Global Taxation, Global Reform, and Collective Action
In: Moral philosophy and politics, Band 1, Heft 1
ISSN: 2194-5624
9 Ergebnisse
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In: Moral philosophy and politics, Band 1, Heft 1
ISSN: 2194-5624
In: Critical review of international social and political philosophy: CRISPP, Band 18, Heft 3, S. 241-263
ISSN: 1743-8772
In: The review of politics, Band 75, Heft 2, S. 301-303
ISSN: 1748-6858
In: The journal of political philosophy, Band 21, Heft 4, S. 473-495
ISSN: 1467-9760
In: Politics, philosophy & economics, Band 12, Heft 3, S. 260-287
ISSN: 1741-3060
What counts as global 'harm'? This article explores this question through critical engagement with Thomas Pogge's conception of negative duties not to harm. My purpose here is to show that while Pogge is right to orient global moral claims around negative duties not to harm, he is mistaken in departing from the standard understanding of these duties. Pogge ties negative duties to global institutions, but I argue that truly negative duties cannot apply to such institutions. In order to retain the global force of negative duties, we need to dissociate these duties from global institutions: each society's negative duty to stop harming specific other societies ought to be seen as independent of global institutional change. In order to establish this thesis, I criticize both the features and the derivation of Pogge's variant of negative duties. I conclude that one must see global negative duties as applying to the relations between specific sovereign societies as unitary agents rather than to global institutions. I then show how this view of negative duties can yield significant global reform, based on Pogge's own accusations concerning democracies' conferral of trading privileges upon dictators who embezzle state resources. After presenting the normative, empirical, and strategic advantages of such reform, I anticipate Poggean objections. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]
In: The journal of political philosophy, Band 21, Heft 4, S. 473-495
ISSN: 0963-8016
In: The review of politics, Band 75, Heft 2, S. 301-303
ISSN: 0034-6705
In: The review of politics, Band 75, Heft 2, S. 301-303
ISSN: 0034-6705
In: Politics, philosophy & economics: ppe, Band 12, Heft 3, S. 260-287
ISSN: 1741-3060
What counts as global 'harm'? This article explores this question through critical engagement with Thomas Pogge's conception of negative duties not to harm. My purpose here is to show that while Pogge is right to orient global moral claims around negative duties not to harm, he is mistaken in departing from the standard understanding of these duties. Pogge ties negative duties to global institutions, but I argue that truly negative duties cannot apply to such institutions. In order to retain the global force of negative duties, we need to dissociate these duties from global institutions: each society's negative duty to stop harming specific other societies ought to be seen as independent of global institutional change. In order to establish this thesis, I criticize both the features and the derivation of Pogge's variant of negative duties. I conclude that one must see global negative duties as applying to the relations between specific sovereign societies as unitary agents rather than to global institutions. I then show how this view of negative duties can yield significant global reform, based on Pogge's own accusations concerning democracies' conferral of trading privileges upon dictators who embezzle state resources. After presenting the normative, empirical, and strategic advantages of such reform, I anticipate Poggean objections.