Background: Travel to countries with high or intermediate hepatitis A virus (HAV) endemicity is a risk factor for infection in residents of countries with low HAV endemicity. Aim: The objective of this study was to estimate the risk for hepatitis A among European travellers using surveillance and travel denominator data. Methods: We retrieved hepatitis A surveillance data from 13 European Union (EU)/ European Economic Area (EEA) countries with comprehensive surveillance systems and travel denominator data from the Statistical Office of the European Union. A travel-associated case of hepatitis A was defined as any case reported as imported. Results: From 2009to2015, the 13 countries reported 18,839 confirmed cases of hepatitis A, of which 5,233 (27.8%) were travel-associated. Of these, 39.8% were among children younger than 15 years. The overall risk associated with travel abroad decreased over the period at an annual rate of 3.7% (95% confidence interval (CI): 0.7–2.7) from 0.70 cases per million nights in 2009 to 0.51 in 2015. The highest risk was observed in travellers to Africa (2.11 cases per million nights). Cases more likely to be reported as travel-associated were male and of younger age (<25 years). Conclusion: Travel is still a major risk factor for HAV infection in the EU/EEA, although the risk of infection may have slightly decreased in recent years. Children younger than 15 years accounted for a large proportion of cases and should be prioritised for vaccination. ; Peer Reviewed
BackgroundTravel to countries with high or intermediate hepatitis A virus (HAV) endemicity is a risk factor for infection in residents of countries with low HAV endemicity. Aim: The objective of this study was to estimate the risk for hepatitis A among European travellers using surveillance and travel denominator data. Methods: We retrieved hepatitis A surveillance data from 13 European Union (EU)/ European Economic Area (EEA) countries with comprehensive surveillance systems and travel denominator data from the Statistical Office of the European Union. A travel-associated case of hepatitis A was defined as any case reported as imported. Results: From 2009 to 2015, the 13 countries reported 18,839 confirmed cases of hepatitis A, of which 5,233 (27.8%) were travel-associated. Of these, 39.8% were among children younger than 15 years. The overall risk associated with travel abroad decreased over the period at an annual rate of 3.7% (95% confidence interval (CI): 0.7-2.7) from 0.70 cases per million nights in 2009 to 0.51 in 2015. The highest risk was observed in travellers to Africa (2.11 cases per million nights). Cases more likely to be reported as travel-associated were male and of younger age (< 25 years). Conclusion: Travel is still a major risk factor for HAV infection in the EU/EEA, although the risk of infection may have slightly decreased in recent years. Children younger than 15 years accounted for a large proportion of cases and should be prioritised for vaccination.
Background: Hepatitis E virus (HEV) infection is not notifiable at EU/EEA level, therefore surveillance relies on national policies only. Between 2005 and 2015, more than 20,000 cases were reported in EU/EEA countries. HEV testing is established in 26 countries and 19 countries sequence HEV viruses. Objective and study design: WHO's European Action plan for viral hepatitis recommends harmonised surveillance objectives and case definitions. ECDC's HEV expert group developed minimal and optimal criteria for national hepatitis E surveillance to support EU/EEA countries in enhancing their capacity and to harmonise methods. Results: The experts agreed that the primary objectives of national surveillance for HEV infections should focus on the basic epidemiology of the disease: to monitor the incidence of acute cases and chronic infections. The secondary objectives should be to describe viral phylotypes or subtypes and to identify potential clusters/outbreaks and possible routes of transmission. Seventeen of 20 countries with existing surveillance systems collect the minimal data set required to describe the epidemiology of acute cases. Eleven countries test for chronic infections. Twelve countries collect data to identify potential clusters/outbreaks and information on possible routes of transmission. Discussion: Overall, the majority of EU/EEA countries collect the suggested data and meet the outlined requirements to confirm an acute case. ; The work was supported by two service contracts No. ECD.7600 (HEV epidemiological support - NP/2017/OCS/253) and No. ID 5132: Hepatitis B, C, and E in the EU/EEA: monitoring and testing activities. Staff that were involved in the contracts: Esther Aspinall (Glasgow Caledonian University and Health Protection Scotland), Andrew Rideout (NHS Dumfries and Galloway), Chris Biggam (Glasgow Caledonian University), Gill Hawkins (Health Protection Scotland), and Alison Smith-Palmer (Health Protection Scotland). ; Sí
BACKGROUND: To assess the level of knowledge and trust in the policy decisions taken regarding the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic among Epirus Health Study (EHS) participants. METHODS: The EHS is an ongoing and deeply-phenotyped prospective cohort study that has recruited 667 participants in northwest Greece until August 31st, 2020. Level of knowledge on coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) transmission and COVID-19 severity was labeled as poor, moderate or good. Variables assessing knowledge and beliefs towards the pandemic were summarized overall and by sex, age group (25–39, 40–49, 50–59, ≥60 years) and period of report (before the lifting of lockdown measures in Greece: March 30th to May 3rd, and two post-lockdown time periods: May 4th to June 31st, July 1st to August 31st). A hypothesis generating exposure-wide association analysis was conducted to evaluate the associations between 153 agnostically-selected explanatory variables and participants' knowledge. Correction for multiple comparisons was applied using a false discovery rate (FDR) threshold of 5%. RESULTS: A total of 563 participants (49 