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This paper studies local governments' public policies in a metropolitan area plagued by traffic congestion, where both residents and workers consume local public goods. We develop a new spatial sub-metropolitan tax competition model which features a central city surrounded by suburban towns linked by mobile capital and mobile residents who commute to work. We show that Pareto-efficiency is achieved if towns can retain their workers using labor subsidies. Otherwise, traffic congestion in the city is inefficiently high and local governments respond by setting inefficient public policies: (1) the city over-taxes capital and under-taxes residents, which leads to too little capital and too many residents in the city; (2) local public goods are under-provided in the city and over-provided in the towns.

This paper studies local governments' public policies in a metropolitan area plagued by traffic congestion, where both residents and workers consume local public goods. We develop a new spatial sub-metropolitan tax competition model which features a central city surrounded by suburban towns linked by mobile capital and mobile residents who commute to work. We show that Pareto-efficiency is achieved if towns can retain their workers using labor subsidies. Otherwise, traffic congestion in the city is inefficiently high and local governments respond by setting inefficient public policies: (1) the city over-taxes capital and under-taxes residents, which leads to too little capital and too many residents in the city; (2) local public goods are under-provided in the city and over-provided in the towns.

This paper studies local governments' public policies in a metropolitan area plagued by traffic congestion, where both residents and workers consume local public goods. We develop a new spatial sub-metropolitan tax competition model which features a central city surrounded by suburban towns linked by mobile capital and mobile residents who commute to work. We show that Pareto-efficiency is achieved if towns can retain their workers using labor subsidies. Otherwise, traffic congestion in the city is inefficiently high and local governments respond by setting inefficient public policies: (1) the city over-taxes capital and under-taxes residents, which leads to too little capital and too many residents in the city; (2) local public goods are under-provided in the city and over-provided in the towns.

This paper studies local governments' public policies in a metropolitan area plagued by traffic congestion, where both residents and workers consume local public goods. We develop a new spatial sub-metropolitan tax competition model which features a central city surrounded by suburban towns linked by mobile capital and mobile residents who commute to work. We show that Pareto-efficiency is achieved if towns can retain their workers using labor subsidies. Otherwise, traffic congestion in the city is inefficiently high and local governments respond by setting inefficient public policies: (1) the city over-taxes capital and under-taxes residents, which leads to too little capital and too many residents in the city; (2) local public goods are under-provided in the city and over-provided in the towns.

This paper studies local governments' public policies in a metropolitan area plagued by traffic congestion, where both residents and workers consume local public goods. We develop a new spatial sub-metropolitan tax competition model which features a central city surrounded by suburban towns linked by mobile capital and mobile residents who commute to work. We show that Pareto-efficiency is achieved if towns can retain their workers using labor subsidies. Otherwise, traffic congestion in the city is inefficiently high and local governments respond by setting inefficient public policies: (1) the city over-taxes capital and under-taxes residents, which leads to too little capital and too many residents in the city; (2) local public goods are under-provided in the city and over-provided in the towns.

