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Political polarization and the French rejection of the European constitution
In: European Journal of Political Economy, Band 21, Heft 4, S. 1077-1084
Political Polarization and the French Rejection of the European Constitution
In: European journal of political economy, Band 21, Heft 4, S. 1077-1084
ISSN: 1873-5703
Political polarization expressed through the spatial model of political competition explains the rejection of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe by French voters. The increasing polarization of the distribution of voters during the last 30 years made the outcome of the 29 May 2005 referendum a predictable event. Figures, References. [Copyright 2005 Elsevier B.V.]
La Privatisation des Rues
In: Journal des économistes et des études humaines: JEEH, Band 7, Heft 2-3, S. 363-374
ISSN: 2153-1552
Social Justice and its Controversies
In: Journal des économistes et des études humaines: JEEH, Band 4, Heft 2-3, S. 235-262
ISSN: 2153-1552
PROHIBITION DE LA DROGUE : DIAGNOSTIC ET SOLUTIONS
In: Journal des économistes et des études humaines: JEEH, Band 3, Heft 4, S. 493-522
ISSN: 2153-1552
Le propriétarisme contre l'utilitarisme
In: Journal des économistes et des études humaines: JEEH, Band 2, Heft 1, S. 151-158
ISSN: 2153-1552
Les tentatives d'explications du comportement des étudiants par les économistes et la confrontation des hypothèses aux faits
In: Revue française de sociologie, Band 18, Heft 3, S. 499
La contrainte budgétaire de l'Etat et l' « Optimal Policy Mix » en régime de change fixe et flexible
In: Revue économique, Band 24, Heft 3, S. 473-504
ISSN: 1950-6694
SSRN
Working paper
The Judge and His Hangman: Judicial Selection and the Accountability of Judges in the US
In: Vienna online journal on international constitutional law: ICL-Journal, Band 12, Heft 3, S. 239-256
ISSN: 1995-5855, 2306-3734
Abstract
Who gets to determine rights and justice? Which mechanism of judicial selection and accountability is optimal? There is no easy answer. If judges are independent experts, nominated and evaluated by their peers, they will be immune from the pressures of electoral rent-seeking, but unaccountable to the people. If judges are elected, they will be democratically accountable, but subject to the redistributive pressures of the ballot box. If judges are nominated and controlled by politicians, they will face the temptations of bureaucratic self-interest and will not be democratically accountable, but they will be shielded from the Public Choice problems of elections. This paper uses the death penalty in the United States to measure and compare the impact of different methods of judicial selection. In the end, there is no optimal solution – at least not within a state judicial monopoly.
Fiscalité, parafiscalité et offre de travail féminin [Rapport préliminaire d'une recherche menée par le CREDOC et cofinancée par la CNAF]
In: Recherches et Prévisions, Band 0, Heft 1, S. 16-17
Bioethics, Rent-Seeking, and Death: Examining the Opposition to Kidney Markets
In: Journal des économistes et des études humaines: JEEH, Band 27, Heft 1, S. 51-74
ISSN: 2153-1552
AbstractThe market for kidneys offers a case study of Baptists and Bootleggers. In almost every country, sales are currently illegal and donated organs are allocated by a central planner. Thousands of people die every year, because of the shortage caused by the absence of markets. This paper starts by examining the free-market alternative, and shows that a market would solve the shortage (and thus unnecessary deaths). It then uses gains-from-trade analysis to explain why current vested interests oppose a move to a market, despite the immense potential for saved lives. In a shift to a market, gains from trade would be distributed away from lucky patients (who receive a zero-price kidney) and various industries that benefit from the shortage (dialysis, medical equipment, etc.); these "Bootleggers" form an alliance with "Baptists" (altruistic donors, large segments of the bioethics community, and organ allocation central planners).
How Should Votes Be Weighted to Reflect the Existing and “Calculated” Distribution of Voting Power of Weighted Voting Organizations Integrating Different Majority Requirements?
In: The Political Economy of Governance; Studies in Political Economy, S. 267-289