Suchergebnisse

AbstractSince it took effect, the EU‐Turkey refugee agreement has been the subject of intense debate. While critics argue that it was politically short‐sighted, others point out that quick action was necessary to avert both a humanitarian crisis in Greece and the collapse of the Schengen system due to the unwillingness of EU member states to share responsibility. Since the agreement took effect, the most serious problems lay in the implementation process, which has revealed a troubling tendency among EU leaders to disregard the fundamental human rights abuses in Turkey. In the southeast, for example, the Turkish government is waging a full‐blown war against its Kurdish population, while a failed coup d'état in July 2016 put the country under a state of emergency that has led to even greater repression and growing reports of violations of asylum law. Ultimately, this agreement may fail, but it will remain necessary for the EU to cooperate with Turkey in order to control migration and work towards developing a comprehensive migration policy. Drawing on lessons from the agreement, this paper shall consider ways forward for future EU migration agreements with third countries.

Notwithstanding the ongoing negotiations between the PKK and the government, the crux of Turkey's Kurdish issue remains the structural inequalities against the Kurds, which are deeply rooted in an anti-democratic politico-legal regime.

Certainly, Turkey has come a long way in acknowledging the Kurdish issue and taking steps to address the Kurds' demands for equality and the rule of law. Once banned from speaking their language, Kurds can now use it to attain a university education. The Kurdish region is no longer governed by a state of emergency, nor are Kurdish civilians disappearing under detention. There is no doubt that the European Court of Human Rights and the European Union have played an indispensable role in this transition.

However, European institutions' engagement in the Kurdish issue has not always been coherent, while their impact on Turkey's policies has been limited, and at times negative, particularly in the post-9/11 context. Their uncritical oversight has facilitated Turkey's reluctance to undertake structural reforms to bring an end to the selective prosecution of Kurdish politicians, the criminalisation of non-violent advocacy of enhanced rights for the Kurds, the armament of civilians in the Kurdish region and the impunity of state officials who commit human rights violations.

Recent developments in Turkey have shown, once again, that a genuine democratic transition will only be possible with the coherent, continuous and critical engagement of European institutions in the Kurdish issue.

Viele hatten weitaus mehr von dem »Demokratiepaket« erwartet, das der türkische Premierminister Recep Tayyip Erdogan am 30. September angekündigt hatte. Schließlich wurde es fast ein Jahr nach Aufnahme der informellen Friedensgespräche beschlossen, die die Regierung mit Abdullah Öcalan führt, dem inhaftierten Führer der Arbeiterpartei Kurdistans (PKK). Doch anstelle von Reformen zur Lösung der Kurdenfrage stellte Erdogan lediglich allgemeine Maßnahmen in Aussicht, die dazu dienen sollen, türkische Gesetze mit dem Acquis der Europäischen Union (EU) zu harmonisieren. Mit der formalen Öffnung von Kapitel 22 im Rahmen der Verhandlungen über den Beitritt der Türkei zur EU ist auch die europäische Politik gefordert, Einfluss auf den Friedensprozess zu nehmen. Denn dieses Kapitel betrifft die Regionalpolitik, die eng mit der Frage der Dezentralisierung zusammenhängt. (Autorenreferat)