Making space: citizens, parties and interest groups in two ideological dimensions
In: Journal of European public policy, S. 1-32
ISSN: 1466-4429
In: Journal of European public policy, S. 1-32
ISSN: 1466-4429
In: Journal of common market studies: JCMS, Band 61, Heft 1, S. 58-75
ISSN: 1468-5965
World Affairs Online
In: Journal of common market studies: JCMS, Band 61, Heft 1, S. 58-75
ISSN: 1468-5965
AbstractEffective procedural arrangements allow courts to reconcile conflicting demands of timely justice and sound legal argument. In the context of the European Union, conflict between these demands emerged most acutely in the face of paralyzing delays in the preliminary reference procedure. It was partly solved by Article 99 of the Rules of Procedure. The provision allowed the European Court of Justice to dispose of repetitive and legally undemanding cases with a reasoned order in lieu of a judgment. This article analyses all published orders of the European Court of Justice to examine the use and the implications of Article 99 of the Rules of Procedure. It is the first article to do so. We find that the Court resorts to orders to save time and to halt repeated questions from the courts of a single Member State.
In: British journal of political science, Band 52, Heft 3, S. 1447-1454
ISSN: 1469-2112
AbstractThe interest group literature has long struggled with how to empirically approach the normative idea of a non-biased group system. While most previous attempts have focused on the descriptive representation of different types of groups, this article argues that substantive representation of citizens' attitudes is closer to the democratic principle of equal effective participation. It develops a methodological approach that captures substantive representation with respect to agenda priorities and policies by surveying interest groups on how much time they spend on lobbying in different policy areas, and in which direction they lobby on salient policy issues. The responses are compared with opinion data to estimate the level of political (in)equality. The findings from the case of Sweden – where relatively high levels of equality would be expected, but striking levels of inequality based on socio-economic status are instead found – highlight the perseverance of what Schattschneider once called the upper-class bias of the pressure system.
Litigation has long been a part of interest groups' lobbying tactics in the U.S. In Europe, by contrast, taking political conflicts to court has traditionally been viewed with skepticism. However, in the wake of an increasing judicialization of politics in Europe, litigation has also become part of the toolbox of European interest groups. Using original survey data from five European countries, we study how they use that tool. We show that European interest groups go to court somewhat less often than their American counterparts, but that the groups that do end up in court have similar characteristics. Overall, we find that the more politically active and resourceful a group is, the more likely it is to turn to the courts. However, a subset of politically active groups, one that deploys distinct outsider tactics, is more likely to use litigation than the rest. Government funding, however, reduces groups' propensity to litigate.
BASE
In: Journal of European public policy, Band 29, Heft 1, S. 78-96
ISSN: 1466-4429
In: Governance: an international journal of policy and administration, Band 34, Heft 4, S. 1235-1253
ISSN: 1468-0491
AbstractLitigation has long been a part of interest groups' lobbying tactics in the U.S. In Europe, by contrast, taking political conflicts to court has traditionally been viewed with skepticism. However, in the wake of an increasing judicialization of politics in Europe, litigation has also become part of the toolbox of European interest groups. Using original survey data from five European countries, we study how they use that tool. We show that European interest groups go to court somewhat less often than their American counterparts, but that the groups that do end up in court have similar characteristics. Overall, we find that the more politically active and resourceful a group is, the more likely it is to turn to the courts. However, a subset of politically active groups, one that deploys distinct outsider tactics, is more likely to use litigation than the rest. Government funding, however, reduces groups' propensity to litigate.
Posted: 17 Dec 2020 ; The benefits of timely justice and rigorous judicial argument are impossible to overstate and hard to reconcile. In its struggle to deliver both, the Court of Justice of the European Union has initiated several reforms of its procedures. The so-called adjudicating orders arguably achieve the impossible: They fast-track recurring questions while safeguarding legal coherence. The present article unpacks this premise. It shows that seemingly inconsequential procedural amendments, often overlooked by scholars, give the Court full control over relevant European legal problems, and centralize its power. Concretely, the analysis introduces a typology of orders of the Court, to demonstrate the unique legal character of adjudicating orders. It then investigates their effects against the backdrop of manifold procedural reforms and institutional adjustments. The findings indicate that the greatest efficiency gains follow reforms, which the Court initiates and implements in relative anonymity. Moreover, the use of adjudicating orders increases in response to a sudden and considerable increase of legally similar preliminary references from one Member State. An equal increase of references from the courts of several Member States has no such effect. The findings suggest that the Court uses adjudicating orders to disengage from 'local' problems and unilaterally terminate the conversations with resolute national courts. Thereby, the preliminary reference procedure, envisaged and promoted as a collaborative tool, transforms into a centralized mechanism of speedy and authoritative dispute resolution.
