What is the global landpower network and what value might it provide?
In: Defense and security analysis, Band 33, Heft 3, S. 209-222
ISSN: 1475-1801
In: Defense and security analysis, Band 33, Heft 3, S. 209-222
ISSN: 1475-1801
In: Studies in comparative international development: SCID, Band 49, Heft 1, S. 44-66
ISSN: 1936-6167
In: International studies quarterly: the journal of the International Studies Association, Band 58, Heft 4
ISSN: 1468-2478
Conventional wisdom holds that voters in developing countries fail to punish pervasive pre-electoral fiscal manipulation. However, we argue that governments are unlikely to engage in pre-electoral fiscal manipulation when facing a high risk of speculative currency attacks. In particular, under fixed exchange rates, governments are less likely to engage in fiscal electioneering when either their real exchange rate is highly appreciated or their foreign exchange reserves are low. In contrast, under a flexible exchange rate, neither a country's real exchange rate nor its reserves affects governments' decision to engage in fiscal manipulation. Our argument receives support through a quantitative analysis of government budget balances in 97 developing countries from 1975 to 2005. Adapted from the source document.
In: International Studies Quarterly, Band 58, Heft 4, S. 828-838
In: Studies in comparative international development, Band 49, Heft 1, S. 1-139
ISSN: 0039-3606
World Affairs Online
In: British journal of political science, Band 43, Heft 4, S. 799-820
ISSN: 1469-2112
Elections, the defining feature of representative democracy, are generally considered domestic matters. However, elections are increasingly influenced by and conducted on the international stage, and migrants have become increasingly important political actors in home country elections. This article analyses the relationship between migrants' remittances and elections in their countries of origin, and argues that migrants' decisions to remit reflect their home countries' electoral calendars and political context. An analysis of remittance flows to eighty-one developing countries, 1990-2005, provides systematic evidence for the existence of political remittance cycles. Remittances increase in election years, an effect that is larger the more contested the election and the poorer the home country, suggesting an understudied link between developing countries' domestic politics and their citizens living abroad. Adapted from the source document.
In: British journal of political science, Band 43, Heft 4, S. 799-820
ISSN: 0007-1234
In: British journal of political science, Band 43, Heft 4, S. 799-820
ISSN: 1469-2112
Elections, the defining feature of representative democracy, are generally considered domestic matters. However, elections are increasingly influenced by and conducted on the international stage, and migrants have become increasingly important political actors in home country elections. This article analyses the relationship between migrants' remittances and elections in their countries of origin, and argues that migrants' decisions to remit reflect their home countries' electoral calendars and political context. An analysis of remittance flows to eighty-one developing countries, 1990–2005, provides systematic evidence for the existence of political remittance cycles. Remittances increase in election years, an effect that is larger the more contested the election and the poorer the home country, suggesting an understudied link between developing countries' domestic politics and their citizens living abroad.
In: British journal of political science, Band 41, Heft 2, S. 315-340
ISSN: 1469-2112
In a global economy, a country's international economic ties affect both how desirable pre-electoral fiscal manipulation is to the government, and how costly it is to the government to engage in such manipulation. Governments are more likely to engage in pre-electoral fiscal manipulation when the country's exchange rate is flexible and the domestic economy is highly open to international trade, and when the exchange rate is fixed and the domestic economy is relatively closed to international trade. This argument is tested empirically through a quantitative analysis of changes in government debt in twenty OECD countries from 1974 to 2008. Adapted from the source document.
In: British journal of political science, Band 41, Heft 2, S. 315-341
ISSN: 0007-1234
In: British journal of political science, Band 41, Heft 2, S. 315-340
ISSN: 1469-2112
In a global economy, a country's international economic ties affect both how desirable pre-electoral fiscal manipulation is to the government, and how costly it is to the government to engage in such manipulation. Governments are more likely to engage in pre-electoral fiscal manipulation when the country's exchange rate is flexible and the domestic economy is highly open to international trade, and when the exchange rate is fixed and the domestic economy is relatively closed to international trade. This argument is tested empirically through a quantitative analysis of changes in government debt in twenty OECD countries from 1974 to 2008.
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 72, Heft 3, S. 690-705
ISSN: 0022-3816
In: The Journal of Politics, Band 72, Heft 3
SSRN
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 72, Heft 3, S. 690-704
ISSN: 1468-2508
In: APSA 2009 Toronto Meeting Paper
SSRN
Working paper