Suchergebnisse
When Does Transparency Generate Legitimacy? Experimenting on a Context‐Bound Relationship
In: Governance: an international journal of policy and administration, Band 27, Heft 1, S. 111-134
ISSN: 1468-0491
We analyze the main rationale for public administrations and political institutions for supplying transparency, namely, that it generates legitimacy for these institutions. First, we discuss different theories of decision making from which plausible causal mechanisms that may drive a link between transparency and legitimacy may be derived. We find that the common notion of a straightforward positive correlation is naïve and that transparency reforms are rather unpredictable phenomena. Second, we test the effect of transparency on procedure acceptance using vignette experiments of representative decision making in schools. We find that transparency can indeed generate legitimacy. Interestingly, however, the form need not be "fishbowl transparency," with full openness of the decision‐making process. Decision makers may improve their legitimacy simply by justifying carefully afterward the decisions taken behind closed doors. Only when behavior close to a deliberative democratic ideal was displayed did openness of the process generate more legitimacy than closed‐door decision making with postdecisional justifications.
Special issue on linking inter- and intra-institutional change in the European Union
In: West European politics vol. 34, no. 1
New External Rules, New Internal Games: How the EU Institutions Respond when Inter-institutional Rules Change
In: West European politics, Band 34, Heft 1
ISSN: 1743-9655
Agreements concerning inter-institutional rules in the treaties of the European Union often give rise to reactions and processes of adaptation within the EU institutions. Recent literature on EU legislative politics has increasingly examined decision-making within the EU institutions, but has largely overlooked how these internal processes react and adapt to changes in relations between the EU bodies. To fill this gap the authors present a series of empirical studies that examine how shifts in inter-institutional rules and procedures affect intra-institutional politics. They show that the resulting intra-institutional adaptations may in turn both have distributive consequences and affect the efficiency of the initial inter-institutional reforms. In addition, they provide some stepping stones for theory-building on how treaty reforms affect organisational structure and decision-making within the EU institutions by outlining a series of mediating variables that link these two types of change processes. Adapted from the source document.
New external rules, new internal games: how the EU institutions respond when inter-institutional rules change
In: West European politics, Band 34, Heft 1, S. 1-17
ISSN: 0140-2382
World Affairs Online
Legislative Decision-Making in the European Union Before and After Enlargement: Explaining Network Ties in an International Legislature
In: APSA 2011 Annual Meeting Paper
SSRN
Working paper
Most Common When Least Important: Deliberation in the European Union Council of Ministers
In: British journal of political science, Band 40, Heft 1, S. 31-50
ISSN: 1469-2112
This article contributes to the empirical turn in deliberative democratic theory, by studying the presence of arguing (discussion on the merits) and bargaining in the working groups of the Council of the European Union. It uses a survey of representatives of member states to analyse to what extent, under what circumstances, and by whom, arguing is used. The results indicate that arguing is indeed common in the Council working groups, but also that there is substantial variation. Most arguing is found in intergovernmental policy areas and by the most powerful and well-connected actors. The findings point to the conclusion that higher stakes and political pressure make actors less willing and able to engage in arguing. Adapted from the source document.
Transparency is not Enough: Making Transparency Effective in Reducing Corruption
In: International political science review: the journal of the International Political Science Association (IPSA) = Revue internationale de science politique, Band 31, Heft 3, S. 301-322
ISSN: 1460-373X
We test the commonly stated, but rarely investigated, assertion that making political institutions more transparent is an effective method for combating corruption. This assertion is confirmed with cross-national data, but also specified and qualified in several respects. Most importantly, we find that looking only at average effects gives a misleading picture of the significance of transparency for corruption. Just making information available will not prevent corruption if such conditions for publicity and accountability as education, media circulation and free and fair elections are weak. Furthermore, we find that transparency requirements that are implemented by the agent itself are less effective compared to non-agent controlled transparency institutions, such as a free press. One important implication of these findings is that reforms focusing on increasing transparency should be accompanied by measures for strengthening citizens' capacity to act upon the available information if we are to see positive effects on corruption.
Out in the cold? Flexible integration and the political status of Euro opt-outs
In: European Union politics: EUP, Band 11, Heft 4, S. 485-509
ISSN: 1741-2757
A common argument against flexible integration as a solution to increased preference heterogeneity is that a likely consequence for those member states opting out of the enhanced cooperation is a loss of status and influence generally in the European Union (EU). It has been argued, for example, that the decisions by Denmark, Sweden and the UK not to join the Euro is considered to be free-riding, which leads to a bad reputation and exclusion from informal networks. We test this proposed free-rider effect by comparing the network capital of Euro-outsiders with insiders in the Council of the EU, using survey data of more than 600 member state representatives. The findings speak strongly against the free-rider hypothesis, as the Euro-outsiders are highly ranked in terms of network capital.
Transparency is not enough: making transparency effective in reducing corruption
In: International political science review: IPSR = Revue internationale de science politique : RISP, Band 31, Heft 3, S. 301-322
ISSN: 0192-5121
World Affairs Online
Out in the cold? Flexible integration and the political status of Euro opt-outs
In: European Union politics: EUP, Band 11, Heft 4, S. 485-510
ISSN: 1465-1165
DIE EUROPAPOLITIK IN DEN MITGLIEDSTAATEN DER EUROPÄISCHEN UNION: Schweden
In: Jahrbuch der europäischen Integration
ISSN: 0721-5436
New External Rules, New Internal Games: How the EU Institutions Respond when Inter-institutional Rules Change
In: West European politics, Band 34, Heft 1, S. 1-17
ISSN: 1743-9655
Schweden
In: Jahrbuch der europäischen Integration, S. 409-412
ISSN: 0721-5436