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This working paper presents findings from a study of network capital and cooperation patterns in the working groups of the Council of the European Union. Two successive rounds of telephone interviews with Council working group representatives from all member states were conducted in 2003 and 2006. It is demonstrated that some member states have a consistently higher stock of network capital (having close ties to a large number of powerful cooperation partners) than others, over time and across policy fields. Size explains a lot of this variation, but there is also room for actor-based factors. For small states in particular inter-personal trust seems to have a positive effect. The findings also indicate that cooperation patterns in the Council working groups follow geographical patterns. The dominant North-South dimension is consistent across policy fields. Rather than having one 'core' the EU15 Council revolved around a North (the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK) and a South (France, Italy, Spain) center, connected by Germany. The 2004 enlargement did not change this pattern, but only added new groups of countries to the periphery around the two main centers. There is evidence to suggest that the geographical cooperation patterns are mainly driven by cultural factors, rather than economic interests or political ideologies.

This article addresses the question of how to define, operationalise and measure empirically the concepts of arguing and bargaining, which are central to the normative theories of deliberative democracy. It points at, and proposes a solution to, one particularly difficult problem with respect to operationalisation, namely the distinction between arguing and cooperative forms of bargaining. The key to capturing this distinction is to look not only at whether, but also at why, actors give reasons for their positions. Motivations partly define arguing and bargaining as types of social decision procedure and it is difficult for researchers within the 'empirical turn' of deliberative democratic theory to distinguish the two without studying the motives of the actors. The most straightforward way of analysing motives is asking people about them in interviews. An illustration of how the survey method can be used in practise is given from an ongoing research project on the Council of the European Union. Adapted from the source document.

Der Beitrag zur Transparenz-Forschung erörtert die These, wonach bei empirischen Untersuchungen zwischen den Konzepten der Transparenz, Publicity und Verantwortlichkeit differenziert werden muss, um irreführende Schlussfolgerungen zur Signifikanz der Transparenz zu vermeiden. Nach der Veranschaulichung des theoretischen Arguments wird die Notwendigkeit dieser Unterscheidung an zwei Beispielen verdeutlicht: (1) dem Kampf gegen Korruption durch Transparenz und (2) der Frage nach der Unabhängigkeit und Verantwortlichkeit der Europäischen Zentralbank. Die Beispiele zeigen die Bedeutung der verschiedenen kausalen Mechanismen bei der Untersuchung von Transparenz und Publizität auf, deren Berücksichtigung sowohl für konzeptuelle Klarheit als auch für ein angemessenes Forschungsdesign in der empirischen sozialwissenschaftlichen Forschung sorgen. (ICG2)

The effect of transparency reforms on political decision making will be studied. According to some, transparency reforms have a positive effect by promoting public-spirited arguing instead of self-interested bargaining. Others however consider that transparency will push actors towards "distributive" rather than "integrative" bargaining, thus losing efficacy. A third hypothesis states that real decision making will leak from formal to non-formal (non-transparent) settings. Methodologically, observation of public versus closed meetings in the Council of Ministers & municipalities of Sweden & interviews will be employed. References. Adapted from the source document.

Thanks to new transparency rules and increased efforts by scholars, researchers are better equipped than ever before to analyze the decision-making processes of the Council of the European Union and to test old wisdoms. This book covers the most contentious areas and important debates in current research

AbstractThe interest group literature has long struggled with how to empirically approach the normative idea of a non-biased group system. While most previous attempts have focused on the descriptive representation of different types of groups, this article argues that substantive representation of citizens' attitudes is closer to the democratic principle of equal effective participation. It develops a methodological approach that captures substantive representation with respect to agenda priorities and policies by surveying interest groups on how much time they spend on lobbying in different policy areas, and in which direction they lobby on salient policy issues. The responses are compared with opinion data to estimate the level of political (in)equality. The findings from the case of Sweden – where relatively high levels of equality would be expected, but striking levels of inequality based on socio-economic status are instead found – highlight the perseverance of what Schattschneider once called the upper-class bias of the pressure system.

Litigation has long been a part of interest groups' lobbying tactics in the U.S. In Europe, by contrast, taking political conflicts to court has traditionally been viewed with skepticism. However, in the wake of an increasing judicialization of politics in Europe, litigation has also become part of the toolbox of European interest groups. Using original survey data from five European countries, we study how they use that tool. We show that European interest groups go to court somewhat less often than their American counterparts, but that the groups that do end up in court have similar characteristics. Overall, we find that the more politically active and resourceful a group is, the more likely it is to turn to the courts. However, a subset of politically active groups, one that deploys distinct outsider tactics, is more likely to use litigation than the rest. Government funding, however, reduces groups' propensity to litigate.

AbstractLitigation has long been a part of interest groups' lobbying tactics in the U.S. In Europe, by contrast, taking political conflicts to court has traditionally been viewed with skepticism. However, in the wake of an increasing judicialization of politics in Europe, litigation has also become part of the toolbox of European interest groups. Using original survey data from five European countries, we study how they use that tool. We show that European interest groups go to court somewhat less often than their American counterparts, but that the groups that do end up in court have similar characteristics. Overall, we find that the more politically active and resourceful a group is, the more likely it is to turn to the courts. However, a subset of politically active groups, one that deploys distinct outsider tactics, is more likely to use litigation than the rest. Government funding, however, reduces groups' propensity to litigate.

