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What are the ideational, strategic, and political foundations of current Australian policy towards China? Although the strategic and security implication of a rising China in the region is frequently seen as a modern issue, the challenge of how to deal with a 'China growing strong' has preoccupied Australia since the 1950s; while modern approaches date from the 1960s. This paper traces the evolution of Australian security policy, attitudes, strategies, and assumptions behind both Liberal and Labor responses to the 'China security question' as well as the politics driving theme from Prime Minister Robert Menzies through to current Prime Minister John Howard. How have attitudes and responses to the 'China security question' evolved and changed, why did they do so, and how is this relevant to understanding current and future Australian responses to meeting the challenge of China's continued rise today? This paper explores these questions in chronological order, which coincides with the thematic development of the 'China security question' beginning with the Liberal Governments up to 1972, then to the Whitlam Government and the period leading to the 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre, and finally from the post-Tiananmen period to the present one culminating in Prime Minister John Howard's attempt at 'synthesis' of both Liberal and Labor approaches to the question.

The days of Chinese double-digit growth are gone. Yet, the analytical separation of economic matters from strategic and military planning is both surprising and illogical. Beijing's capacity to continue building its military power is diminishing much faster than is commonly appreciated.

The days of Chinese double-digit growth are gone. Yet, the analytical separation of economic matters from strategic and military planning is both surprising and illogical. Beijing's capacity to continue building its military power is diminishing much faster than is commonly appreciated.

Australia's new government is committed to delivering the next defence white paper in 2015. The two previous white papers took a predominantly risk-management approach to Southeast Asia, generally ignored the strategic opportunities in the region, treated it as a stand-alone region largely unrelated to developments in East Asia and failed to link Australia's policies in Southeast Asia with the broader goal of helping to ensure greater strategic stability in Asia by putting constraints on Chinese assertiveness and encouraging its peaceful rise. After offering a summary of recent Australian defence thinking on Southeast Asia, this paper outlines why managing China is the key variable when it comes to strategic stability in the region. It then examines how China's strategy and behaviour can be shaped and influenced by events and relationships in Southeast Asia, and offers some suggestions as to the role Australia can seek to play in Southeast Asia that relates to Canberra's China-focused objectives and strategic stability in Asia more broadly. If that can be achieved in the 2015 defence white paper, Australia - which is often criticized for being preoccupied primarily with managing the relationship with its superpower ally the United States - will demonstrate to itself and Asia that its heavy reliance on the ANZUS treaty is no barrier to strategic creativity in Asia. (Contemp Southeast Asia/GIGA)