretical' knowledge significantly misunderstands both the type of knowledge we need when we make practical choices and that of 'history' in constituting us as agents. In using Bull's argument in the second debate as a foil, and in revisiting also the controversies concerning the democratic peace and the role of macro-historical studies I first elaborate on the nature of the 'historicity' and situatedness of all practical knowledge. In a second step, I attempt to clarify how the knowledge of the past relates to practical choices in that 'history' is not simply a storehouse of fixed data, but a product of memory, which in turn is deeply involved in our constructions of identity and of the political projects we pursue. In a third step I adumbrate the criteria for knowledge generation that are more appropriate when we face practical problems

In this response, I answer some of the critiques that were raised in the Forum. In particular, this response clarifies the role of practices and pragmatism, the limits of inter-disciplinarity, and the authority and assumed foundations of law in a post-foundational time. Even though this contribution does not attempt to solve these issues once and for all, it provides avenues for future engagement.