This thesis is interested in public policy choices of local governments of the low-level jurisdictions, such as municipalities which face a high degree of mobility of capital, residents and workers. The tax competition literature did not pay enough attention to this strong mobility of the agents. Household mobility is most often ignored in the literature and there exists no model including capital, residents' and workers' mobility. By assuming immobility of households (either residents or workers or both), previous work depicts more a regional or national environment than a local one.This thesis addresses the following question: within metropolitan areas, how do competing local governments, facing a high mobility of capital, residents and workers, choose their various policy instruments? Theoretically, our thesis contributes to fill the gap in the literature mentioned above. It also matters from an empirical perspective. Indeed, fiscal, socio-demographic, economic and political data at the municipal level are among the most accessible ones.Our thesis can help to provide better theoretical grounds for future empirical work and pave the way for new approaches in the study of local governments' choices where agents' mobility plays a central role. ; Cette thèse s'intéresse aux choix de politique publique des collectivités locales, telles que les municipalités, qui font face à une forte mobilité du capital, des résidents et des travailleurs. La littérature sur la concurrence fiscale a porté une attention très limitée à cette forte mobilité des agents économiques au niveau local. La mobilité des ménages a le plus souvent été ignorée. Aucun modèle unifié ne tient compte de la mobilité du capital, des résidents et des travailleurs. Les modèles existants,en faisant l'hypothèse de résidents ou travailleurs immobiles, décrivent davantage une réalité nationale, voire régionale, mais pas locale.La question de recherche de notre thèse est : comment, au sein d'une agglomération urbaine, des gouvernements locaux concurrents, faisant face à une importante mobilité du capital, des résidents et des travailleurs, choisissent-ils leurs divers instruments de politique publique ? Elle a un intérêt théorique car elle met en lumière nos lacunes dans la connaissance des gouvernements locaux. Elle a également un intérêt empirique car les données fiscales, socio-démographiques, économiques etpolitiques au niveau municipal comptent parmi les plus accessibles.Notre thèse peut fournir de meilleures bases théoriques pour de futurs travaux théoriques et permettre d'ouvrir la voie vers de nouvelles approches dans l'étude des choix des gouvernements locaux.

This thesis is interested in public policy choices of local governments of the low-level jurisdictions, such as municipalities which face a high degree of mobility of capital, residents and workers. The tax competition literature did not pay enough attention to this strong mobility of the agents. Household mobility is most often ignored in the literature and there exists no model including capital, residents' and workers' mobility. By assuming immobility of households (either residents or workers or both), previous work depicts more a regional or national environment than a local one.This thesis addresses the following question: within metropolitan areas, how do competing local governments, facing a high mobility of capital, residents and workers, choose their various policy instruments? Theoretically, our thesis contributes to fill the gap in the literature mentioned above. It also matters from an empirical perspective. Indeed, fiscal, socio-demographic, economic and political data at the municipal level are among the most accessible ones.Our thesis can help to provide better theoretical grounds for future empirical work and pave the way for new approaches in the study of local governments' choices where agents' mobility plays a central role. ; Cette thèse s'intéresse aux choix de politique publique des collectivités locales, telles que les municipalités, qui font face à une forte mobilité du capital, des résidents et des travailleurs. La littérature sur la concurrence fiscale a porté une attention très limitée à cette forte mobilité des agents économiques au niveau local. La mobilité des ménages a le plus souvent été ignorée. Aucun modèle unifié ne tient compte de la mobilité du capital, des résidents et des travailleurs. Les modèles existants,en faisant l'hypothèse de résidents ou travailleurs immobiles, décrivent davantage une réalité nationale, voire régionale, mais pas locale.La question de recherche de notre thèse est : comment, au sein d'une agglomération urbaine, des gouvernements locaux concurrents, faisant face à une importante mobilité du capital, des résidents et des travailleurs, choisissent-ils leurs divers instruments de politique publique ? Elle a un intérêt théorique car elle met en lumière nos lacunes dans la connaissance des gouvernements locaux. Elle a également un intérêt empirique car les données fiscales, socio-démographiques, économiques etpolitiques au niveau municipal comptent parmi les plus accessibles.Notre thèse peut fournir de meilleures bases théoriques pour de futurs travaux théoriques et permettre d'ouvrir la voie vers de nouvelles approches dans l'étude des choix des gouvernements locaux.

