Suchergebnisse

AbstractWhen states are targeted with sanctions, they may respond with alterations of their domestic economies meant to counter any negative effects of sanctions. In this article, we argue that these alterations tend to lead to increased state command of the economy and reduced economic freedom, as sanctions create opportunities and incentives that encourage target states and firms within them to pursue increased state control of the economy. These declines in economic freedom may come about through a number of causal mechanisms, several of which will be elaborated upon in this article. We use large‐N empirical analysis of all aspects of the Fraser Institute's Index of Economic Freedom and find that sanctions associate with reductions in most components of economic freedom.

The question of whether campaign contributions buy roll-call votes is both important and contentious. Although researchers often find positive correlations between the two, it is difficult to conclude that these correlations are causal because interest groups may be simply giving to their supporters rather than attempting to change members' voting behavior. In this paper we use a pair of votes on antisugar subsidy amendments to investigate the causal effects of contributions on voting. With multiple votes we can control for the supportiveness of the district or member by using fixed effects. We find strong evidence that changing contribution patterns caused significant changes in the probability that a district or member would vote to support the sugar industry (i.e., against the amendments). Our results hold in both district and incumbent fixed effects models and also when we redefine the time window for measuring relevant contributions.