The mutual dependence between courts and their compliance constituencies is a fundamental feature of judicial power. Actors whose rights and interests are reinforced by court decisions may use these as legal ammunitions while contributing to ensuring that court decisions are effectively implemented. We argue that judgments that contain dissenting opinions are less powerful in this regard, compared with unanimous decisions. The reason is that dissent reduces the perceived legal authority of the judgment. Using data from the international human rights judiciaries in Europe and the Americas, we provide evidence of a negative relationship between judicial dissent and compliance. Our findings have important implications for questions relating to the institutional design of courts, for courts' ability to manage compliance problems, and for understanding the conditions for effective international judicial protection of human rights.

AbstractThe European Union (EU) offers an example of deep judicialization, where highly salient political values are adjudicated on a regular basis. In such contexts, political attention may shift from national sovereignty costs (the vertical dimension) to distributive conflicts within and between states (the horizontal dimension), creating a multidimensional legal policy space. We discuss the implications of this setting for judicial behavior and argue that it may create both opportunities and pitfalls for international judges, depending on how the dimensions are related. If the institutional interests of judges in promoting international law systematically favor some states over others on the horizontal dimension, judicial activism is likely to provoke feedback effects in the form of severe legitimacy problems. If the dimensions are unrelated, on the other hand, adjudicators become further empowered. We draw on a large dataset to show how the Court of Justice of the EU has been able to use divisions between states on the left-right dimension to enhance the legitimacy and autonomy of European law.

The preliminary reference procedure under which the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) responds to questions from national courts regarding the interpretation of EU law is a key mechanism in many accounts of the development of European integration and law. While the significance of the procedure has been broadly acknowledged, one aspect has been largely omitted: The opportunity for member state governments to submit their views ('observations') to the Court in ongoing cases. Previous research has shown that these observations matter for the Court's decisions, and thus that they are likely to have a significant impact on the course of European integration. Still, little is known about when and why member states decide to engage in the preliminary reference procedure by submitting observations. This article shows that there is significant variation, both between cases and between member states, in the number of observations filed. A theoretical argument is developed to explain this variation. Most importantly, a distinction is made between legal and political reasons for governments to get involved in the preliminary reference cases, and it is argued that both types of factors should be relevant. By matching empirical data from inter‐governmental negotiations on legislative acts in the Council of the EU with member states' subsequent participation in the Court procedures, a research design is developed to test these arguments. It is found that the decision to submit observations can be tied both to concerns with the doctrinal development of EU law and to more immediate political preferences. The conclusion is that the legal (the CJEU) and political (the Council) arenas of the EU system are more interconnected than some of the previous literature would lead us to believe. ; ISSN:0304-4130 ; ISSN:1475-6765

AbstractThe preliminary reference procedure under which the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) responds to questions from national courts regarding the interpretation of EU law is a key mechanism in many accounts of the development of European integration and law. While the significance of the procedure has been broadly acknowledged, one aspect has been largely omitted: The opportunity for member state governments to submit their views ('observations') to the Court in ongoing cases. Previous research has shown that these observations matter for the Court's decisions, and thus that they are likely to have a significant impact on the course of European integration. Still, little is known about when and why member states decide to engage in the preliminary reference procedure by submitting observations. This article shows that there is significant variation, both between cases and between member states, in the number of observations filed. A theoretical argument is developed to explain this variation. Most importantly, a distinction is made between legal and political reasons for governments to get involved in the preliminary reference cases, and it is argued that both types of factors should be relevant. By matching empirical data from inter‐governmental negotiations on legislative acts in the Council of the EU with member states' subsequent participation in the Court procedures, a research design is developed to test these arguments. It is found that the decision to submit observations can be tied both to concerns with the doctrinal development of EU law and to more immediate political preferences. The conclusion is that the legal (the CJEU) and political (the Council) arenas of the EU system are more interconnected than some of the previous literature would lead us to believe.

AbstractThere is broad agreement in the literature that international courts (ICs) make decisions with bounded discretion in relation to state governments. However, the scope of this discretion, and the determinants of its boundaries, are highly contested. In particular, the central mechanism in separation-of-powers models of judicial politics—the possibility of legislative override—has raised controversy. We argue that the uncertainty that judges face regarding the political reactions to their decisions has important and undertheorized implications for their behavior. On the one hand, cautious judges are likely to be attentive to signals that contain information about the probability of an unfavorable override. On the other hand, misjudgments of the political risks are likely to be made. Thus, the possibility of override is a significant factor affecting judicial behavior, but it is also a fairly blunt mechanism for balancing the independence and accountability of courts. The empirical study focuses on the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), which has long been at the center of theory development regarding the legalization of world politics and the rise of international courts. The results demonstrate a strong correlation between the CJEU's rulings and the political signals it receives, in a pattern that goes beyond legal merit, and that fits with the override mechanism. State governments are crucial parts of the broader audience that defines the political boundaries of judicial discretion.