This thesis is interested in public policy choices of local governments of the low-level jurisdictions, such as municipalities which face a high degree of mobility of capital, residents and workers. The tax competition literature did not pay enough attention to this strong mobility of the agents. Household mobility is most often ignored in the literature and there exists no model including capital, residents' and workers' mobility. By assuming immobility of households (either residents or workers or both), previous work depicts more a regional or national environment than a local one.This thesis addresses the following question: within metropolitan areas, how do competing local governments, facing a high mobility of capital, residents and workers, choose their various policy instruments? Theoretically, our thesis contributes to fill the gap in the literature mentioned above. It also matters from an empirical perspective. Indeed, fiscal, socio-demographic, economic and political data at the municipal level are among the most accessible ones.Our thesis can help to provide better theoretical grounds for future empirical work and pave the way for new approaches in the study of local governments' choices where agents' mobility plays a central role. ; Cette thèse s'intéresse aux choix de politique publique des collectivités locales, telles que les municipalités, qui font face à une forte mobilité du capital, des résidents et des travailleurs. La littérature sur la concurrence fiscale a porté une attention très limitée à cette forte mobilité des agents économiques au niveau local. La mobilité des ménages a le plus souvent été ignorée. Aucun modèle unifié ne tient compte de la mobilité du capital, des résidents et des travailleurs. Les modèles existants,en faisant l'hypothèse de résidents ou travailleurs immobiles, décrivent davantage une réalité nationale, voire régionale, mais pas locale.La question de recherche de notre thèse est : comment, au sein d'une agglomération urbaine, des gouvernements locaux concurrents, ...

This thesis is interested in public policy choices of local governments of the low-level jurisdictions, such as municipalities which face a high degree of mobility of capital, residents and workers. The tax competition literature did not pay enough attention to this strong mobility of the agents. Household mobility is most often ignored in the literature and there exists no model including capital, residents' and workers' mobility. By assuming immobility of households (either residents or workers or both), previous work depicts more a regional or national environment than a local one.This thesis addresses the following question: within metropolitan areas, how do competing local governments, facing a high mobility of capital, residents and workers, choose their various policy instruments? Theoretically, our thesis contributes to fill the gap in the literature mentioned above. It also matters from an empirical perspective. Indeed, fiscal, socio-demographic, economic and political data at the municipal level are among the most accessible ones.Our thesis can help to provide better theoretical grounds for future empirical work and pave the way for new approaches in the study of local governments' choices where agents' mobility plays a central role. ; Cette thèse s'intéresse aux choix de politique publique des collectivités locales, telles que les municipalités, qui font face à une forte mobilité du capital, des résidents et des travailleurs. La littérature sur la concurrence fiscale a porté une attention très limitée à cette forte mobilité des agents économiques au niveau local. La mobilité des ménages a le plus souvent été ignorée. Aucun modèle unifié ne tient compte de la mobilité du capital, des résidents et des travailleurs. Les modèles existants,en faisant l'hypothèse de résidents ou travailleurs immobiles, décrivent davantage une réalité nationale, voire régionale, mais pas locale.La question de recherche de notre thèse est : comment, au sein d'une agglomération urbaine, des gouvernements locaux concurrents, faisant face à une importante mobilité du capital, des résidents et des travailleurs, choisissent-ils leurs divers instruments de politique publique ? Elle a un intérêt théorique car elle met en lumière nos lacunes dans la connaissance des gouvernements locaux. Elle a également un intérêt empirique car les données fiscales, socio-démographiques, économiques etpolitiques au niveau municipal comptent parmi les plus accessibles.Notre thèse peut fournir de meilleures bases théoriques pour de futurs travaux théoriques et permettre d'ouvrir la voie vers de nouvelles approches dans l'étude des choix des gouvernements locaux.

