The UN, Peace and Force
In: Australian journal of international affairs: journal of the Australian Institute of International Affairs, Band 52, Heft 2, S. 207-208
ISSN: 1035-7718
'The UN, Peace and Force' edited by Michael Pugh is reviewed.
In: Australian journal of international affairs: journal of the Australian Institute of International Affairs, Band 52, Heft 2, S. 207-208
ISSN: 1035-7718
'The UN, Peace and Force' edited by Michael Pugh is reviewed.
In: Australian journal of international affairs: journal of the Australian Institute of International Affairs, Band 52, Heft 1, S. 105-106
ISSN: 1035-7718
'Bondi in the Sinai: Australia, the MFO and the Politics of Participation,' by Rodney Gouttman, is reviewed.
In: Journal of political ecology: JPE ; case studies in history and society, Band 28, Heft 1
ISSN: 1073-0451
In: Trends in Southeast Asia, 2020, issue 6
American Indo-Pacific policy will be driven by its China policy, regardless of whether there is a second-term Donald Trump administration or a first-term Joe Biden administration. The Republicans will continue to frame the major challenge as 'balancing' against Chinese power and 'countering' the worst aspects of Beijing's policies. Establishment or moderate Democrats under Biden will choose the softer language of seeking a favourable 'competitive coexistence' in the military, economic, political and global governance realms, and the reassertion of American leadership and moral standing. In advancing the FOIP, the current administration argues that disruptiveness and unpredictability are necessary to reverse what they see as the 'normalization' of Chinese assertiveness, coercion and revisionism. They also point to the closeness of US cooperation with Japan, Australia and India and bourgeoning strategic relationships with Vietnam. A second-term Trump administration will continue to seek out 'fit-for-purpose' existing institutions and relationships, or prioritize new ones. Establishment Democrats believe that the 'America First' unilateralist approach is unsettling for allies and partners. In advancing a favourable 'competitive coexistence' with China, Democrats will seek to expand the tools of statecraft and achieve a better balance between military/economic/political/governance approaches. Prima facie, a Biden administration might position America as a more consultative guarantor of a preferred order. However, there will be greater pressure on Southeast Asians to accept more collective responsibility to advance common objectives. This means hedging in a manner more suitable to American rather than Chinese preferences. Failing that, more emphasis might be placed on greater institutionalization of the Quad and ad hoc groupings. A Bernie Sanders administration, now an unlikely prospect, would be a disaster for US standing and power in the region, and therefore for Southeast Asia.
In: Trends in Southeast Asia 2020, issue 6
American Indo-Pacific policy will be driven by its China policy, regardless of whether there is a second-term Donald Trump administration or a first-term Joe Biden administration. The Republicans will continue to frame the major challenge as 'balancing' against Chinese power and 'countering' the worst aspects of Beijing's policies. Establishment or moderate Democrats under Biden will choose the softer language of seeking a favourable 'competitive coexistence' in the military, economic, political and global governance realms, and the reassertion of American leadership and moral standing. In advancing the FOIP, the current administration argues that disruptiveness and unpredictability are necessary to reverse what they see as the 'normalization' of Chinese assertiveness, coercion and revisionism. They also point to the closeness of US cooperation with Japan, Australia and India and bourgeoning strategic relationships with Vietnam. A second-term Trump administration will continue to seek out 'fit-for-purpose' existing institutions and relationships, or prioritize new ones. Establishment Democrats believe that the 'America First' unilateralist approach is unsettling for allies and partners. In advancing a favourable 'competitive coexistence' with China, Democrats will seek to expand the tools of statecraft and achieve a better balance between military/economic/political/governance approaches. Prima facie, a Biden administration might position America as a more consultative guarantor of a preferred order. However, there will be greater pressure on Southeast Asians to accept more collective responsibility to advance common objectives. This means hedging in a manner more suitable to American rather than Chinese preferences. Failing that, more emphasis might be placed on greater institutionalization of the Quad and ad hoc groupings. A Bernie Sanders administration, now an unlikely prospect, would be a disaster for US standing and power in the region, and therefore for Southeast Asia.