BASE
In: Comparative political studies: CPS, Band 53, Heft 6, S. 959-991
ISSN: 1552-3829
The mutual dependence between courts and their compliance constituencies is a fundamental feature of judicial power. Actors whose rights and interests are reinforced by court decisions may use these as legal ammunitions while contributing to ensuring that court decisions are effectively implemented. We argue that judgments that contain dissenting opinions are less powerful in this regard, compared with unanimous decisions. The reason is that dissent reduces the perceived legal authority of the judgment. Using data from the international human rights judiciaries in Europe and the Americas, we provide evidence of a negative relationship between judicial dissent and compliance. Our findings have important implications for questions relating to the institutional design of courts, for courts' ability to manage compliance problems, and for understanding the conditions for effective international judicial protection of human rights.
In: International studies quarterly: the journal of the International Studies Association, Band 63, Heft 3, S. 492-506
ISSN: 1468-2478
AbstractThe European Union (EU) offers an example of deep judicialization, where highly salient political values are adjudicated on a regular basis. In such contexts, political attention may shift from national sovereignty costs (the vertical dimension) to distributive conflicts within and between states (the horizontal dimension), creating a multidimensional legal policy space. We discuss the implications of this setting for judicial behavior and argue that it may create both opportunities and pitfalls for international judges, depending on how the dimensions are related. If the institutional interests of judges in promoting international law systematically favor some states over others on the horizontal dimension, judicial activism is likely to provoke feedback effects in the form of severe legitimacy problems. If the dimensions are unrelated, on the other hand, adjudicators become further empowered. We draw on a large dataset to show how the Court of Justice of the EU has been able to use divisions between states on the left-right dimension to enhance the legitimacy and autonomy of European law.
In: European Union politics: EUP, Band 21, Heft 1, S. 152-172
ISSN: 1741-2757
We assess the impact of the United Kingdom's 2016 decision to leave the European Union on the Council of the European Union, where Brexit is likely to have the clearest observable implications. Using concepts and models from the spatial model of politics and network analysis, we formulate and test expectations regarding the effects of Brexit. We examine two of the most prominent datasets on recent decision-making in the European Union, which include data on cooperation networks among member states before and after the 2016 referendum. Our findings identify some of the political challenges that Brexit will bring, but also highlight the factors that are already helping the European Union's remaining member states to adapt to Brexit.
In: International organization, Band 73, Heft 4, S. 927-927
ISSN: 1531-5088
In: International organization, Band 73, Heft 2, S. 469-488
ISSN: 1531-5088
AbstractGender stereotypes—stylized expectations of individuals' traits and capabilities based on their gender—may affect the behavior of diplomats and the processes of international negotiations. In a survey experiment in the Council of the European Union, we find that female representatives behaving stereotypically weak and vulnerable may trigger a chivalry reaction among male representatives, increasing the likelihood that the men will agree to support a bargaining proposal from the women. The effect is conditional on the negotiators' cultural background—the chivalry reaction is displayed mainly by diplomats from countries with relatively low levels of gender equality. Our study contributes to the research on nonstandard behavior in international relations, and in particular the expression and reception of emotions in diplomacy. We argue that gender stereotypes may have a moderating impact on decision making based on such intuitive cognitive processes. We also add to the broader negotiation literature, both by showing the pervasiveness of gender stereotyping, and by testing at the elite level the generalizability of claims regarding gender effects derived from laboratory experiments. Overall, our findings demonstrate the importance of bringing gender into the study of international negotiations, where it has been largely and surprisingly ignored.
In: International studies quarterly: the journal of the International Studies Association, Band 63, Heft 3, S. 449-530
ISSN: 1468-2478
World Affairs Online
In: Journal of common market studies: JCMS, Band 56, Heft 7, S. 1526-1543
ISSN: 1468-5965
AbstractHow has the research on the European Council and the Council of the EU engaged with Moravcsik's theory on liberal intergovernmentalism (LI)? This article analyzes 25 years of Council research. Most of this literature does not refer to LI, and a majority of the references that are made raise critique against LI. However, compared to other major works on European integration, LI is by far the most important source in the Council literature. Furthermore, a closer look at the most significant challenges raised against LI indicates that its account of intergovernmental bargaining in the EU is not in serious question. On the other hand, few studies provide systematic tests of the key assumptions of LI with regards to interstate bargaining. As a result, the self‐proclaimed status of LI as a baseline theory is confirmed in the Council literature more by implicit, somewhat reluctant, consent than by overt support.