years mean age; 60% women) had available information on the standard EHS questionnaire, the clinical and biochemical measurements, and the COVID-19-related questionnaire. Percentages of poor, moderate and good knowledge status regarding COVID-19 were 4.5, 10.0 and 85.6%, respectively. The majority of participants showed absolute or moderate trust in the Greek health authorities for the management of the epidemic (90.1%), as well as in the Greek Government (84.7%) and the official national sources of information (87.4%). Trust in the authorities was weaker in younger participants and those who joined the study after the lifting of lockdown measures (p-value≤0.001). None of the factors examined was associated with participants' level of knowledge after correction for multiple testing. CONCLUSIONS: High level of knowledge about the COVID-19 pandemic and trust in the Greek authorities was observed, possibly due to the ...
Hepatitis E virus (HEV) is endemic in EU/EEA countries, but the understanding of the burden of the infection in humans is inconsistent as the disease is not under EU surveillance but subject to national policies. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
Between 1 June 2016 and 31 May 2017, 17 European Union (EU) and European Economic Area countries reported 4,096 cases associated with a multi-country hepatitis A (HA) outbreak. Molecular analysis identified three co-circulating hepatitis A virus (HAV) strains of genotype IA: VRD_521_2016, V16–25801 and RIVM-HAV16–090. We categorised cases as confirmed, probable or possible, according to the EU outbreak case definitions. Confirmed cases were infected with one of the three outbreak strains. We investigated case characteristics and strain-specific risk factors for transmission. A total of 1,400 (34%) cases were confirmed; VRD_521_2016 and RIVM-HAV16–090 accounted for 92% of these. Among confirmed cases with available epidemiological data, 92% (361/393) were unvaccinated, 43% (83/195) travelled to Spain during the incubation period and 84% (565/676) identified as men who have sex with men (MSM). Results depict an HA outbreak of multiple HAV strains, within a cross-European population, that was particularly driven by transmission between non-immune MSM engaging in high-risk sexual behaviour. The most effective preventive measure to curb this outbreak is HAV vaccination of MSM, supplemented by primary prevention campaigns that target the MSM population and promote protective sexual behaviour. ; Peer Reviewed
IntroductionSequence-based typing of hepatitis A virus (HAV) is important for outbreak detection, investigation and surveillance. In 2013, sequencing was central to resolving a large European Union (EU)-wide outbreak related to frozen berries. However, as the sequenced HAV genome regions were only partly comparable between countries, results were not always conclusive.AimThe objective was to gather information on HAV surveillance and sequencing in EU/European Economic Area (EEA) countries to find ways to harmonise their procedures, for improvement of cross-border outbreak responses.MethodsIn 2014, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) conducted a survey on HAV surveillance practices in EU/EEA countries. The survey enquired whether a referral system for confirming primary diagnostics of hepatitis A existed as well as a central collection/storage of hepatitis A cases' samples for typing. Questions on HAV sequencing procedures were also asked. Based on the results, an expert consultation proposed harmonised procedures for cross-border outbreak response, in particular regarding sequencing. In 2016, a follow-up survey assessed uptake of suggested methods.ResultsOf 31 EU/EEA countries, 23 (2014) and 27 (2016) participated. Numbers of countries with central collection and storage of HAV positive samples and of those performing sequencing increased from 12 to 15 and 12 to 14 respectively in 2016, with all countries typing an overlapping fragment of 218 nt. However, variation existed in the sequenced genomic regions and their lengths.ConclusionsWhile HAV sequences in EU/EEA countries are comparable for surveillance, collaboration in sharing and comparing these can be further strengthened. ; We have received valuable comments to the manuscript from Mike Catchpole, Piotr Kramaz and Marc Struelens and acknowledge their contribution in improving the paper. ; Sí
INTRODUCTION: Sequence-based typing of hepatitis A virus (HAV) is important for outbreak detection, investigation and surveillance. In 2013, sequencing was central to resolving a large European Union (EU)-wide outbreak related to frozen berries. However, as the sequenced HAV genome regions were only partly comparable between countries, results were not always conclusive. AIM: The objective was to gather information on HAV surveillance and sequencing in EU/European Economic Area (EEA) countries to find ways to harmonise their procedures, for improvement of cross-border outbreak responses. METHODS: In 2014, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) conducted a survey on HAV surveillance practices in EU/EEA countries. The survey enquired whether a referral system for confirming primary diagnostics of hepatitis A existed as well as a central collection/storage of hepatitis A cases' samples for typing. Questions on HAV sequencing procedures were also asked. Based on the results, an expert consultation proposed harmonised procedures for cross-border outbreak response, in particular regarding sequencing. In 2016, a follow-up survey assessed uptake of suggested methods. RESULTS: Of 31 EU/EEA countries, 23 (2014) and 27 (2016) participated. Numbers of countries with central collection and storage of HAV positive samples and of those performing sequencing increased from 12 to 15 and 12 to 14 respectively in 2016, with all countries typing an overlapping fragment of 218 nt. However, variation existed in the sequenced genomic regions and their lengths. CONCLUSIONS: While HAV sequences in EU/EEA countries are comparable for surveillance, collaboration in sharing and comparing these can be further strengthened.