In: Trends in Southeast Asia, 2018 no. 13
In recent times, the United States, Japan and Australia have all promoted extremely similar visions of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific as the central organizing concept to guide their efforts in the region. The concept is essentially a reaffirmation of the security and economic rules-based order which was cobbled together after the Second World War - especially as it relates to freedom of the regional and global commons such as sea, air and cyberspace, and the way nations conduct economic relations. Be that as it may, the Free and Open Indo-Pacific is an updated vision of collective action to defend, strengthen and advance that order. It signals a greater acceptance by the two regional allies of the U.S. of their security burden and takes into account the realities of China's rise and the relative decline in dominance of the U.S. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its member states continue to delay any definitive response to the Free and Open Indo-Pacific concept. Although its principles are attractive to many ASEAN member states, long-held conceptions of ASEAN centrality and its meaning gives the organization apparent reason for hesitation. The reasons include fears of diminished centrality and relevance, and reluctance to endorse a more confrontational mindset being adopted by the U.S. and its allies - including the revival of the Quadrilateral grouping with India - with respect to China. The reality is that while ASEAN and major member states are focused primarily on the risks of action, there are considerable risks of inaction and hesitation. The current era will either enhance or lessen the relevance of ASEAN in the eyes of these three countries in the years ahead depending on how the organisation and its key member states respond. Indeed, this Trends paper argues that ASEAN is more likely to be left behind by strategic events and developments if it remains passive, and that the ball is in ASEAN's court in terms of the future of its regional 'centrality'.
In: Trends in Southeast Asia 2018 no. 13
In recent times, the United States, Japan and Australia have all promoted extremely similar visions of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific as the central organizing concept to guide their efforts in the region. The concept is essentially a reaffirmation of the security and economic rules-based order which was cobbled together after the Second World War - especially as it relates to freedom of the regional and global commons such as sea, air and cyberspace, and the way nations conduct economic relations. Be that as it may, the Free and Open Indo-Pacific is an updated vision of collective action to defend, strengthen and advance that order. It signals a greater acceptance by the two regional allies of the U.S. of their security burden and takes into account the realities of China's rise and the relative decline in dominance of the U.S. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its member states continue to delay any definitive response to the Free and Open Indo-Pacific concept. Although its principles are attractive to many ASEAN member states, long-held conceptions of ASEAN centrality and its meaning gives the organization apparent reason for hesitation. The reasons include fears of diminished centrality and relevance, and reluctance to endorse a more confrontational mindset being adopted by the U.S. and its allies - including the revival of the Quadrilateral grouping with India - with respect to China. The reality is that while ASEAN and major member states are focused primarily on the risks of action, there are considerable risks of inaction and hesitation. The current era will either enhance or lessen the relevance of ASEAN in the eyes of these three countries in the years ahead depending on how the organisation and its key member states respond. Indeed, this Trends paper argues that ASEAN is more likely to be left behind by strategic events and developments if it remains passive, and that the ball is in ASEAN's court in terms of the future of its regional 'centrality'.
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In recent times, the United States, Japan and Australia have all promoted extremely similar visions of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific as the central organizing concept to guide their efforts in the region. The concept is essentially a reaffirmation of the security and economic rules-based order which was cobbled together after the Second World War -- especially as it relates to freedom of the regional and global commons such as sea, air and cyberspace, and the way nations conduct economic relations.Be that as it may, the Free and Open Indo-Pacific is an updated vision of collective action to defend, strengthen and advance that order. It signals a greater acceptance by the two regional allies of the U.S. of their security burden and takes into account the realities of China's rise and the relative decline in dominance of the U.S.There are a number of noteworthy "updates" which include:* A deliberate move from "Asia-Pacific" to "Indo-Pacific" as the primary geo-strategic and geo-economic area of interest and responsibility for the three countries;* An increased emphasis on creating and sustaining a "balance of power" in favour of the rules-based order; and* A greater emphasis on the liberal aspects of a preferred order including the importance of rule-of-law and limitations on how governments wield their power, and greater separation of political and strategic objectives on one hand with commercial activities on the other.While operationalization of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific concept is at an early stage, trilateral strategic cooperation between the U.S., Japan and Australia is significant and quickly deepening. On the other hand, and with respect to misalignment and inconsistency, the economic policies of the Trump administration are causing considerable frustration.The three countries have also been strong supporters for the revival of the
In: Trends in Southeast Asia 2018 13
The "free and open Indo-Pacific" and implications for ASEAN -- FOREWORD -- EXECUTIVE SUMMARY -- INTRODUCTION -- A FREE AND OPEN INDO-PACIFIC: BACK TO THE FUTURE BUT THIS TIME IT'S DIFFERENT -- OPERATIONALISING A FREE AND OPEN INDO-PACIFIC -- PUTTING THE "INDO" IN INDO-PACIFIC: THE REVIVAL OF THE QUAD -- ASEAN AND THE FREE AND OPEN INDO-PACIFIC -- CHALLENGE OR OPPORTUNITY: ASEAN MUST DECIDE -- CONCLUSION.
In: Trends in Southeast Asia 2014 7