Suchergebnisse
Did Obama's Ground Game Matter?: The Influence of Local Field Offices During the 2008 Presidential Election
In: The public opinion quarterly: POQ, Band 73, Heft 5, S. 1023-1039
ISSN: 1537-5331
It Takes an Outsider: Extralegislative Organization and Partisanship in the California Assembly, 1849–2006
In: American Journal of Political Science, Band 51, Heft 3, S. 482-497
SSRN
SSRN
Working paper
527 Committees and the Political Party Network
In: APSA 2009 Toronto Meeting Paper
SSRN
Working paper
Networking the Parties: A Comparative Study of Democratic and Republican National Convention Delegates in 2008
In: APSA 2009 Toronto Meeting Paper
SSRN
Working paper
Where You Sit Is Where You Stand: The Impact of Seating Proximity on Legislative Cue-Taking
In: Quarterly journal of political science, Band 3, Heft 3, S. 301-311
ISSN: 1554-0626
This article builds on Matthews and Stimsons (1975) study of legislative cue taking, analyzing the extent to which legislators sitting next to each other influence each others voting behavior. Data come from three decades of roll call votes in the California Assembly, a chamber in which each member is paired with a deskmate. By comparing deskmate pairs with nondeskmate pairs, I find that legislators vote identically to their deskmates on a sizeable subset of roll calls. This deskmate effect appears to remain strong even as a rival influence, legislative partisanship, increases in strength. Adapted from the source document.
Where You Sit is Where You Stand: The Impact of Seating Proximity on Legislative Cue-Taking
In: Quarterly Journal of Political Science, Band 3, S. 301-311
SSRN
Where You Sit is Where You Stand: The Impact of Seating Proximity on Legislative Cue-Taking
In: Quarterly journal of political science: QJPS, Band 3, Heft 3, S. 301-311
ISSN: 1554-0634
It Takes an Outsider: Extralegislative Organization and Partisanship in the California Assembly, 1849-2006
In: American journal of political science: AJPS, Band 51, Heft 3, S. 482-497
ISSN: 0092-5853
It Takes an Outsider: Extralegislative Organization and Partisanship in the California Assembly, 1849–2006
In: American journal of political science, Band 51, Heft 3, S. 482-497
ISSN: 1540-5907
Why are American politicians "single‐minded seekers of reelection" in some decades and fierce ideological warriors in others? This article argues that the key to understanding the behavior of members inside a legislative chamber is to follow the actions of key figures outside the chamber. These outsiders—activists, interest groups, and party bosses—use their control over party nominations, conditioned on institutional rules, to ensure ideological behavior among officeholders. To understand how vital these outsiders are to legislative partisanship, this article takes advantage of a particular natural experiment: the state of California's experience with cross‐filing (1914–59), under which institutional rules prevented outsiders from influencing party nominations. Under cross‐filing, legislative partisanship collapsed, demonstrating that incumbents tend to prefer nonpartisanship or fake partisanship to actual ideological combat. Partisanship quickly returned once these outsiders could again dominate nominations. Several other historical examples reveal extralegislative actors exerting considerably greater influence over members' voting behavior than intralegislative party institutions did. These results suggest that candidates and legislators are the agents of activists and others who coordinate at the community level to control party nominations.
A Return to Normalcy? Revisiting the Effects of Term Limits on Competitiveness and Spending in California Assembly Elections
In: State politics & policy quarterly: the official journal of the State Politics and Policy Section of the American Political Science Association, Band 7, Heft 1, S. 20-38
ISSN: 1532-4400
Term limits advocates argued that their reform would make state legislative campaigns more competitive and less expensive, and limited early studies suggested that it may have achieved those goals. But now, with evidence from more than a decade of experience with reform, we re-examine the effects of terms limits on electoral competitiveness and campaign spending in California Assembly elections. We find that while term limits initially suppressed campaign spending, they did not check its growth for long. Today, California's state legislative elections are as expensive in real dollars as they have ever been. In terms of electoral competitiveness, state legislative incumbents are in no more danger of losing their seats today than they were in the pre-term limits days of the late 1980s. Furthermore, open-seat races are not any more competitive under term limits than before them; however, we do find a modest, but significant, decline in incumbents' average winning margin since the imposition of term limits. But since term limits have made fewer incumbents eligible to run for office, this incumbency advantage helps fewer people than it once did. Yet, for the most part, rather than being supplanted by citizen-legislators, career politicians have simply adapted to the constraints imposed by term limits. Adapted from the source document.
A Return to Normalcy? Revisiting the Effects of Term Limits on Competitiveness and Spending in California Assembly Elections
In: State politics & policy quarterly: the official journal of the State Politics and Policy section of the American Political Science Association, Band 7, Heft 1, S. 20-38
ISSN: 1946-1607
Term limits advocates argued that their reform would make state legislative campaigns more competitive and less expensive, and limited early studies suggested that it may have achieved those goals. But now, with evidence from more than a decade of experience with reform, we re-examine the effects of terms limits on electoral competitiveness and campaign spending in California Assembly elections. We find that while term limits initially suppressed campaign spending, they did not check its growth for long. Today, California's state legislative elections are as expensive in real dollars as they have ever been. In terms of electoral competitiveness, state legislative incumbents are in no more danger of losing their seats today than they were in the pre-term limits days of the late 1980s. Furthermore, open-seat races are not any more competitive under term limits than before them; however, we do find a modest, but significant, decline in incumbents' average winning margin since the imposition of term limits. But since term limits have made fewer incumbents eligible to run for office, this incumbency advantage helps fewer people than it once did. Yet, for the most part, rather than being supplanted by citizen-legislators, career politicians have simply adapted to the constraints imposed by term limits.
Ideological Adaptation? The Survival Instinct of Threatened Legislators
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 69, Heft 3, S. 828-843
ISSN: 1468-2508