Introduction Sequence-based typing of hepatitis A virus (HAV) is important for outbreak detection, investigation and surveillance. In 2013, sequencing was central to resolving a large European Union (EU)-wide outbreak related to frozen berries. However, as the sequenced HAV genome regions were only partly comparable between countries, results were not always conclusive. Aim The objective was to gather information on HAV surveillance and sequencing in EU/European Economic Area (EEA) countries to find ways to harmonise their procedures, for improvement of cross-border outbreak responses. Methods In 2014, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) conducted a survey on HAV surveillance practices in EU/EEA countries. The survey enquired whether a referral system for confirming primary diagnostics of hepatitis A existed as well as a central collection/storage of hepatitis A cases' samples for typing. Questions on HAV sequencing procedures were also asked. Based on the results, an expert consultation proposed harmonised procedures for cross-border outbreak response, in particular regarding sequencing. In 2016, a follow-up survey assessed uptake of suggested methods. Results Of 31 EU/EEA countries, 23 (2014) and 27 (2016) participated. Numbers of countries with central collection and storage of HAV positive samples and of those performing sequencing increased from 12 to 15 and 12 to 14 respectively in 2016, with all countries typing an overlapping fragment of 218 nt. However, variation existed in the sequenced genomic regions and their lengths. Conclusions While HAV sequences in EU/EEA countries are comparable for surveillance, collaboration in sharing and comparing these can be further strengthened. ; Peer Reviewed
In: Enkirch , T , Severi , E , Vennema , H , Thornton , L , Dean , J , Borg , M-L , Ciccaglione , A R , Bruni , R , Christova , I , Ngui , S L , Balogun , K , Němeček , V , Kontio , M , Takács , M , Hettmann , A , Korotinska , R , Löve , A , Avellón , A , Muñoz-Chimeno , M , de Sousa , R , Janta , D , Epštein , J , Klamer , S , Suin , V , Aberle , S W , Holzmann , H , Mellou , K , Ederth , J L , Sundqvist , L , Roque-Afonso , A-M , Filipović , S K , Poljak , M , Vold , L , Stene-Johansen , K , Midgley , S , Fischer , T K , Faber , M , Wenzel , J J , Takkinen , J & Leitmeyer , K 2019 , ' Improving preparedness to respond to cross-border hepatitis A outbreaks in the European Union/European Economic Area : towards comparable sequencing of hepatitis A virus ' , Eurosurveillance (Online Edition) , vol. 24 , no. 28 , pii=1800397 . https://doi.org/10.2807/1560-7917.ES.2019.24.28.1800397
IntroductionSequence-based typing of hepatitis A virus (HAV) is important for outbreak detection, investigation and surveillance. In 2013, sequencing was central to resolving a large European Union (EU)-wide outbreak related to frozen berries. However, as the sequenced HAV genome regions were only partly comparable between countries, results were not always conclusive.AimThe objective was to gather information on HAV surveillance and sequencing in EU/European Economic Area (EEA) countries to find ways to harmonise their procedures, for improvement of cross-border outbreak responses.MethodsIn 2014, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) conducted a survey on HAV surveillance practices in EU/EEA countries. The survey enquired whether a referral system for confirming primary diagnostics of hepatitis A existed as well as a central collection/storage of hepatitis A cases' samples for typing. Questions on HAV sequencing procedures were also asked. Based on the results, an expert consultation proposed harmonised procedures for cross-border outbreak response, in particular regarding sequencing. In 2016, a follow-up survey assessed uptake of suggested methods.ResultsOf 31 EU/EEA countries, 23 (2014) and 27 (2016) participated. Numbers of countries with central collection and storage of HAV positive samples and of those performing sequencing increased from 12 to 15 and 12 to 14 respectively in 2016, with all countries typing an overlapping fragment of 218 nt. However, variation existed in the sequenced genomic regions and their lengths.ConclusionsWhile HAV sequences in EU/EEA countries are comparable for surveillance, collaboration in sharing and comparing these can be further strengthened.