This thesis is interested in public policy choices of local governments of the low-level jurisdictions, such as municipalities which face a high degree of mobility of capital, residents and workers. The tax competition literature did not pay enough attention to this strong mobility of the agents. Household mobility is most often ignored in the literature and there exists no model including capital, residents' and workers' mobility. By assuming immobility of households (either residents or workers or both), previous work depicts more a regional or national environment than a local one.This thesis addresses the following question: within metropolitan areas, how do competing local governments, facing a high mobility of capital, residents and workers, choose their various policy instruments? Theoretically, our thesis contributes to fill the gap in the literature mentioned above. It also matters from an empirical perspective. Indeed, fiscal, socio-demographic, economic and political data at the municipal level are among the most accessible ones.Our thesis can help to provide better theoretical grounds for future empirical work and pave the way for new approaches in the study of local governments' choices where agents' mobility plays a central role. ; Cette thèse s'intéresse aux choix de politique publique des collectivités locales, telles que les municipalités, qui font face à une forte mobilité du capital, des résidents et des travailleurs. La littérature sur la concurrence fiscale a porté une attention très limitée à cette forte mobilité des agents économiques au niveau local. La mobilité des ménages a le plus souvent été ignorée. Aucun modèle unifié ne tient compte de la mobilité du capital, des résidents et des travailleurs. Les modèles existants,en faisant l'hypothèse de résidents ou travailleurs immobiles, décrivent davantage une réalité nationale, voire régionale, mais pas locale.La question de recherche de notre thèse est : comment, au sein d'une agglomération urbaine, des gouvernements locaux concurrents, faisant face à une importante mobilité du capital, des résidents et des travailleurs, choisissent-ils leurs divers instruments de politique publique ? Elle a un intérêt théorique car elle met en lumière nos lacunes dans la connaissance des gouvernements locaux. Elle a également un intérêt empirique car les données fiscales, socio-démographiques, économiques etpolitiques au niveau municipal comptent parmi les plus accessibles.Notre thèse peut fournir de meilleures bases théoriques pour de futurs travaux théoriques et permettre d'ouvrir la voie vers de nouvelles approches dans l'étude des choix des gouvernements locaux.

This paper investigates the efficiency properties of tax competition between submetropolitan jurisdictions when capital, residents and workers are mobile, and both households and firms compete for local land markets. We analyze two decentralized equilibria: (1) with a local tax on residents and two separate local taxes on capital and land inputs, efficiency is achieved and the existence of a marginal fiscal cost due to residents' mobility is revealed; (2) combination of the taxes on capital and land inputs into a single business property tax leads local authorities to charge inefficiently high taxation on capital. We show that capital mobility induces a reduction in the business land taxation and local public inputs are used to offset the distorting effects of the property tax, accounting for the distorting impact of workers' mobility.

This paper investigates the efficiency properties of tax competition between submetropolitan jurisdictions when capital, residents and workers are mobile, and both households and firms compete for local land markets. We analyze two decentralized equilibria: (1) with a local tax on residents and two separate local taxes on capital and land inputs, efficiency is achieved and the existence of a marginal fiscal cost due to residents' mobility is revealed; (2) combination of the taxes on capital and land inputs into a single business property tax leads local authorities to charge inefficiently high taxation on capital. We show that capital mobility induces a reduction in the business land taxation and local public inputs are used to offset the distorting effects of the property tax, accounting for the distorting impact of workers' mobility.

This paper investigates the efficiency properties of tax competition between submetropolitan jurisdictions when capital, residents and workers are mobile, and both households and firms compete for local land markets. We analyze two decentralized equilibria: (1) with a local tax on residents and two separate local taxes on capital and land inputs, efficiency is achieved and the existence of a marginal fiscal cost due to residents' mobility is revealed; (2) combination of the taxes on capital and land inputs into a single business property tax leads local authorities to charge inefficiently high taxation on capital. We show that capital mobility induces a reduction in the business land taxation and local public inputs are used to offset the distorting effects of the property tax, accounting for the distorting impact of workers' mobility.

This paper investigates the efficiency properties of tax competition between submetropolitan jurisdictions when capital, residents and workers are mobile, and both households and firms compete for local land markets. We analyze two decentralized equilibria: (1) with a local tax on residents and two separate local taxes on capital and land inputs, efficiency is achieved and the existence of a marginal fiscal cost due to residents' mobility is revealed; (2) combination of the taxes on capital and land inputs into a single business property tax leads local authorities to charge inefficiently high taxation on capital. We show that capital mobility induces a reduction in the business land taxation and local public inputs are used to offset the distorting effects of the property tax, accounting for the distorting impact of workers' mobility.