Suchergebnisse

Elections, the defining feature of representative democracy, are generally considered domestic matters. However, elections are increasingly influenced by and conducted on the international stage, and migrants have become increasingly important political actors in home country elections. This article analyses the relationship between migrants' remittances and elections in their countries of origin, and argues that migrants' decisions to remit reflect their home countries' electoral calendars and political context. An analysis of remittance flows to eighty-one developing countries, 1990-2005, provides systematic evidence for the existence of political remittance cycles. Remittances increase in election years, an effect that is larger the more contested the election and the poorer the home country, suggesting an understudied link between developing countries' domestic politics and their citizens living abroad. Adapted from the source document.

Elections, the defining feature of representative democracy, are generally considered domestic matters. However, elections are increasingly influenced by and conducted on the international stage, and migrants have become increasingly important political actors in home country elections. This article analyses the relationship between migrants' remittances and elections in their countries of origin, and argues that migrants' decisions to remit reflect their home countries' electoral calendars and political context. An analysis of remittance flows to eighty-one developing countries, 1990–2005, provides systematic evidence for the existence of political remittance cycles. Remittances increase in election years, an effect that is larger the more contested the election and the poorer the home country, suggesting an understudied link between developing countries' domestic politics and their citizens living abroad.

In a global economy, a country's international economic ties affect both how desirable pre-electoral fiscal manipulation is to the government, and how costly it is to the government to engage in such manipulation. Governments are more likely to engage in pre-electoral fiscal manipulation when the country's exchange rate is flexible and the domestic economy is highly open to international trade, and when the exchange rate is fixed and the domestic economy is relatively closed to international trade. This argument is tested empirically through a quantitative analysis of changes in government debt in twenty OECD countries from 1974 to 2008. Adapted from the source document.

In a global economy, a country's international economic ties affect both how desirable pre-electoral fiscal manipulation is to the government, and how costly it is to the government to engage in such manipulation. Governments are more likely to engage in pre-electoral fiscal manipulation when the country's exchange rate is flexible and the domestic economy is highly open to international trade, and when the exchange rate is fixed and the domestic economy is relatively closed to international trade. This argument is tested empirically through a quantitative analysis of changes in government debt in twenty OECD countries from 1974 to 2008.

Central bank independence has been seen as an effective way to achieve low inflation. However, by increasing the likelihood that the government will adopt a fixed exchange rate rather than maintain domestic control over monetary policy, an independent central bank may be a victim of its own success. Because monetary policy set by an independent central bank may result in what the government considers to be adverse distributive consequences, governments may look for ways to mitigate the central bank's control over monetary policy, turning to a fixed exchange rate as one possible solution. The author examines the implications of this argument through an analysis of the British, German, and French governments' preferences on joining the European Monetary System in 1978.

Conventional wisdom holds that voters in developing countries fail to punish pervasive pre-electoral fiscal manipulation. However, we argue that governments are unlikely to engage in pre-electoral fiscal manipulation when facing a high risk of speculative currency attacks. In particular, under fixed exchange rates, governments are less likely to engage in fiscal electioneering when either their real exchange rate is highly appreciated or their foreign exchange reserves are low. In contrast, under a flexible exchange rate, neither a country's real exchange rate nor its reserves affects governments' decision to engage in fiscal manipulation. Our argument receives support through a quantitative analysis of government budget balances in 97 developing countries from 1975 to 2005. Adapted from the source document.