To access publisher's full text version of this article, please click on the hyperlink in Additional Links field or click on the hyperlink at the top of the page marked Download ; IntroductionSequence-based typing of hepatitis A virus (HAV) is important for outbreak detection, investigation and surveillance. In 2013, sequencing was central to resolving a large European Union (EU)-wide outbreak related to frozen berries. However, as the sequenced HAV genome regions were only partly comparable between countries, results were not always conclusive.AimThe objective was to gather information on HAV surveillance and sequencing in EU/European Economic Area (EEA) countries to find ways to harmonise their procedures, for improvement of cross-border outbreak responses.MethodsIn 2014, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) conducted a survey on HAV surveillance practices in EU/EEA countries. The survey enquired whether a referral system for confirming primary diagnostics of hepatitis A existed as well as a central collection/storage of hepatitis A cases' samples for typing. Questions on HAV sequencing procedures were also asked. Based on the results, an expert consultation proposed harmonised procedures for cross-border outbreak response, in particular regarding sequencing. In 2016, a follow-up survey assessed uptake of suggested methods.ResultsOf 31 EU/EEA countries, 23 (2014) and 27 (2016) participated. Numbers of countries with central collection and storage of HAV positive samples and of those performing sequencing increased from 12 to 15 and 12 to 14 respectively in 2016, with all countries typing an overlapping fragment of 218 nt. However, variation existed in the sequenced genomic regions and their lengths.ConclusionsWhile HAV sequences in EU/EEA countries are comparable for surveillance, collaboration in sharing and comparing these can be further strengthened.
Between 1 June 2016 and 31 May 2017, 17 European Union (EU) and European Economic Area countries reported 4,096 cases associated with a multi-country hepatitis A (HA) outbreak. Molecular analysis identified three co-circulating hepatitis A virus (HAV) strains of genotype IA: VRD_521_2016, V16-25801 and RIVM-HAV16-090. We categorised cases as confirmed, probable or possible, according to the EU outbreak case definitions. Confirmed cases were infected with one of the three outbreak strains. We investigated case characteristics and strain-specific risk factors for transmission. A total of 1,400 (34%) cases were confirmed; VRD_521_2016 and RIVM-HAV16-090 accounted for 92% of these. Among confirmed cases with available epidemiological data, 92% (361/393) were unvaccinated, 43% (83/195) travelled to Spain during the incubation period and 84% (565/676) identified as men who have sex with men (MSM). Results depict an HA outbreak of multiple HAV strains, within a cross-European population, that was particularly driven by transmission between non-immune MSM engaging in high-risk sexual behaviour. The most effective preventive measure to curb this outbreak is HAV vaccination of MSM, supplemented by primary prevention campaigns that target the MSM population and promote protective sexual behaviour. ; Sí
Between 1 June 2016 and 31 May 2017, 17 European Union (EU) and European Economic Area countries reported 4,096 cases associated with a multi-country hepatitis A (HA) outbreak. Molecular analysis identified three co-circulating hepatitis A virus (HAV) strains of genotype IA: VRD_521_2016, V16-25801 and RIVM-HAV16-090. We categorised cases as confirmed, probable or possible, according to the EU outbreak case definitions. Confirmed cases were infected with one of the three outbreak strains. We investigated case characteristics and strain-specific risk factors for transmission. A total of 1,400 (34%) cases were confirmed; VRD_521_2016 and RIVM-HAV16-090 accounted for 92% of these. Among confirmed cases with available epidemiological data, 92% (361/393) were unvaccinated, 43% (83/195) travelled to Spain during the incubation period and 84% (565/676) identified as men who have sex with men (MSM). Results depict an HA outbreak of multiple HAV strains, within a cross-European population, that was particularly driven by transmission between non-immune MSM engaging in high-risk sexual behaviour. The most effective preventive measure to curb this outbreak is HAV vaccination of MSM, supplemented by primary prevention campaigns that target the MSM population and promote protective sexual behaviour.