The advantages of neomoorean antiskeptical strategy
In: Filozofija i društvo, Band 31, Heft 4, S. 615-628
ISSN: 2334-8577
This paper aims to argue in support of the neo-Moorean attempt(s) to solve a
skeptical paradox. It defends the thesis that neo-Mooreans retain advantages
and avoid disadvantages of rival anti-skeptical strategies - namely
epistemic contextualism. The puzzle that a radical skeptic poses is
exemplified by Nozick?s famous Brain in a Vat thought experiment, which
enables construing valid arguments consisting of jointly inconsistent but
independently plausible premises. The first and the second part of the paper
are devoted to Nozick?s conditional analysis of knowledge and De Rose?s
epistemic contextualism, both based on the sensitivity principle. Referring
to De Roses? contextualist theory, we demonstrate that the failure of
Nozick?s conditional analysis of knowledge to provide a satisfactory answer
to a skeptical paradox does not concern the sensitivity principle but rather
closure denial and embracing the so-called ?abominable conjunction?. In the
third part, we point out the weaknesses of the presumably most successful,
contextualist response to the paradox. We explain that even though DeRose?s
anti-skeptical strategy is built upon Nozick?s theory, he successfully
surmounts its difficulties. Yet it seems that as a contextualist, he
necessarily makes some concessions to a radical skeptic. Eventually, the
article introduces Black?s neo-Moorean anti-skeptical theory based on the
sensitivity principle as a strategy that makes neither concessions, nor
counterintuitive proposals.