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AbstractHow has the research on the European Council and the Council of the EU engaged with Moravcsik's theory on liberal intergovernmentalism (LI)? This article analyzes 25 years of Council research. Most of this literature does not refer to LI, and a majority of the references that are made raise critique against LI. However, compared to other major works on European integration, LI is by far the most important source in the Council literature. Furthermore, a closer look at the most significant challenges raised against LI indicates that its account of intergovernmental bargaining in the EU is not in serious question. On the other hand, few studies provide systematic tests of the key assumptions of LI with regards to interstate bargaining. As a result, the self‐proclaimed status of LI as a baseline theory is confirmed in the Council literature more by implicit, somewhat reluctant, consent than by overt support.

I argue that the transparency reforms that have been implemented in the Council of the EU in the last decades are unlikely to change the perception of the Council as a non-transparent institution. My argument is based on three distinctions: the distinction between transparency (availability of information) and publicity (spread and reception of information); between transparency in process and transparency in rationale; and between plenary and committee decision-making arenas in legislatures. While national parliaments tend to have all these features, the Council of the EU only has two (transparency in process and committee decision-making). As a consequence, publishing ever more documents and detailed minutes of committee meetings is unlikely to strengthen the descriptive legitimacy of the Council. Furthermore, I argue that the democratic transparency problem is the reverse of what is most often argued: It is not the lack of transparency that causes a democratic deficit, but the (perceived) lack of a democratic infrastructure that makes more serious transparency reforms unthinkable to government representatives.

I argue that the transparency reforms that have been implemented in the Council of the EU in the last decades are unlikely to change the perception of the Council as a non-transparent institution. My argument is based on three distinctions: the distinction between transparency (availability of information) and publicity (spread and reception of information); between transparency in process and transparency in rationale; and between plenary and committee decision-making arenas in legislatures. While national parliaments tend to have all these features, the Council of the EU only has two (transparency in process and committee decision-making). As a consequence, publishing ever more documents and detailed minutes of committee meetings is unlikely to strengthen the descriptive legitimacy of the Council. Furthermore, I argue that the democratic transparency problem is the reverse of what is most often argued: It is not the lack of transparency that causes a democratic deficit, but the (perceived) lack of a democratic infrastructure that makes more serious transparency reforms unthinkable to government representatives.

AbstractScholars have long emphasised the consensual nature of the intergovernmental negotiations in the Council of the European Union. Unlike other international organisations, where surface consensus has been found to be merely a cover for the dominance of powerful states, the EU literature describes a norm of generosity that works as a real constraining factor. In contrast, this article warns against descriptions of the EU as different in kind. Based on interviews with 231 EU Member State representatives involved in day‐to‐day negotiations in the Council, it finds a strong bias in generosity on behalf of the three dominant powers: France, Germany and the United Kingdom. The 'Big 3' are strikingly unwilling to make generous concessions, compared to other states. Furthermore, from a rational perspective, there are good reasons for expecting this pattern. The study also shows that extensive pooling of power in the form of qualified majority rule and hard law commitment is associated with less generosity, while there seems to be no socialising effect towards generosity from exposure to the 'Brussels community'. These findings cast a new light on the common narrative of the EU as a 'soft‐bargaining' anomaly among international organisations, where national interests are upgraded into common interests by a process of norm socialisation. Instead, it seems that the purported 'consensus norm' has been far from successful in transcending fundamental power asymmetries between the EU Member States.

This article contributes to the empirical turn in deliberative democratic theory, by studying the presence of arguing (discussion on the merits) and bargaining in the working groups of the Council of the European Union. It uses a survey of representatives of member states to analyse to what extent, under what circumstances, and by whom, arguing is used. The results indicate that arguing is indeed common in the Council working groups, but also that there is substantial variation. Most arguing is found in intergovernmental policy areas and by the most powerful and well-connected actors. The findings point to the conclusion that higher stakes and political pressure make actors less willing and able to engage in arguing. Adapted from the source document.

This article contributes to the empirical turn in deliberative democratic theory, by studying the presence of arguing (discussion on the merits) and bargaining in the working groups of the Council of the European Union. It uses a survey of representatives of member states to analyse to what extent, under what circumstances, and by whom, arguing is used. The results indicate that arguing is indeed common in the Council working groups, but also that there is substantial variation. Most arguing is found in intergovernmental policy areas and by the most powerful and well-connected actors. The findings point to the conclusion that higher stakes and political pressure make actors less willing and able to engage in arguing.

This article addresses the question of how to define, operationalise and measure empirically the concepts of arguing and bargaining, which are central to the normative theories of deliberative democracy. It points at, and proposes a solution to, one particularly difficult problem with respect to operationalisation, namely the distinction between arguing and cooperative forms of bargaining. The key to capturing this distinction is to look not only at whether, but also at why, actors give reasons for their positions. Motivations partly define arguing and bargaining as types of social decision procedure and it is difficult for researchers within the "empirical turn" of deliberative democratic theory to distinguish the two without studying the motives of the actors. The most straightforward way of analysing motives is asking people about them in interviews. An illustration of how the survey method can be used in practise is given from an ongoing research project on the Council of the European Union.

This article addresses the question of how to define, operationalise and measure empirically the concepts of arguing and bargaining, which are central to the normative theories of deliberative democracy. It points at, and proposes a solution to, one particularly difficult problem with respect to operationalisation, namely the distinction between arguing and cooperative forms of bargaining. The key to capturing this distinction is to look not only at whether, but also at why, actors give reasons for their positions. Motivations partly define arguing and bargaining as types of social decision procedure and it is difficult for researchers within the "empirical turn" of deliberative democratic theory to distinguish the two without studying the motives of the actors. The most straightforward way of analysing motives is asking people about them in interviews. An illustration of how the survey method can be used in practise is given from an ongoing research project on the Council of the European Union.