Suchergebnisse

Reforming pensions looms large over the policy agenda of OECD countries. This is hardly surprising since public spending on pensions accounted on average for 7 per cent of OECD GDP in 2005; and this pension spending effort is set to increase significantly over the coming decades in response to population ageing. Pension policy is indeed challenging and controversial because it involves long-term decisions in the face of numerous short-term political pressures. However, the status quo does not always win out so far as pension reform in concerned: public finance crises and the looming threat of ageing populations have proved effective spurs for reform. As a result, much has been done since the early 1990s to make pension systems fit for the future. Nearly all the 30 OECD countries have made at least some changes to their pension systems in that period. In 16 of them, there have been major reforms that will significantly affect future benefits. The purpose of this paper is to summarise these reforms and highlight the main lessons. Section 1 looks at which countries reformed their pensions systems and which did not. It also examines the fiscal challenges posed by public pensions. Section 2 describes the measures in the reforms themselves. These include, among other things, increases in pension age, changes in the way benefits are calculated and smaller pension increases in retirement than in the past. Section 3 explores the impact of these reforms on future pension entitlements of today's retirees, showing a clear trend to a lower pension promise for today´s workers than for past generations. This means that people will need to save more for their own retirement via private pension schemes, an issue examined in Section 4. This is followed in Section 5 by a review of the main outstanding challenges facing pension systems in OECD countries. The final section presents some concluding remarks.

Despite the fact that today's young cohorts are smaller in number and better educated than their older counterparts, high youth unemployment remains a serious problem in many OECD countries. This reflects a variety of factors, including the relatively high proportion of young people leaving school without a basic education qualification, the fact that skills acquired in initial education are not always well adapted to labour market requirements, as well as general labour market conditions and problems in the functioning of labour markets. The paper highlights the contrasting trends in youth labour market performance over the past decade using a wide range of indicators. It also presents new evidence on i) the length of transitions from school to work; and ii) the degree to which temporary jobs serve as either traps for young people or stepping-stones to good careers. In addition, the paper reviews some recent policy innovations to improve youth employment prospects

The question of whether migration can be an equilibrating force in the labour market is an important criterion for an optimal currency area. It is of particular interest currently in the context of high and rising levels of labour market disparities, in particular within the Eurozone where there is no exchange-rate mechanism available to play this role. We shed some new light on this question by comparing pre- and post-crisis migration movements at the regional level in both Europe and the United States, and their association with asymmetric labour market shocks. We find that recent migration flows have reacted quite significantly to the EU enlargements in 2004 and 2007 and to changes in labour market conditions, particularly in Europe. Indeed, in contrast to the pre-crisis situation and the findings of previous empirical studies, there is tentative evidence that the migration response to the crisis has been considerable in Europe, in contrast to the United States where the crisis and subsequent sluggish recovery were not accompanied by greater interregional labour mobility in reaction to labour market shocks. Our estimates suggest that, if all measured population changes in Europe were due to migration for employment purposes - i.e. an upper-bound estimate - up to about a quarter of the asymmetric labour market shock would be absorbed by migration within a year. However, in the urozone the reaction mainly stems from migration of third-country nationals. Even within the group of Eurozone nationals, a significant part of the free mobility stems from immigrants from third countries who have taken on the nationality of their Eurozone host country.

The question of whether migration can be an equilibrating force in the labour market is an important criterion for an optimal currency area. It is of particular interest currently in the context of high and rising levels of labour market disparities, in particular within the Eurozone where there is no exchange-rate mechanism available to play this role. We shed some new light on this question by comparing pre- and post-crisis migration movements at the regional level in both Europe and the United States, and their association with asymmetric labour market shocks. We find that recent migration flows have reacted quite significantly to the EU enlargements in 2004 and 2007 and to changes in labour market conditions, particularly in Europe. Indeed, in contrast to the pre-crisis situation and the findings of previous empirical studies, there is tentative evidence that the migration response to the crisis has been considerable in Europe, in contrast to the United States where the crisis and subsequent sluggish recovery were not accompanied by greater interregional labour mobility in reaction to labour market shocks. Our estimates suggest that, if all measured population changes in Europe were due to migration for employment purposes - i.e. an upper-bound estimate - up to about a quarter of the asymmetric labour market shock would be absorbed by migration within a year. However, in the Eurozone the reaction mainly stems from migration of third-country nationals. Even within the group of Eurozone nationals, a significant part of the free mobility stems from immigrants from third countries who have taken on the nationality of their Eurozone host country.