Suchergebnisse

As Japan's pre-Pearl Harbor ambassador to the United States, Admiral Nomura Kichisaburo (1877-1964) played a significant role in a tense and turbulent period in Japanese-US relations. This biography casts light on the life and career of this important figure

Abstract
This essay introduces readers to the recent discovery of the personal papers of Grand Steward Tajima Michiji. These documents capture the post-surrender reflections of Hirohito, Japan's Shōwa Emperor, and record him speaking on such issues as his war responsibility, as well as the culpability of prewar politicians such as Konoe Fumimaro and General Tōjō Hideki. In August 2019, Nippon Hoso Kyokai (Japan Broadcasting Corporation) (nhk) announced that it had gained privileged access to the papers. Acting on advice from scholars, it then released extracts from Tajima's audience records. Drawing not on the Tajima papers themselves, but on what the nhk has made available, the documents demonstrate that Hirohito, after Japan's surrender, experienced anguish and over the war and its outcome. He continued as emperor because he accepted "moral responsibility" for the war that required him to help his nation and its people endure occupation and reconstruction. This article also describes Hirohito's postwar reflections on several issues, such as Japanese field officers and subordinates in the 1930s initiating without authorization acts of aggression, the Rape of Nanjing, and Japan's postwar rearmament. While the Tajima papers will not resolve the ongoing debate over the emperor's responsibility for Japan's path of aggression before 1945, they do provide valuable insights about his role in and reaction to events before, during, and after World War ii.

This article examines a criminally understudied moment in modern Japanese military and political history. It is well known that the Imperial Japanese Army, in July 1940, toppled the cabinet of Prime Minister Yonai Mitsumasa. Yet, the damage thereby inflicted on the army's relationship with the emperor remains virtually unnoticed. So, too, are the army's subsequent efforts at repairing its relationship with its emperor. By exploring these issues, this article enters the long-standing and polarized debate concerning the Shôwa Emperor's role in Japanese aggression in the 1930s and early 1940s.

The Australian government in January 1940 appointed Richard Gardiner Casey minister to the United States. He sought both U.S. support for Britain in its war against Nazi Germany, and a U.S. guarantee to preserve Australian security in the face of an aggressive and threatening Japan. When Casey's mission ended in March 1942, the United States had entered war in both the Atlantic and the Pacific. The limits to Casey's ministerial influence were such, however, that one hardly can credit him with having delivered U.S. belligerency. The existing literature nonetheless locates merit in Casey's ministerial mission, particularly in his highly effective public diplomacy and also in his ability to remain abreast of key U.S. decisions and strategy. This essay takes no particular issue with these findings. Instead, it finds value elsewhere in Casey's mission, and in particular in the delicate balance he struck between his twin loyalties, to both Australia and the British Empire. It also departs from the existing literature insofar as it identifies a number of issues and episodes that call into question Casey's accomplishments and acumen.

This essay reproduces in its entirety a translated version of a hitherto neglected document from 1941, entitled "Armed Services' and Foreign Ministry's Revised Draft, April 21." The revisions pertain to the so-called "Draft Understanding between Japan and the United States," a plan for peace in the Pacific which Ambassador Nomura Kichisaburō submitted to U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull on 14 April, and then to Japanese Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro on 17 April. The revisions – or, to be more exact, the scarcity of revisions – suggest that even the Imperial Japanese Army viewed the Draft Understanding with an equanimity that has escaped previous scholarship. In so doing, the reproduced document raises important questions about the gulf separating Japan's armed services and hardline Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yōsuke.

Examines the impact of Ambassador Nomura Kichisaburo on Japanese-US relations in 1941, drawing on primary source documents that allow a detailed reappraisal of his role & shed light on the eleventh-hour Japanese-US negotiations. Focus is on three critical turning points viewed as lost opportunities in the run up to Pearl Harbor: (1) Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yosuke's Mar-Apr European rendezvous; (2) the aftermath of the June German invasion of the USSR; & (3) Japan's Nov modus vivendi proposal. At issue is whether Nomura had anything but a negative influence on the Japanese-US negotiations, his policy prescriptions & how they were received, & why he failed. Three principal themes come to light: (A) Nomura's naval background is at the root of his incisive & accurate foresight of Japanese aggression. (B) By mid-1941, there was a strangely fatalistic view from Tokyo regarding Japanese-US relations. (C) Nomura found his hands tied as a result of the US response to Japan's alliance with Germany & Italy. It is concluded that Nomura was critical to the tenor of Japanese-US relations in 1941, particularly because his interpretation of events differed so greatly from his colleagues; he advocated rapprochement with the US, a far more potent enemy than his superiors thought. J. Zendejas